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ABSTRACT
New York City's Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) licenses
home improvement contractors and salesmen. DCA receives complaints
from consumers with respect to all types of goods and services, and
attempts in each case not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
another agency to resolve the complaint informally. Where a com-
plaint against a licensee cannot be resolved informally, a formal
hearing is held at which both the consumer and the licensee are
present and testify. They may also present witnesses and documen-
tary evidence. In home improvement cases DCA retains a special
inspector knowledgeable in construction matters who may be assigned,
either prior or subsequent to an initial hearing, to inspect the
job site, prepare a report, and be ready to testify at a hearing
as to whether the work conformed to contract specifications and, if
it did not, as to what additional work was necessary. Following
the initial or adjourned hearing the hearing officer prepares a
decision, which is reviewed and formally promulgated by a higher DCA
official, either exonerating the licensee or ordering him to provide
the consumer with a specific remedy (usually, completing or repair-
ing the job) within a specified time. The failure of the licensee
to either provide the specified remedy or to seek judicial review
of the decision within the allotted time may result in the suspen-
sion, and thereafter the revocation, of his license.
This study examines the formal structures, formal and infor-
mal procedures, characteristic decisions, actual results, and
associated costs of DCA's consumer redress process in home improve-
ment cases. It contrasts this process as to each of these aspects
with the process offered by New York City's small claims courts in
similar cases. The descriptions and analyses are based on a sample
of complaint files from each process, on a sample of DCA decisions,
on direct observation of a sample of DCA hearings, on less system-
atic observations of small claims court hearings and of various
aspects of both processes, and on interviews with officials, con-
sumers, and contractors who were involved in each process.
3The study concludes that both processes are equally effective,
that neither is dispensable, that the costs of both are reasonable
in view of their results, but that DCA provides higher quality fact-
finding and remediation and is used much more frequently. The DCA
process is recommended as a model for other jurisdictions. Sugges-
tions for improving both the DCA and the small claims court
processes in home improvement cases are also made.
Thesis Supervisors: Suzann R. Thomas Buckle and Leonard G. Buckle
Titles: Associate Professors of Urban Studies
and Planning
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6Textual Note
In this paper generic references to consumers will be to "she"
and to "her", while generic references to contractors will be to
"he" and to "him". This is to be understood simply as a convention.
Since there will be many abstract discussions of relations between
consumers and contractors, and since our language has two sets of
pronouns, there is good reason to utilize this linguistic facility
to simplify these discussions. When particular consumers are dis-
cussed, the appropriate pronoun will, of course, be used.
Footnotes are numbered consecutively and appear at the end of
the text.
7I. Introduction
A. Background of the Study
The question, "Does X have a legal right to a specific remedy?",
has meant to judges and most legal scholars, "How should a court rule
on X's claim (assuming the claim is properly before it)?" To X's
lawyer, that question has meant, "How is a court likely to rule if
and when I present it with X's claim?" For X, the same question
should mean, "Given what I expect to win from bringing my claim in
court, is any relief available to me at a reasonable cost?" I say
"should", because X may be under the illusion that her question is
the same as that of the judge's or lawyer's. However, any experience
the consumer has with using the legal system to "get what she is
entitled to" will quickly disabuse her.
When a consumer purchases a product or service which turns out
to be defective and the seller refuses to make the necessary repairs
or replacement, the cost to the consumer of obtaining redress in an
ordinary court is usually prohibitive. This is true even where the
amount of her loss is quite substantial (several hundred dollars or
more). For any but a very educated and self-confident person, a
lawyer is a necessity in navigating the formal court system, yet the
expected value of the consumer's recovery (the amount of her expect-
ed recovery, multiplied by the probability of her ever receiving it)
is rarely significantly more than her expected attorney's fee. 2
Furthermore, her attorney would typically demand a substantial por-
tion of his or her fee in advance of any recovery, recognizing that
most consumer cases which do not involve physical injury will not
generate large enough recoveries to make contingent fees profitable.3
8Some low-income people have access to government-provided lawyers.
Working class people, however, normally do not qualify for free
legal assistance.4
Small claims courts are available for consumer redress cases in
most jurisdictions. However, they: (1) generally require at least
two personal appearances, one to file the claim and the second
(absent a quick out-of-court settlement) to press it at the hearing;
(2) require filing, process-serving, and perhaps judgment-executing
fees (recoverable if and when a judgment is collected, but payable
well before that contingent event); (3) have strict jurisdictional
limits, typically $1000 or less; (4) despite efforts at informality,
favor the more articulate, organized, and aggressive person and tend
to intimidate people with little education or experience with the
system;5 and (5) where they do not produce settlements, result in
legal judgments which are frequently not collectable. 6
The great practical impediments to consumers using ordinary
courts to recover for economic (as opposed to physical) injuries,
and lesser but still significant impediments to their effective use
of small claims courts for this purpose, have two serious adverse
consequences. First, lower income consumers suffer disproportion-
ately. The amount of their unrecoverable loss is likely to be a
higher proportion of their income or net worth.7 Second, for those
businessmen who do not always treat consumers fairly from consider-
ations of conscience, concern for reputation, or desire to aviod un-
pleasantness,8 the absence of official coercive mechanisms which
predictably will force them to rectify injustices will likely result
9in less scrupulous performance of their obligations initially, and
a lesser willingness to settle informally any grievances which
thereafter arise.
Both of these consequences tend to be particularly frequent and
acute where consumers have developed problems with home improvement
contractors. The amounts of money involved are usually substantial.9
A consumer who does not obtain value for a significant proportion of
her investment has suffered a serious loss. By the same token, a
contractor who is asked to make good for this loss faces a much
greater strain on his good intentions than, say, an appliance outlet
confronting an aggrieved consumer.10 Furthermore, contractors are
unlike most other retailers. They do not have regularly staffed
offices at known locations with substantial assets on hand. There-
fore, they are more difficult to serve with legal process and more
difficult to collect from if they attempt to avoid paying adverse
legal judgments.
The problem of providing effective "alternative" low cost civil
justice delivery systems has attracted substantial attention recently.
Studies have been done of small claims courts, complaint handling
procedures by state Attorney Generals' offices,12 and assorted arbi-
tration and mediation schemes. 13 The inadequacies of the existing
mechanisms for remedying consumer complaints have been systematically
criticized. 4 Just this year, Congress adopted the Dispute Resolu-
tion Act, P.L. 96-390 (1980), in order to establish a clearinghouse
for information about such systems, and to provide seed money for
further experiments in implementing them.
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One alternative civil justice system, based on the power to
suspend or revoke home improvement contractors' licenses, has not
been studied. It is found in New York City and operated by the
City's Department of Consumer Affairs (hereinafter, DCA). Similar
systems may exist in other jurisdictions. This mechanism combines
a licensing requirement with low-cost access to licenses, mediation
of consumer complaints against licensees, a special inspection pro-
cedure for neutral and expert fact-finding, and a hearing procedure
for complaints not resolved informally. The hearing procedure is
backed up by sanctions when the contractor does not obey a remedial
order issued as a result of a hearing. DCA can suspend or revoke
his license, and once revoked, there is the possibility of subse-
quent judicial injunction or criminal prosecution against the ex-
licensee.
DCA's system has several structural advantages over those which
have been studied. Unlike prosecutors' offices, DCA can proceed past
the stages of letters and phone calls, entreaties, arguments, and
bluffs,16 even where no criminal intent on the part of the contrac-
tor is manifest and where a decision in favor of the consumer is
unlikely to have broad social impact. Unlike arbitration and media-
tion schemes, it does not require the businessman's voluntary
acquiescence. Finally, unlike small claims courts, it is able to
(1) order contractors to complete the job or repair defects, rather
than being restricted to monetary judgments; (2) avoid the necessity
for the consumer to pay a filing fee or make a personal appearance,
unless a formal hearing becomes necessary; (3) resolve disagreements
over whether or how the work was done through the report of an
11
official inspector, as opposed to a judge's or arbitrator's estima-
tion of which party was more credible; and (4) knowledgeably enforce
standards of conduct it has created for the home improvement industry.
B. The Present Study
The present study has two related purposes. The first is to
determine the extent to which DCA's consumer redress process for home
improvement complaints realizes in practice the structural advantages
described in the preceding section. The second purpose is to evalu-
ate whether this process provides a service worth continuing in New
York City and worth emulating in other jurisdictions with respect to
home improvement contractors, and perhaps in other contexts as well.
This study describes, analyzes, and compares, along various
quantitative and qualitative dimensions, the processes available at
DCA and in New York City's small claims courts for handling such
complaints. The performance of the small claims courts has been used
to provide baseline data for several reasons. Small claims courts
in general, and New York City's small claims courts in particular,17
have been studied widely.18 They are the "alternative" dispute
resolution forums most often mentioned when consumer justice is dis-
cussed. They therefore provide a familiar point of reference for
describing and comparing a less well known alternative. Furthermore,
aside from the "ordinary" courts, the small claims courts provide
the only forums other than DCA's in which the dissatisfied purchaser
of a home improvement in New York City can try to obtain a remedial
order which is legally binding upon the contractor. This jurisdic-
tional similarity facilitates comparisons. Finally, comparing the
12
structure, processes, and results obtainable in the two forums may
bring into focus some of the relative strengths and weaknesses of
"judicial" versus "administrative" tribunals.
I spent the first six months of 1979 gathering information,
including systematic data, about how small claims court and DCA
handle consumer complaints against home improvement contractors.
I interviewed the relevant personnel, sat in on hearings, studied
case files, and spoke with consumers and contractors. The remainder
of this paper reflects the results of this study.
The structure and procedures of New York City's small claims
courts and of DCA will be described in Chapter II, to the extent
that these are relevant to the disposition of consumer complaints
against home improvement contractors. Chapter III describes how I
went about collecting systematic data on the functioning and effec-
tiveness of the two processes. Statistical analysis of some of
this data will be used in Chapter IV to estimate the effectiveness
of the two forums and to facilitate comparisons between them.
Chapter V begins by describing the remedial capabilities and
practices of "ordinary" courts and comparing them with those of
small claims courts and of DCA. The remedies offered by the latter
two tribunals are then evaluated by comparing actual and optimal
remedies for the full range of typical consumer grievances against
home improvement contractors. This section of the chapter, and the
concluding section recommending improvements in the remedial powers
and procedures of both forums, draw heavily on cases from the col-
lected data. Chapter VI contains cost/benefit analyses of the two
forums, along with recommendations with respect to preserving small
13
claims court and DCA jurisdiction in New York City and replicating
the latter elsewhere. Finally, Chapter VII analyzes the applica-
bility of consumer redress hearings by licensing authorities beyond
the context of home improvement cases, and concludes with some
consequent reflections on the institution of licensing.
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II. Processes of Consumer Redress: Small Claims Court vs. DCA
This chapter examines what is involved for the consumer in
making use of each forum, and what goes on "backstage" when the
consumer does so. Since an understanding of procedures requires a
familiarity with the structures in which they take place, the des-
cription of the procedures in each forum will be preceded by a
brief explanation of the way in which each forum is organized.
A. Small Claims Court Structure
There are six small claims courts in New York City, one in
each borough and an extra one in Manhattan, serving Harlem. All
are administratively part of the Civil Court of the City of New York.
All but the Harlem court are located on the same premises as the
remaining Parts of the Civil Court in their respective boroughs.
In 1978 the Brooklyn court handled 17,060 claims, Queens 16,329,
Manhattan 15,967, the Bronx 8,480, Staten Island 3,202, and Harlem
1,416, for a city-wide total of 62,463 claims.19 Clerk's offices
are open every day during business hours, and one evening per week
in Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Harlem. The court sessions are
held entirely on weekday evenings, beginning at 6:30 p.m.: 4 even-
ings per week in Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan, 3 evenings per
week in the Bronx, one evening per week in Harlem, and one evening
15
every other week in Staten Island. The cases at each session are
heard by a presiding judge, sometimes a back-up judge (2 evenings
per week in Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan, one evening per week
in the Bronx), and between five and eight arbitrators, who are
attorneys who serve about one evening per month on a volunteer
basis. About 30 people staff the various clerk's offices, and
about another 25 (not counting decision-makers) assist at the even-
ing sessions.
The jurisdiction of these courts is limited to "any cause of
action for money only not in excess of one thousand dollars exclusive
of interest and costs..." 20 Thus, a claimant who has suffered more
than $1000 damage must whittle his claim down to that amount or fore-
go using small claims court. Nor can he obtain an order from the
court requiring the defendant to do a specific task such as to com-
plete a home improvement contract. He must settle instead for
"damages", the closest possible monetary equivalent to what he would
have received had the defendant performed. Furthermore, while small
claims courts can order a defendant to pay a money judgment, they can-
not punish him for disobeying. They are relegated in such cases to
issuing an authorization (called an "execution") to a sheriff or
marshall empowering him to seize and sell enough of the defendant's
property to satisfy the judgment plus collection costs.21 The small
claims court in each borough has jurisdiction only if the claimant
lives in that borough or if the defendant lives or has his place of
business in that borough; however, regardless of the claimant's
residence the court will not have jurisdiction if the defendant
neither resides nor has his place of business in New York City.22
16
These courts also do not have jurisdiction if the claimant is a
partnership or a corporation, thus keeping out most of the collection
cases which swamp other small claims courts.23 The small claims
courts are enjoined to determine claims "in accordance with the rules
and principles of substantive law".24 Appeals can be taken "on the
sole grounds that substantial justice has not been done between the
parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law",25
but since no court stenographers are provided for arbitrators, parties
wishing to have their cases heard by an arbitrator must waive even
this limited appellate right.
B. Small Claims Court Procedures
Small claims court procedures, unlike those at DCA, are the
same regardless of the type of case involved. The experience of the
consumer suing a home improvement contractor will therefore be simi-
lar to that of any other claimant no matter what the claim.
The consumer, or a friend acting on her behalf, must file her
claim in person at the clerk's office of the court in which she
wishes to sue. She is instructed by a large sign to fill out a form,
called a "Request for Information", before getting in line. The form
has places for "Name and Address of Party Being Sued", "Name and
Address of Party Suing", "Amount: $ '' (a note at the top of
the forms states "Maximum: $1,000.00"), and "State Your Claim Here".
Five lines are provided for the statement of claim, but there is
plenty of blank space on the bottom and the back of the form for
claimants to continue their statements.
17
The consumer then brings the form to the counter. About half
the time she has to wait on a short line, but the wait is rarely
more than 10 minutes.26 At the counter the clerk on duty goes over
the information with the claimant. The first item on the form,
"Name and Address of Party Being Sued", is surprisingly often a
stumbling block. A non-corporate defendant must be sued in his in-
dividual or partnership name rather than in the name (such as "Acme
Contractors") under which his company may have dealt with the con-
sumer. Corporations must be sued in the precise corporate name.
Information on the "legal" name of both corporate and non-corporate
businesses is easily available at the County Clerk's office of the
borough where the business is conducted (in Brooklyn for example
this is two blocks from the small claims court), and consumers who
are not convinced that they have the correct legal name of the
contractor are detoured there at this point.27 If the consumer has
not filled in an "Amount", or if the clerk cannot make sense of the
written statement of claim, some discussion will take place around
these items as well. The clerks are acutely aware that they have
not been trained in the law, and are reluctant to give claimants
anything resembling legal advice. Their concern with the consumer's
statement of claim is rather that they have to fill in an item on
the back of the file card labelled "Cause of Action", and therefore
must understand the consumer's statement well enough to be able to
decide what to write.
The clerk then collects $3.40 in cash from the consumer ($2.00
filing fee, + $1.40 postage for the certified mail notice that goes
to the defendant), and proceeds to fill in the names of the parties
18
and the "cause of action" on the 5" x 8" file card, which becomes
the principal record in the case (the "Request for Information"
forms are stored for about 6 months, and then thrown away). The
consumer signs the card below the place where the clerk has para-
phrased her statement of claim, frequently condensing a 50-word or
longer statement of claim into a four-word "cause of action" such
as "$850 Breach of Warranty" or "$250 Return of Deposit". The clerk
then informs her of the hearing date. The hearing is generally
about a month after the claim has been filed.28 The consumer is
not given a choice of dates. The clerk may also give her some last
words of advice, typically that she should bring her papers with her
(in cases where documentary evidence is crucial) or that she should
bring along an expert or a paid bill (required in cases where she is
alleging damage to her property). Needless to say, some clerks are
more forthcoming than others, and at least in Brooklyn they vary in
attitude from polite and helpful to snippy and short. Claimants are
not, however, encouraged to air their questions about what the hear-
ing will be like; rather, they are told where to report next, and
that further instructions will await them when they arrive.
The next day a clerk sends out a formal notice to the defendant,
by certified mail, return receipt requested, instructing him that
the claimant "ask judgment in this Court against you for $
together with costs upon the following claim: ."
The clerk fills in the amount and the claim exactly as it is written
in the "Cause of action" section on the back of the card. Defendant
is presumably familiar with the claimant and she has almost always
complained to him directly before filing her claim. Therefore the
19
identification of the claimant on the notice, along with her address,
and an otherwise cryptic statement of her claim, is generally suffi-
cient to remind the defendant of her complaint. The notice goes on to
inform the defendant of the date, time and place of the hearing, and
that he may present his defense and any counterclaim he may desire at
the hearing. It also informs him that a default judgment will be en-
tered if he does not appear, that if he has any "witnesses, account
books, receipts or other documents" which support his defense or
counterclaim he should bring them to the hearing, that if he requests
before the hearing the clerk will issue subpoenas without fee, and
that "Corporation defendants may appear by an officer or major stock-
holder, but Voluntary Associations must appear by attorney."
If the notice is returned from the post office "undelivered"
(meaning defendant was not home when the postman arrived, and did not
respond to the notice which the postman left in his mailbox to come
to the post office to pick up a certified letter) the Clerk's Office
mails it out again for a second try. If, however, it is returned
marked "refused" (meaning defendant told a postal service employee
that he would not accept the letter), it is treated as a complete
service of process. If the notice is neither delivered nor refused
on the second try, the claimant is notified and given a chance to
attempt a personal service. This can be done by any adult other than
herself, including a professional process-server. If this is success-
ful, the person who actually served the defendant files an affidavit
of service with the Clerk's Office.
Since hearings are initially scheduled within a month of the
filing of the claim, any significant delay in service requires that
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the hearing be adjourned. The parties can also get the hearing
adjourned by mutual agreement, and defendant is always given at
least one adjournment by the court upon request. Actually, a savvy
defendant can get two adjournments almost automatically. He can get
the first by asking that the case be heard "by the Court" when it is
called on the original hearing date. An adjournment is virtually
assured because the judge's hearing time (from about 7 p.m., when he
finishes the calendar call, until about 10, when everyone leaves) will
be taken up with cases that have previously been adjourned, and hence
moved to the top of that day's calendar. The second time around he
makes his motion for an adjournment; if the claimant objects vigor-
ously, the judge marks the new date "final against defendant",
alerting the judge who sits that date that another easy adjournment
should not be granted.
Many cases are settled soon after the defendant receives his
notice to appear.29 If , however, the case is neither settled nor
adjourned before the hearing day, the claimant arrives at the court,
typically with at least one other member of the family as a witness
or for moral support, sometime before 6:30 on the appointed day.30
In Brooklyn, a sign sends her up a flight of stairs to a smoky lobby,
where another sign on a door indicates "Small Claims Courtroom". By
6:30 there are usually more than 200 people sitting in the courtroom
on wooden benches, while another 40 or 50 stand in the back. These
include claimants and defendants, their spouses, grown children, and
friendly witnesses (subpoenas are rare). A half dozen attorneys,
usually representing insurance companies that will be liable if the
defendant loses in motor vehicle property damage cases, stand in the
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front or the aisles of the courtroom shouting out the names of their
clients (whom they frequently have not met before). A senior court
clerk takes a seat at the bench, next to where the judge will sit.
Two other clerks, a stenographer, and two uniformed court officers
mill around or settle down at desks on the other side of the railing
from the people on the benches.
Between 6:30 and 6:45 the judge enters, the court officer orders
people to rise and to put away newspapers and stop talking, and when
those with seats have sat down the senior clerk begins the calendar
call. First he instructs the litigants that they waive their right
to appeal if they go before an arbitrator, but usually adds that the
judge only gets through two or three cases each night whereas the
arbitrators generally finish their calendars.
Litigants are told to call out their names when their case is
called. They are sometimes also told to say "By the court!" if they
want the judge to hear the case, or "Application!" if they want an
adjournment. Other times they are left to figure this out for them-
selves. The cases are called by name rather than number. If only
the claimant responds the clerk says "Inquest, go to the other room".
An inquest is a brief hearing at which the arbitrator considers a
claimant's evidence before issuing her a default judgment. Since
there is no reason why a claimant should know what "inquest" means,
she often looks bewildered when the clerk makes this statement, but
the clerk is on to the next case before she can collect her wits
and ask him what it means. Generally, someone sitting near the
claimant who knows the ropes directs her next door, and assures her
it is o.k. If both sides respond they are also sent to the next
22
room, unless one or both say "By the court!" or "Application!" in
which case they are both instructed to wait until the end of the
calendar call. If only the defendant responds he is told to go
home, that he has won his case. If neither party responds the
clerk mumbles "Dismissed" and states the time, which a junior clerk
enters on the file card. Claimants may also be told that their
case is dismissed because service was not completed, or because
their affidavit of service was defective, or perhaps for some even
more arcane reason; they are told if they have any questions about
the disposition they should see the clerk during business hours.
After the calendar has been called (generally about 7:00), the
clerk goes through it again, picking up the "Applications" (generally
for adjournments or to reopen default judgments) which the judge
proceeds to dispose of. Once they have been sorted through the judge
begins to hear cases. If there is a second judge on that evening he
can begin hearing cases earlier, even before the first calendar call
is completed.
Meanwhile, the room next door, which seats about 100 people, has
begun to fill up. About 10 minutes into the calendar call a clerk
takes the file cards of the parties who had been sent to "the room
next door", the arbitration and "inquest" cases, and sets up shop
behind a railing in the front of that room. She checks how many
arbitrators have shown up and been sworn in by the judge, makes sure
they are each settled into a small hearing room (with a small
judicial bench at one end, and a table with six or seven chairs
facing it), makes each party address an envelope to himself (in which
a copy of the arbitrator's decision will be sent the next day), and
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then directs the parties to the various hearing rooms. People wait
outside the hearing rooms until the arbitrator has finished the
previous case; the clerk or a court officer checks the backlog every
once in a while to keep the hall from getting too crowded. While the
calendar call is continuing in the courtroom batches of file cards
are brought from there to the next-door assignment room. The back-up
in the assignment room can last until about 9:00, and in the hallway
outside the hearing rooms until about 9:30.
The arbitrators in Brooklyn are generally older, and sometimes
semi-retired, attorneys, unpaid volunteers who serve about one even-
ing per month. On a typical evening there are about five arbitrators,
and each one hears perhaps four or five inquests and as many trials.
At an inquest the arbitrator asks the claimant to explain her
claim and show him whatever evidence she has. He will then award the
claimant as large a judgment (up to $1000) as her evidence -- docu-
mentary, oral, and/or expert -- will support. This is subject, at
least in Brooklyn, to the rule that property damage must be demon-
strated by a paid bill or the testimony of an expert as to the value
of the damage: I observed two cases, both of which had already
been adjourned once on other grounds, in which a judgment was denied
and another adjournment ordered because the consumer had brought
neither a paid bill nor an expert. Most inquests are very brief,
with the claimant standing at the bench giving the facts to the
arbitrator, who is in turn busy filling out the "Inquest" card
(which gets stapled to the file card) giving her the default judgment.
At a trial, on the other hand, both parties sit down along with
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any family members and witnesses they may have brought, and with their
lawyer (if any). The arbitrator begins the hearing with an explana-
tion that he cannot hear the case unless both sides waive their right
to appeal. The arbitrators always go through this waiver ritual with
great solemnity, in an effort to guarantee that the parties are fully
aware of the consequences of what they are doing.32 This careful
warning frequently (several times in my personal observation) makes
one or the other party bolt, refusing to sign so as to preserve his
or her newly discovered right of appeal. The parties then return to
the clerk who assigned them the arbitrator, who must now give them a
new trial date several weeks later (since the judge or judges
assigned for the evening are fully booked with cases for that even-
ing at this point in the proceedings).
Further complications and frustrations follow from the refusal
to waive. First, if either party felt the need to bring family
members, witnesses, or a lawyer the first evening, he or she will
probably do the same the second evening, producing additional
inconvenience and expense. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the
defendant will return on the adjourned date (I encountered several
cases in my evenings at the court, and in calling consumers in my
sample, in which he did not). The second date may turn out to be
inconvenient for him, or he may simply decide that one wasted
evening is enough. While the consumer will then get an inquest,
and likely a default judgment, this is not necessarily the victory
it appears to be since about half of all small claims court judg-
ments are never collected.33 In contrast, where a trial proceeds
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past the waiver point, settlement negotiations may take place, and
practically all settlements reached in small claims court are
carried out.34 Finally, even if both parties appear at the ad-
journed trial date, and one of them remembers to say '"By the Court!"
when the case is called, and the case is in fact heard by a judge that
day (the latter assumption is a realistic one, since adjourned cases
are put at the beginning of the calendar), and the judge decides the
case against the party who refused to waive his or her right of
appeal, an appeal is most unlikely, since the party taking the
appeal must pay for a transcript and an attorney.35
Once both parties have given the written consent to arbitration
on the "Arbitration" card, the arbitrator swears in everyone who
intends to testify, and the testimony begins. The claimant begins
to tell her story. The arbitrator may interrupt for clarification.
The defendant or his witnesses sometimes interrupt with impromptu
rebuttal or cross-examination, but they are generally told by the
arbitrator to wait their turn. If the defendant has an attorney --
typically, only in "fender-bender" cases, where he has been
retained by defendant's insurer -- the attorney may make evidentiary
objections such as "That's just hearsay!", which the arbitrator
usually overrules with a comment like, "This is small claims court,
you know". After the claimant concludes, defendant is permitted to
cross-examine. Next, the claimant's witness if any (who may have
been sent out of the room when the claimant gave her testimony) goes
through his or her story, followed by cross-examination. Then the
same thing happens with the defendant and any witness he may have.
After the testimony is complete the arbitrator dismisses the parties,
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telling them they will hear of his decision in a couple of days. The
arbitrator writes out his "award" on the Arbitration card, filling in
the blanks on " is entitled to recover from
the sum of $ ", signs the card in five places, and calls
in the parties waiting for the next case. The process usually takes
about 20 minutes, but cases where the testimony is complicated can
extend beyond an hour.
At any point in the hearing, but most likely at the beginning,
the arbitrator may try to negotiate a settlement. Many of the cases
originally scheduled for hearing that day have, of course, been
settled prior to the calendar call. If the clerk has been so inform-
ed, the senior clerk will intone 'Thrked settled" after he calls the
name of the case, while if he has not been so informed there will be
no response to the call of the case, and it will be marked "dismissed
-- no appearance either side". Additional cases are settled as the
parties stand around together waiting for the case to be heard. But
there is still room for a skillful or persistent arbitrator to obtain
a settlement at the hearing from parties who have not done so on their
own. He may do this by developing the areas of agreement between them
and emphasizing the narrowness of the remaining differences, by warn-
ing each party that he stands to lose the whole amount of the claim
if the arbitration proceeds whereas he can cut his potential losses
by settling, or by requesting each party (and his entourage) to
leave the room in turn while obtaining a "last offer" from the other
party, in the hope that these last offers will at least match.
If a settlement is reached, the parties are asked to sign a
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"Stipulation of Settlement" form unless payment is made on the spot.
The form has a place for them to state when and how the agreed sum
is to be paid. It provides that upon 15 days default in payment,
the claimant, by filing an affidavit, "shall be entitled to enter
judgment without further notice to the defendant, for the amount
sued for, together with interest, costs, and disbursements". While
the settlement form contemplates cash settlements, it can be used
for other types of settlements. Examples of the latter include
"Defendant pays $900 by 12/10/78 unless defendant completes
aluminum installation on the rear wall at /claimant's addresy " and
"$508 to be paid to defendant upon completion of installation of
overhead doors by defendant (height of door to remain at 6'1" and
door shall not roll down)". 36
If the case goes to judgment, either after an inquest or after
a trial before an arbitrator or a judge, both parties are notified
by mail. The defendant is instructed to pay the claimant any
amount awarded her, but as often as not he ignores the instruction.37
The claimant, in turn, is informed by the notice that if the
defendant fails to pay the judgment she should go to a sheriff or
marshall for help. When she does, they inform her that she must
supply them with the information as to where property belonging to
the defendant can be found, or where he is employed.
This is often the end of the road for the claimant, and
especially so for the consumer who has a judgment against a home
improvement contractor. Most home improvement contractors are
either self-employed or only sporadically employed, so an "income
execution" (of 10% of his salary, if his salary is above $85/week)
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will not work. While the contractor may have a bank account or own
a truck, for example, it may be in his own name or his spouse's
name, while the consumer's judgment is against his corporate name.
In any case, the consumer, with no one to help her, may have no idea
how to track these assets down. Thus, only 46% of the small claim
property executions received by the sheriff's offices in New York
City in 1975 resulted in the satisfaction of the claimants' judg-
ments,38 and since the sheriff requires a $10 "mileage" deposit
from the claimant (returned to the claimant if the judgment is
satisfied) as well as the information on the location of defendant's
assets before he even attempts an execution, the actual proportion
of "successful" claimants (also known as "judgment creditors") who
ever collect from unwilling defendants is actually much less than
46%. 39
One other collection device, available if the defendant is a DCA
licensee and the judgment has not been satisfied within 30 days of its
issuance, is to file a complaint with DCA. DCA will inform the
licensee of his obligation to pay the judgment under its General
Regulation 7 (See Appendix C), hold a consumer redress hearing if he
fails to do so, issue an order following the hearing requiring him
to pay within a short additional time, and suspend and, if necessary,
revoke his license if he continues not to comply. The difficulty with
this device is that most judgment creditors do not know of its
existence and would not know which categories of businesses are sup-
posed to be licensed. Efforts at providing claimants with this and
similar information useful in collecting their judgments, such as
one sponsored by DCA and another run by NYPIRG and sponsored by
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Citibank, have lost their funding and lapsed. Furthermore, if my
small sample is any indication, 40 this device is not necessary
(except perhaps as an unspoken goad or deterrent) in the case of
licensees, while it is necessary but not applicable in the case of
non-licensees.
C. DCA Structure
The Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) of the City of New York
had 325 employees and a budget of about $4.4 million in 1979.
Established in 1968, it is the successor to the City's Departments
of Markets and Licenses and retains much of their respective
jurisdictions over weights and measures and many categories of reg-
ulated businesses. It is however, also responsible for enforcing a
series of more modern consumer protection laws (which its officials
past and present had a hand in drafting), handling consumer complaints,
contributing to consumer education (as by researching consumer abuses
and publicizing the results), proposing legislation, and generally
doing whatever it can by way of public relations to enhance the
incumbent Mayor's image (any incumbent Mayor's image) as a committed
and powerful champion of the City's consumers. DCA is housed on the
first four floors of an older office building in downtown Manhattan,
but has small field offices for handling consumer complaints in Queens,
Brooklyn, and Staten Island.
Only about 95 of DCA employees are directly involved with any
stage of the processes by which home improvement contractors and sales-
men get licensed, and by which consumers' complaints against such con-
tractors and salesmen (whether licensed or unlicensed) are dealt with.
30
This includes in the latter the process by which unresolved complaints
against licensees are submitted to consumer redress hearings for
resolution. Sixty of these employees work in the Licensing Division,
and 13% of the licenses they issue are for home improvement contrac-
tors or salesmen.
The Home Improvement Business Law, adopted in 1968, provides
"No person shall solicit, canvass, sell, perform or obtain a home
improvement contract as a contractor or salesman from an owner with-
out a license therefor."42 As DCA licenses go, these two types are
fairly easy to obtain. A salesman must pay $50 ($25/year for a two-
year license), get himself fingerprinted at a police station, submit
a letter from his employer attesting to his employment as a salesman
and three passport-size photographs of himself. He must fill out an
application form which asks about previous licenses held, whether
any such license has been denied, cancelled, suspended or revoked,
and about past criminal convictions. A contractor must pay $100
($50/year for a two-year license), submit the fingerprints and photos,
a copy of any trade name or partnership certificate or corporate
papers, a copy of his workman's compensation insurance certificate,
and his state sales tax identification numbers. He must fill out an
application form listing partners or corporate officers, salesmen
and their license numbers, prior licenses held (stating whether they
were ever denied, cancelled, suspended or revoked), prior criminal
convictions, and any relevant prior experience or education of the
owner(s) of the business, as well as stating whether any small
claims judgments have been outstanding against the applicant for
more than 30 days.
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DCA's discretion to deny a license once the required items are
submitted is quite limited. DCA's General Regulation 7 requires it
to deny a license to an applicant who admits to having an outstanding
30-day old small claims judgment against him which has not been
stayed or appealed, and which he is not in the process of paying off
pursuant to an arrangement with the judgment creditor.43  It must
also deny either type of license if the applicant is not "over 18
years of age and of good character".44  Doubts as to his good
character may be occasioned by admissions on his application form as
to criminal convictions or problems with earlier licenses, or police
information about the former and departmental records as to the
latter. Where such doubts are raised, DCA must offer the applicant
a hearing (before the same group of hearing officers who conduct
consumer redress hearings) as to the accuracy of the adverse
information and its relevance to the license sought prior to denying
the license on this ground.
The principal practical importance of this character requirement
is that it gives DCA some leverage against non-licensees and ex-
licensees who are applying for licenses and who have outstanding com-
plaints against them. If a prior license was revoked for failure to
comply with a DCA consumer redress order, or if the Licensing
Division has been alerted by another division to hold any future
license application,45 the Advocacy Division (an office with about
eight lawyers, whose principal responsibility is bringing civil
litigation under DCA's general Consumer Protection Law) is brought
into the case to oppose the application or, if possible, to negotiate
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a settlement with the applicant under which the Advocacy Division will
withdraw its opposition once he satisfies the outstanding complaints.
What is most striking about the -rules under which DCA licenses
home improvement contractors and salesmen is that, while the DCA asks
the applicant about prior education or experience, it has no authority
to deny a license on the basis of lack of relevant education or
experience. What this means is that the strongest bite of DCA's
home improvement licensing is not in the conditions for obtaining a
license but in the conditions for retaining it.
The Home Improvement Business Law of 1968 (Appendix A) sets out
a series of 12 "Prohibited Acts", 46 and the regulations promulgated
by DCA (Appendix B) pursuant to authority given it in 1973 sets out
an additional seven requirements for home improvement contractors,
some of them quite complex. These are supplemented by six "General
Regulations" applicable to all DCA licensees (Appendix C). Broadly
speaking, these require contractors to complete their contracts as
agreed, refrain from deceptive practices, put particular information
and assurances in their contracts (including three-day consumer's
option cancellation clauses), obtain necessary governmental permits
for their jobs, pay their small claims court judgments, and comply
with various regulatory bookkeeping requirements.
The DCA derives its authority to hold consumer redress hearings
from sec. 773-4.0(e) of the License Enforcement Act of 1973 (Appendix
D). This Act became Title A of Chapter 32 of the Administrative Code
of the City of New York -- the same Chapter in which the Home
Improvement Business Law (and the other licensing laws administered
by DCA) appears. This paragraph provides:
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e. The commissioner shall be authorized, upon due notice and
hearing, to suspend, revoke or cancel any license issued by
him in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and...
the commissioner or the commissioner's designee may impose or
institute fines of not more than three hundred and fifty
dollars nor less than five dollars for each violation of this
chapter and regulations and rules promulgated under it; the
commissioner may arrange for the redress of injuries caused by
such violations, and may otherwise provide for compliance with
the provisions and purposes of this chapter and with regulations
and rules promulgated under this chapter. The commissioner or
the commissioner's designee shall be authorized to suspend the
license of any person pending payment of such fine or to
suspend a license or both for a failure to appear at a hearing
at the department after due notice of such hearing. If a
license has been suspended, it shall be returned to the
department forthwith upon receipt of the order of suspension.
Failure to surrender the license shall be grounds for a fine
or revocation of the license. (Emphasis supplied.)
Even without this explicit authority DCA might have been able to
hold consumer redress hearings under the guise of disciplinary
hearings under the Home Improvement Business Law, by simply adopting
a policy of aborting such hearings whenever the consumer is satisfied,
and of issuing disciplinary orders conditioned on the failure of the
licensee to provide the consumer with a specific remedy mentioned in
the order. The explicit authority obviates the need for such
"bootstrapping", and protects DCA from the attacks (political and
judicial) which might follow from such a practice.48
The major limitation on DCA's authority to hold consumer redress
hearings is that it does not extend to businesses that do not in fact
obtain licenses -- even where the law requires them to do so. Under
sec. 773-5.0 of the License Enforcement Act of 1973, such businesses
are subject to fines of between $25 and $2000. Their owners are
subject to imprisonment for up to 60 days, and they are also subject
to civil penalties, as are those who aid and abet them, even
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including their landlords. The penalties specified by the Home
Improvement Business Law sec. B32-365.0 (which was not repealed, even
in this respect, by the 1973 law) are even stiffer: the unlicensed
businessman is guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be imprisoned for up
to six months and fined up to $1000. Both of these provisions also
apply to ex-licensees and to some extent to licensees who violate
some requirement or prohibition applicable to them. Both laws also
permit the corporation counsel to seek injunctions against anyone
(licensee, ex-licensee, or non-licensee) who violates the law.49
Despite all the legal firepower which could be directed at non-
licensees, very little of it actually is so directed. Nor are other
restrictions on non-licensees, such as their inability to make a
truthful claim that they are licensed, show a valid license when
asked, obtain a building permit, or (in theory at least) sue on their
contracts, significant impediments to smaller unlicensed operators.
The result is that perhaps half of all home improvement contracts in
New York City are carried out by non-licensees.50
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DCA GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Before embarking on an analysis of DCA's procedures, it is
necessary for the reader to have working definitions of the terms used
by that organization to refer to those of its forms and procedures
which are relevant to the consumer redress process. What follows is
a brief glossary of such terms.
1. "Inspection". Visit by a DCA inspector to the address of an
unlicensed contractor, in an effort to serve him with a criminal court
summons or a citation to appear before an informal DCA hearing, or to
leave him a letter asking him to call Harold Goodman, Director of
DCA's Home Improvement Division.
2. "Special Inspection". This is a visit to the consumer's home in
an effort to determine impartially and expertly whether the contract
has been properly completed (and if not, what must be done). The
visit is ordered by either Harold Goodman or a hearing officer, and
conducted by the special inspector, Frank Sendyka.
3. "NL letter". (A) Upon receiving the consumer's complaint, Harold
Goodman sends a letter to the contractor telling him of the complaint,
noting that DCA records indicate that he has no license, warning him
that operating without a license is a misdemeanor for which he could
receive "a fine of up to $1000.00 and/or six months in jail", and
requesting that he call Goodman's office "regarding this matter".
(B) A letter is sent at the same time to the consumer, stating that
the contractor is not licensed, that the matter has been forwarded to
the Enforcement Division (in reality, to one of the inspectors who
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work for Goodman) "for investigation, and such action as may be
necessary". The letter also requests the consumer to send in a copy of
the contract (if she has not already done so), and tells her that
"this does not preclude you from seeking redress in Civil Court".
4. "L letter". (A) A letter from Goodman to the contractor, stating:
A letter of complaint has been received by this Department
complaining of the manner in which you executed a recent home
improvement contract.
Please contact the consumer with regard to the issue raised
and notify us within ten days as to your disposition of these
charges. If we have not been notified by you within the time
stated that this matter has been satisfactorily resolved, we
shall schedule a Hearing at the Department.
(B) A letter to the consumer informing her that the contractor
has been notified of her dissatisfaction and advised to take corrective
action. She is requested to allow him 15 days from the date of this
letter to take appropriate measures. DCA states that if they do not
hear from the consumer thereafter, they will assume the complaint has
been resolved and will close the case.
5. "Exhaustion letter". Either of two form letters, one of which
states that DCA is unable to act because "Departmental procedures
exhausted against the above-named unlicensed contractor", while the
other states that "We found the Contractor was operating without the
required license. A summons was issued to the owner for this violation
of the City's Administrative Code B32-352.0": both go on to suggest
the consumer seek redress in Civil or Small Claims Court.
6. "Seven-day letter". A letter sent to the consumer, after the
contractor has called in response to the L letter (or NL letter) to
say that the complaint has been resolved and after Goodman has been
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unsuccessful in attempts to contact the consumer by telephone. The
letter requests that she call him and informs the consumer that if
Goodman does not hear from her within seven days he will assume the
complaint has been resolved and will close the case file.
7. "Notice of Hearing". (A) A formal-looking printed summons sent by
the Calendar Division to the licensee once Goodman has referred the
file to them on the basis that the complaint is unresolved. Written in
legalese, this requires the contractor to appear at 9:30 a.m. (or at
2p.m.) "to answer the following complaint of the above-named complain-
ant:
/what follows is mimeographed, and appears on almost all notices
of hearings sent to home improvement contractors'
The licensee operating as a Home Improvement Contractor in the
City of New York, violated Section B32-358.0 Subdivision 1 of
the Administrative Code, in that on or about the
licensee induced the complainant to enter into a Home Improve-
ment Contract and the complainant agreed to pay .
That the licensee without justification abandoned or wilfully
failed to perform the contract; or wilfully deviated from the
plans or specifications without the consent of the owner.
This language is sufficiently broad to encompass most major categories
of consumer complaints involving home improvements, including failure
to begin work, complete work, do the work right, or later breach of
warranty (the warranty is part of the original contract). The notice
of hearing may also include Departmental charges, such as the failure
of the contractor to include on his contract forms his license number,
agreement to furnish the consumer with a certificate of Workmen's
Compensation Insurance, agreement to procure all permits required by
local law, and a three-day cancellation clause in the specified form.
See DCA, Amended Regulations Relating to Home Improvement Business
1(a) - (e) (1975), set out in Appendix B. The printed form concludes:
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"In case of your failure to obey this summons you will be liable to a
fine or suspension or revocation of your license or licenses, in
accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Code for the City
of New York, or statutes, in such case provided. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT
TO BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL."
(B) A mimeographed form letter is also sent to the consumer at the same
time telling her when and where the hearing will be held and requesting
that she attend.
8. "Departmental charges". Allegations included in the "Notice of
hearing" seeking punishment of the licensee rather than redress for the
consumer. They may be heard as a separate part of the "consumer redress
hearing", or at a separate "disciplinary hearing".
9. "Disciplinary hearing". Any hearing in which DCA is the complainant-.
While such hearings are more common in non-home improvement contexts,
they can occur in home improvement cases. Typically, they follow the
failure of the contractor to appear at a consumer redress hearing, and
their purpose is to evaluate the contractor's excuse and if necessary
to assess a fine.
10. "Consumer redress hearing". A term created for this study to fit
the following: A hearing held to determine whether a dissatisfied con-
sumer has a right to obtain "redress of injuries", pursuant to sec.
773-4.0(e) of the License Enforcement Law of 1973 (Appendix C), from a
licensed home improvement contractor or salesman. This is not a
"disciplinary hearing". DCA is not the complainant. The only parties
are the consumer and the contractor. If "Departmental charges" are
included in the notice of hearing, they are dealt with at a separate
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part of the hearing, without the consumer's presence, either
immediately before or immediately after the issues between the
consumer and the contractor have been heard.
11. "Decision". While the hearing officer drafts a decision following
each hearing, this does not become official until it has been approved
by a higher-up (which during the period of my study was Deputy
Commissioner Douglas White through April, 1979, and Director of
Adjudication Shelley Sherman thereafter). Since the decisions are
rarely changed substantially, I will speak as if the final decision
were made by the hearing officer, except in those cases where the file
makes clear that it was not.
12. "Article 78 proceeding". The method by which a licensee obtains
judicial review of an adverse DCA decision. He brings a proceeding in
New York State's Supreme Court (its court of general jurisdiction!)
under Article 78 of the CPLR (New York's procedural code). If DCA's
decision is being attacked on the ground that it is not "on the entire
record, supported by substantial evidence", the court transfers the
case to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.51 Since DCA, not
the consumer, is the respondent in Article 78 proceedings, the City
pays the costs. Unfortunately, DCA's order in the case, and hence
any relief to the consumer, is normally stayed pending the final
determination of the proceeding. In these proceedings DCA is not
represented by its own Counsel or the Advocacy Division, but by the
City Corporation Counsel.
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D. DCA Procedures
(NOTE: Each term included in the preceding glossary is asterisked the
first time it appears in the present section.)
The processing of consumer complaints against home improvement
contractors involves personnel from DCA's Complaints Division,
Neighborhood Offices Division, Home Improvement Division, Enforcement
Division, Calendar Division, Adjudication Division, and its Counsel's
office, as well as from the New York City Corporation Counsel's office.
As the following account makes clear, the great bulk of this work is
done by three small offices, the Home Improvement Division, the Calendar
Division, and the Adjudication Division. 5 2
The Complaints Division runs a well-publicized consumer complaint
telephone, with volunteers manning several lines. Consumers who call
in with complaints against home improvement contractors are instructed
to mail a written complaint, together with a copy of the contract, to
the Complaints Division. When the written complaint comes in, a clerk
in the Complaints Division immediately makes up a case file for it.
This involves a number of steps. The vendor's name and address, the
vendee's name and address, and a code for the type of complaint are
entered on a serially numbered multiple copy form. Three index cards
are torn off from the form. Each index card contains the docket
number. Additionally one of the cards contains the vendor's name, one
the vendee's name, and one the type of complaint. These are stapled to
the consumer's letter and the copy of her contract to the remainder of
the docket form. The case files containing home improvement complaints
are left on a pile to be picked up by someone from the Home Improvement
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Division, and all the "vendor", "vendee", and "type of complaint"
cards are made into neat piles, to be filed later in "vendor",
"vendee", and "type of complaint" card files. Occasionally consumers
arrive in person with their complaints. Once their complaints have
been reduced to writing they are handled the same way as complaints
which are mailed in.53
Complaints may also come in through walk-ins at the "Neighborhood
Offices" in Queens, Brooklyn, and Staten Island. These complaints are
handled somewhat differently. They are docketed at the field office,
and a DCA employee there will in each case (including home improvement
cases) attempt to effect a settlement by phone calls and/or letters to
both parties. If a settlement is reached at the field office the case
file remains there, and no information (other than gross statistical
information) makes its way back to the main office. If a settlement
cannot be effected there the case file is sent, along with cover letter,
to the Complaint Division, where it is redocketed (with a new number,
and with the cover letter and the original field office case file,
including papers gathered by the field office, stapled underneath) and
treated the same way as a newly-filed complaint.
The Home Improvement Division (which is administratively part of
the Enforcement Division) is run by Harold Goodman, a former small
businessman who is paid on an "inspector's" line. He is assisted in
the office by an inspector and by a CETA worker. Another inspector
performs most of the "inspections*" (asterisked phrases in this section
are defined in the glossary which precedes this section). Frank
Sendyka, a former construction supervisor for a large company, performs
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all the "special inspections*" under a three-day/week contract with
DCA. Wednesday is his day to be at DCA headquarters in case his
testimony is needed at a "consumer redress hearing*", and he will help
out with the telephone at the Home Improvement Division when he is not
so needed.54
When a case file reaches the Home Improvement Division the first
step involves checking a computer print-out from the Licensing Division
to determine if the contractor is licensed. If the contractor is not
licensed, "NL letters*" go out to the contractor and the consumer. A
few days later an "inspection" is attempted in an effort to serve the
contractor with a summons or citation if the contractor has not
responded to the letter and if he has an address in New York City.
None is attempted if he does not, since while all contractors
performing work in the City are required to be licensed by DCA, the
jurisdictional rules of the New York Criminal Court require that
defendants be personally served within the City limits, an almost
impossible task if the contractor has neither a residential nor a
business address there. Often, however, a "non-licensee" will call
Goodman in response to the NL letter and/or the inspector's visit,
sometimes to tell him that he has a license (possibly because the
computer print-outs are not completely up-to-date or because the
license may be in his individual name but the consumer may have filed
her complaint under some trade name he was using) in which case the
process recycles with "L letters*' or to make an excuse for not having
a license and/or to promise to apply for one. He will also discuss the
consumer's complaint, either disputing it, and/or insisting that he
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corrected it upon receiving Goodman's letter, and/or offering to do
something about it. He may also ask for Goodman's help in mediating
with the consumer. Sometimes a similar process occurs when an inspec-
tor visits the contractor pursuant to an "inspection". Many complaints
are resolved by these processes (which may include some more calls
between Goodman or the inspector and one or both parties).
If Goodman believes the contractor is proceeding in good faith,
and if the criminal court summons has not yet been served, he will send
the consumer a "seven-day letter" and then close the file (rather than
taking further enforcement action) if he does not hear from the
consumer. On the other hand, if the NL letter and any enforcement
efforts do not quickly produce settlement negotiations, an "exhaustion
letter*" is sent to the consumer.
Where a criminal court summons has been served, an employee of the
Enforcement Division who has the responsibility for all criminal court
summonses issued by DCA inspectors goes into court on the return date
of the summons in the hope that the contractor will appear (if like 40%
of those summoned he does not appear a bench warrant for him is issued,
but never executed!) and that the judge will be tough (in which case
the contractor will be fined $50 rather than the usual $25). If a non-
licensee has five unresolved complaints pending against him, and if
Goodman is convinced that he is not proceeding in good faith to resolve
this, he will request the Counsel's Office to enlist the aid of the
City Corporation Counsel in seeking an injunction against the
contractor. Such injunction proceedings are brought infrequently and
are drawn-out, formalistic, and only sporadically effective.
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If , on the other hand, when the Home Improvement Division
receives a docket from the Complaints Division it determines that the
contractor (or, if not the contractor, the salesman) is licensed, it
mails "L letters*" to the licensee and to the consumer. In the unusual
case where the salesman is licensed but the contractor is not, the case
is bifurcated, with the salesman receiving an L letter, the contractor
an NL letter, and the two parts of the case then proceeding each in its
own fashion. In the more usual case in which the contractor is
licensed, no attempt is made to determine if the salesman is licensed
or to involve his license in the proceedings if he is already involved.
The L letter generally elicits some response, written or telephoned,
from the contractor.
If the contractor either disputes the claim, asserts that he has
since satisfied the consumer, or requests Goodman's help in mediating,
Goodman tries to call the consumer to attempt to ascertain the truth of
the contractor's assertions and, if necessary, to work out a settlement.
If she is not in, he mails her a copy of the contractor's response and
requests her comment. If the contractor stated that the matter was
settled after the consumer's complaint was filed, and if Goodman cannot
contact the consumer by telephone to confirm this, he mails her a
seven-day letter*'.' If the consumer at any point agrees that her com-
plaint has been resolved, or if she fails to respond to a "seven-day
letter", Goodman marks the file "closed" and returns it to the
Complaints Division, which places it in numerical order in the
Complaints file.
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In some cases Goodman, after speaking with both the consumer and
the contractor, decides that a "special inspection" may help the
parties to resolve their differences and, with their consent, arranges
one. If a settlement does not result, or if the consumer later
complains that it was not carried out, Sendyka's report and testimony
are available for use at a subsequent consumer redress hearing.
If the contractor has not responded to the "L letter", or if the
consumer disagrees with his assertion that the complaint has been
settled, or if Goodman's attempts to negotiate a settlement (with or
without Sendyka's assistance) have been unsuccessful, he sends the
case file on to the Calendar Division in order for them to schedule a
consumer redress hearing. If in the process of doing so he notices
that the contractor has committed some violation of which the consumer
is not complaining (typically, the failure to put his license number or
the three-day cancellation clause on his contract form, or his failure
to notify DCA of a change of address), he will mention this in his
covering note to the Calendar Division, thus triggering some "Depart-
mental charges*" in the "notice of hearing*".
The Calendar Division prepares a formal "notice of hearing*"
which it sends to the licensee; the consumer gets a simple form letter
telling her when and where the hearing will be held. Hearings are
scheduled for Monday through Thursday (but only on Wednesday if a
"special inspection" has taken place and Frank Sendyka's presence at
the hearing might be needed). The parties are told to arrive at either
9:30a.m. for the morning hearings, or at 2 p.m., for the afternoon
ones. The notice of hearing is usually sent out about three weeks
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after the Home Improvement Division first becomes aware of the impasse.
The notice itself generally precedes the hearing by three to four
weeks. The notice contains a statement that "an Application for an
Adjournment will be entertained only for good cause and only if
submitted in writing and received by the Deputy Commissioner for
Adjudication, Department of Consumer Affairs at least three days before
the return date of the Hearing." Indeed, such nonconsensual adjourn-
ments are rare. Consensual adjournments, typically while the consumer
waits to see if the contractor carries out a promised settlement, are
quite frequent and are granted automatically by the Calendar Division.
There are normally two hearing officers, both lawyers, who hear
cases involving licensees. The week prior to the scheduled hearing
the Calendar Division makes up a weekly calendar indicating when each
complaint will be heard and before which hearing officer. The morning
before the hearing is scheduled the Claendar Division delivers the
case file to the hearing officer.
As the parties arrive for the hearing they check in with a DCA
employee who sits in a booth in front of a 30-person waiting room. He
tells them to wait and that they will be called. Each hearing officer
has three or four cases scheduled for each morning and for each after-
noon on a typical day. The cases are called in the order in which they
are ready (both sides present). People can therefore be kept in the
waiting room up to about two hours, though the average wait is much
less. If the consumer appears but the contractor does not show within
one hour of the scheduled time, the case is called but the consumer is
told by the hearing officer that the case will have to be rescheduled.
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She is assured, however, that the contractor's license will be suspended
in the meantime and that he will be fined for his failure to appear.
The contractor is then notified of the impending suspension; when he
calls to protest a "disciplinary hearing* ? is scheduled at which he has
a chance to explain his earlier non-appearance. If he does not do a
persuasive job of it, he is fined at least $50, the suspension is
called off upon the payment of the fine, and the consumer redress
hearing is rescheduled (on the theory that the properly chastened
contractor will now appear) If, however, the contractor does not
appear at the disciplinary hearing his license is suspended immediately.
The "consumer redress hearing*" is conducted by a hearing officer,
usually in his own hearing room. He sits at his desk, while the con-
sumer, the contractor, their witnesses, spouses, friends and family,
and/or advocates, and (if a special inspection was done) Frank Sendyka
sit around a small table. There is a microphone at the hearing
officer's desk, and three around the table; a tape recorder operator
(who works for a transcription agency which is under contract with DCA)
sits at a small desk to the side, operating his machine.
The parties and their witnesses then tell their stories, beginning
with the consumer and her witnesses, with considerable questioning from
the hearing officer and liberal amounts of interjections from the other
party usually permitted. An attorney, if present, will be allowed to
question the witnesses, but not to control the manner in which the
hearing proceeds.
The hearings last from 20 minutes (if the parties quickly agree on
a settlement, or if the hearing officer immediately sees the need for a
"special inspection"), to more than an hour (where both sides slog
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through the details of a complicated contract, arguing over what was
or was not done, and whose fault it was in each instance). One of the
hearing officers was quite deft at obtaining settlements, and would
order the proceeding to be "off the record" whenever he saw an
opportunity to turn the parties from testimony to settlement negotia-
tions. On the other hand, a single case might include several hearings,
separated by "adjournments", while Sendyka was doing a special
inspection or while the parties were trying (with incomplete success)
to work out some kind of adjustment of the complaint.55
Following the consumer redress hearing, the hearing officer may
fill out a single page "case disposition form". The form permits the
hearing officer to check one of the following: "Licensee's license to
be suspended for failure to appear -- consumer to be notified";
"Complaint to be dismissed -- Consumer failed to appear -- advise both
sides"; "Complaint to be dismissed -- for failure of both sides to
appear -- Licensee to be fined $ for willful failure to attend
a hearing"; "Matter to be adjourned to (date)" or "Reset to
first available date"; "S.I. requested (see attached)"; 56 "Complaint
settled -- see settlement attached -- copy to be sent to both sides";
"Matter adjourned pending judicial action not to be reset unless
consumer requests it -- Copy of order to go to both sides"; or,
finally, "Other (State)", followed by three short lines. If the
hearing officer uses this form, he forwards it to the Calendar Division
along with the case file.
If none of the spaces on the case disposition form applies, the
hearing officer drafts a formal "decision" and submits it for approval
49
(which is usually forthcoming) to the Director of Adjudication. The
decision describes the consumer's complaint, sets out the relevant
facts as "found" by the hearing officer from the testimony and other
items (such as the contract) in the record, comes to a conclusion as
to the licensee's liability in light of these facts and the relevant
law, and finishes with an "order". The order typically provides
either that the complaint is dismissed, that the licensee is to
refund some or all of the amounts he received from the consumer
within 30 days of the date of the order, or that the licensee is to
complete or redo specific portions of the job according to specified
standards within 30 days of the date of the order. If the order
takes the latter form, it may condition the licensee's responsibility
to perform on the consumer's paying him some or all of any outstanding
balance on the contract, or may embody some other remedial provision
agreed to at the hearing, such as one contemplating that the consumer
will pay once Special Inspector Sendyka inspects the completed or
redone work and pronounces it satisfactory.57
The Director of Adjudication has the power to alter the decision
before promulgating it, but rarely does so unless convinced it is
mistaken as to the law. Promulgating the decision involves sending
copies to the parties, attaching several copies to the case file, and
inserting a copy in a looseleaf book of that month's decisions (which
book is kept in the DCA library as a public record). At the same time
the licensee is also sent a letter (copy to the consumer) which
repeats the "order" portion of the decision and concludes, "The
licensee is directed to comply with this order within thirty days of
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the date hereof, unless otherwise specified. Failure to comply will
result in the suspension of the license." This form letter is also
used to remind the licensee of any settlement he agreed to, and to
inform him of any fine which might have been imposed as a result of
Departmental charges, including one for failure to appear at prior
hearings.
The licensee's practical options upon receiving an order to do
work, make a refund, and/or pay a fine, along with the proportion of
licensees in my samples pursuing each option,58 are: (1) to comply
within the time specified, (47%); (2) to write the Director of Adjudi-
cation, arguing that there was some gross error in the decision and
requesting that she reconsider it and/or order a new hearing, (12%);
(3) to file an "Article 78 proceeding*"? in New York State Supreme
Court, (6%); (4) to begin the required work, or otherwise demonstrate
an intention to comply, (12%); or (5) not to comply (with or without
offering an explanation to DCA) (24%).
Option (1) requires no comment. Options (2) and (3) are not
mentioned in the decision or order. They are discussed in the GUIDE
FOR HEARING OFFICERS which is available to licensees from the DCA
(though I doubt many licensees even know of its existence), but more
importantly they would occur to any lawyer whom the licensee might
consult. Option (2) requires a written petition "confined to new
questions raised by the decision or final order and which the peti-
tioner had no opportunity to argue before the Department".59 Filing
such a petition does not automatically stay the effective date of the
order. However, in practice it does give the licensee a few week's
grace.
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In theory option (3) does not produce an automatic stay either,
but in practice it can gum up the works for months or even years,
since the DCA will generally not take action to enforce an order which
may ultimately be reversed. Exercising this option is difficult in
that it requires hiring an attorney to file the petition and to defend
it against motions to dismiss filed by the City Corporation Counsel's
office, which represents DCA. The cost to the licensee is such that
I encountered only two cases in which Article 78 proceedings had been
brought.60 These were also the only two cases in which DCA had
ordered the contractor to make monetary refunds of over $1000.
Exercising option (4) is likely to have the practical result that
the consumer will hold off complaining to DCA. Consumer complaints
are the only device DCA has which alert it to possible non-compliance
with its remedial orders. If consumer complaints do not come in, DCA
will have no notice of the technical violation of its orders.
Even if the consumer does complain that the work has not been done
or the ordered refund paid within the prescribed time the contractor
gets another chance. Before Lillian Maglino, the head of the Calendar
Division, schedules another hearing to determine whether the order was
or was not complied with she usually calls the contractor and gives
him an opportunity to make an informal explanation and to promise swift
compliance. If he appears to be preparing in good faith to comply,
Maglino will so inform the consumer and will delay rescheduling the
hearing for a few weeks to give the contractor a chance to make good
on his new promises.
Option (5) may produce a cheap victory for the contractor. The
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consumer may never complain that the work was not done, either because
she is unaware that DCA can do anything further for her or because she
does not want to waste more time and effort on a project which she
thinks will probably be futile. Additionally, the consumer may fear
some physical reprisal from the contractor if she takes any further
steps to deprive him of his license. If the consumer does complain,
the contractor can then obtain at least a few weeks' grace (more, if
the consumer gives up, the file gets lost, etc.) by making false
protestations and promises of "good faith" over the telephone. If a
hearing on the contractor's alleged non-compliance is then scheduled,
he has a crack at convincing the hearing officer that he had some
excuse for not complying. The likely result of the hearing is that he
will be fined $50 and given another 15 days or so to carry out the
original order or face the suspension or revocation of his license.
Failure to appear at the second hearing, or a report by the
consumer that the contractor has failed to comply within the time
specified in the second order, will quickly produce a DCA order
suspending or revoking his license. The contractor can, as a matter
of practice, get a suspension or revocation stopped or rescinded at
any point before it becomes effective by complying with all DCA orders
then outstanding against him. Once his license is revoked, he will
have to make a deal with the Advocacy Division (which normally involves
satisfying any existing orders and any newly-arrived consumer com-
plaints, as well as paying a penalty to the DCA) before he will be
permitted to have another license.61
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III. Data Collection: The Four Samples
In order to determine the characteristic progress and resolution
of complaints filed against home improvement businesses in small claims
court and at DCA, I needed roughly comparable samples of complaints
filed in each forum. The "small claims court" sample and the DCA
"complaints" sample were drawn with this criterion in mind. These two
samples provide the grist for the quantitative analyses and comparisons
in Chapter IV.
The "small claims court" sample was drawn from cases filed in the
Brooklyn (King's County) small claims court. Since all of the small
claims courts in New York City are in theory subject to the same juris-
dictional and procedural rules, I felt free to choose the Brooklyn
court for the sample simply because it was the one most accessible to
me (once I excluded the Manhattan court on the basis that home improve-
ment cases filed there were likely to be few and far between).
Additional samples, of DCA "decisions" and of DCA "hearings",
were needed to obtain a representative sampling of cases going through
DCA's formal adjudicative processes, since few such cases were uncov-
ered in the "complaints" sample. For the reasons explained in the next
section, I was not able to take analogous samples of small claims
court decisions or hearings. The "decisions" and "hearings" samples
will therefore be used primarily to supplement cases from the first
two samples in providing illustrations for the qualitative discussions
in Chapter V. However, information which I have gleaned from the
complaint records which I read and the interviews with consumers
which I did in the course of compiling all four samples, along with
all that I learned from extensive discussions with and observations of
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DCA and small claims court personnel, observations of actual hearings,
and conversations with contractors, form the basis for most of the
descriptions and analyses contained in this study.63
A. Small Claims Court
I wanted filed cases that had run their course (if need be,
through adjournments, hearings, and executions) but which were recent
enough that the clerk's office would not have thrown out the "Requests
for Information". When I began my search of the Brooklyn small claims
court's files on March 2, 1979, the chief clerk of that office suggest-
ed I start by looking at the file cards from August 1978. Starting
from there, working mostly forward but occasionally backwards in time,
I eventually looked at 4500 file cards covering the three-month period
from July 24, 1978 through October 24, 1978.64
My procedure was to look through the cards, turning over each card
in which the "defendant" was either identified as a business of a type
which frequently does home improvements, 65or the nature of which was
uncertain or ambiguous, or as a private individual. On each card I
turned over I checked the "Cause of Action". I rejected cards in which
the cause of action clearly arose from (1) an automobile accident,
(2) the failure of the defendant to pay the claimant for work allegedly
done or materials allegedly supplied by claimant, (3) work which the
defendant was supposed to have done for the claimant's business,
(4) problems with goods supplied by the defendant on the understanding
that he was not also obligated to install them, or (5) (in the case of
the individual defendants) one of the infinite number of other reasons
A might sue B, other than that B had failed to properly perform a home
improvement contract for A.
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With respect to each of the cards that were still in the running
as possible home improvement cases, I dug up the original "Request for
Information" for whatever light the claimant's original statement
(usually, much fuller than the "Cause of Action") would cast on the
question of whether this was really a home improvement case. If I
decided it was, I copied all the information about the case on both
the file card and the Request for Information, and gave the case a
serial number, beginning with SC1, and eventually running through SC55.
There was even a sorting stage after this point. I later deleted two
of the serial numbered cases from the sample on the basis of informa-
tion which I acquired when I called the consumer to find out whether
the desired result was ever achieved. Neither was a "home improvement
contract" within the meaning of the Home Improvement Business Law.66
I used the Home Improvement Business Law criteria in selecting cases
for my small claims court sample, since they were as good as any and
were the ones in use at DCA. Using them therefore guaranteed that the
cases in my small claims court sample were as comparable as possible
with those that I would collect in my DCA samples.
For each case in my small claims court sample I checked (using
the computer printout supplied by DCA's Licensing Division) whether
the contractor was licensed and (using the "vendee" file at the DCA
Complaints Division) whether there were any complaints against him in
1978. Where there were complaints, I went through the case file on
each of them and made notes about what I found. This latter process
sometimes provided me with more information about the licensing history
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of a particular contractor than I could get from the printout (e.g.
that he was or was not licensed until recently, or that he is presently
licensed, but under a different name than the one under which he is
being sued). It was also my first foray into the DCA case files,
allowing me an opportunity to familiarize myself with them and with
DCA procedures prior to beginning the formal collection of data for my
DCA samples, as well as providing some insight into typical modus
operandi of both licensed and unlicensed home improvement contractors.
The final stage in the development of my small claims court
sample involved telephoning the claimants to obtain the final results
of their claims. I succeeded in contacting 31 out of the 55 claimants
originally in the sample. The remainder had no listed telephone
number. One of the latter group obtained an execution from the court,
which the sheriff had marked "satisfied". As for the remaining 23,
while I cannot be sure what the fate of their claims were, some reason-
able assumptions can be made on the basis of what happened with the
claims of people in the same apparent situation whom I was able to
contact. This will be done in the quantitative analysis, Chapter IV.
I did not attempt to contact the contractors involved in any of
these cases, or those involved in cases from my DCA samples, for the
purpose of confirming whether work was done or money paid in individual
cases (though I did speak with several about other matters). My fear
was that, like the Truthtellers and the Liars in the popular riddle,
the honest ones would tell me they had performed (because they had),
while the less honest ones, if they would speak with me at all, would
also tell me they had performed, but regardless of whether or not they
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had (to avoid any hassles which might flow from admitting failures to
carry out their duties).67 On the other hand, the consumers involved
in my samples had no obvious reasons to lie to me about whether the
contractor had performed.
I could not do a sample of written decisions of small claims
court arbitrators similar to the sample I was doing of DCA decisions,
since the arbitrators do not write decisions but simply issue judgments
either for the claimant (in some dollar amount) or for the defendant.
I did, however, attempt to do a sample of actual small claims court
hearings in home improvement cases, analogous to the sample I was
doing of DCA hearings.
At first it looked like it would be simple. Since all of the
cases filed on a given day are assigned the same trial date (about a
month later), looking through a day's cards for home improvement cases
enabled me to know a month in advance on which evenings one or more
such cases would be scheduled. Hence, I arrived at the Brooklyn small
claims court on Monday, April 23 at 6:30 p.m. ready for the hearing in
my first such case (having previously obtained permission from Judge
Smith to attend arbitrations). However, when the case was called, no
one responded, and the clerk intoned "Dismissed -- no appearance
either side." With the exception of one contested case and one short
inquest, I encountered similar frustrations the other eight evenings I
attended court sessions in Brooklyn and the one evening I attended a
session in Queens (hoping to change my luck). Two variations on this
frustration were where the defendant appeared but the claimant did not
(still producing a dismissal), or where both parties appeared but the
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case turned out not to involve a home improvement contract. These
results are only slightly worse than would be predicted from the
results of my small claims court sample. Out of 53 cases filed both
sides appeared for the scheduled hearing in only 12 (23%). The claim-
ant alone appeared in an additional 11 (21%), leaving more than half
in which a would-be observer would not even witness an inquest. My
problem was that I had no possibility of developing a system analogous
to the one I had at DCA which would alert me only when a hearing in a
home improvement case was actually about to take place.68 Rather, I
was stuck with having to show up for the calendar call each evening
such a case was scheduled. I simply did not have enough evenings to
devote to this wasteful procedure, and called it quits after ten.
This is not to say that my evenings at small claims court were
a total loss. My statements about small claims court procedures are
based in part on this experience,69 as are my observations on the costs
to the consumer of obtaining relief through this process,70 and my
comparison throughout this paper of small claims court hearings with
DCA consumer redress hearings. I did in fact attend at least 20
arbitrations in Brooklyn small claims court and two in Queens, and
watched at least that many inquests take place. Even though only one
of the arbitrations and one of the inquests was in a home improvement
case, I am sure that many of my observations would also be applicable
if the hearing had involved home improvement contracts. 7I I have tried
to be careful not to generalize from my observations of non-home-im-
provement cases if I could think of any reason why they would not be
applicable in the home improvement context.
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B. Complaints
The closest analogue at DCA to a sample of small claims court
claims is a sample of docketed complaints. A complaint is not dock-
eted unless the consumer (1) walks into a DCA office with a complaint
against a "vendor", (2) mails one in to DCA, or (3) in a similar
manner complains to another government agency such as the New York City
Attorney General's office, which sends all its New York City home improve-
ment contractor complaints to DCA as soon as it receives them. In
contrast, telephoned complaints, or mere inquiries (e.g. as to whether
a particular contractor is licensed or has many complaints against him,
or whether a particular practice is legal), are not docketed. Occas-
ional docketed complaints are simply filed for the purpose of seeking
information or of informing DCA of an abusive practice (there was one
of each among the 92 cases in my complaints sample). The overwhelming
majority of complainants, however, seek some sort of relief from the
vendor. Following through on a sample of docketed complaints, in the
same way I had done with the sample of small claims, would therefore
provide a valid statistical comparison of the likely results in the
two forums for a consumer with a complaint about a home improvement
contractor.
I obtained my complaints sample by going through every home im-
provement contractor case among docket numbers 134000 through 134999.
All of these cases were docketed between July 31, 1978 and September 6,
1978, well within the period included in my small claims court sample.
The selection of home improvement contractor cases within this series
was much simpler than the corresponding task at small claims court had
been, since all such cases at DCA were clearly marked "HIC" in a
60
docket ledger.72
I noted the docket numbers of all such home improvement cases in
order on a pad of paper, and proceeded to try to locate them in the
files. I gave each file a serial number (from 1 to 92) in the order
in which I located it. This is not entirely the same as the order of
the docket numbers, since many of the files were not in the file
drawers when I began my research. Some drifted back in as my research
continued. I located others in the various file drawers ("awaiting
hearings", "awaiting special inspections", etc.) at the Calendar
Division. I had to hunt down the rest detective-fashion in a number
of other DCA offices -- but in the end I found them all.
I prefixed the serial number with an "L" if the contractor was
licensed at all relevant times, and "NL" if he was unlicensed at all
relevant times, an "L-NL" if he was licensed at the time the contract
was signed but was no longer licensed at the time the complaint was
filed (because it had been suspended or revoked, or simply because he
had not bothered to renew it), and with an "NL-L" if he was not licensed
at the time of the complaint but obtained a license thereafter.
I assigned the serial number before determining the appropriate
prefix. The prefixes appear at random in the series, e.g. L8, NL9,
and L-NL10 are three consecutive cases in the complaints sample. In
determining the status of the contractor and hence the appropriate
prefix, I had no problem figuring out what his status was at the time
the complaint was filed, because Harold Goodman had made that determin-
ation in each case upon receiving the file, and his conclusion was
reflected in whether the file contained an L letter or an NL letter.
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Occasionally, a contractor would reply to an NL letter by filing his
license number (which Goodman might have missed as a result of a des-
crepancy between the name on the contractor's forms and the name under
which he is licensed). In such a case, the corrected status of course
determined the prefix. If the copy of the contract which the consumer
submitted had a license number on it but the computer print-out in-
dicated no current license, Goodman would send out an NL letter and
would note in the file any information which his records revealed as
to whether the contractor was in fact ever licensed (some contractors
simply make up a license number) and, if so, what happened to his
license. Those cases in which the file reflected the existence of a
license at the time of the contract were accordingly marked "L-NL".
Finally, I checked the computer print-outs through June, 1979 (nine
months after the most recent Nb letter in my sample had been sent out)
to determine which of the contractors who had received NL letters
thereafter obtained a license. Those cases in which they had were
prefixed "NL-L".
As to each of the 92 cases in my complaints sample, I drew from
the file the name of the contractor, a description of the complaint,
the amount of the contract, a thorough chronology of the case from the
time DCA was first contacted through the time the file was closed, and
summaries of any correspondence and of any DCA decisions reached in
the case. I then tried to determine the final result to the consumer
of the complaint. Where the file indicated unambiguously that the
consumer got nothing, I treated that as conclusive. Similarly, I
treated any type of written indication from the consumer that the work
had been done (whether a copy of the contractor's service slip on which
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the consumer signed her agreement that the work had been done, or a
separate letter to DCA by the consumer to the same effect), and any
notation by a DCA employee of a conversation held with the consumer
in which she acknowledge performance as establishing that fact.74
There were also a few miscellaneous situations in which I concluded
that the possibility that I would learn something more by calling the
consumer than I could infer from the case file was so small that I
could not justify disturbing her with a phone call.75
In general I did not assume either that the failure of the
contractor to respond to DCA letters meant that nothing was done, or
conversely that a plausible-sounding letter from a contractor, detail-
ing all the work he had supposedly done in response to DCA's letters,
phone calls, or formal decisions, was in fact truthful. In all, I
attempted to contact 60 of the 92 consumers in question, and succeeded
in contacting 50 of them. In the process, I contacted every one of
the 60 whose telephone was either listed in a telephone directory or
discoverable from the DCA case file. I made a judgment as to each of
the remaining 10 as to whether I had enough information to be reasonably
certain of what happened, or whether I had to place the results in the
"unknown" category. Of the people I contacted, none refused to give me
the information I was seeking. In some cases the information I got
was not sufficient to convince me that I knew what had happened, but
in the end I acquired enough information to categorize the results in
all but five cases with reasonable confidence.
C. Decisions
The purpose of my research was to study all aspects of the consumer
redress hearing process. Out of the 92 cases in my complaints sample
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only 21 were ever scheduled for a hearing. In only 16 of these did at
least one party appear. In only 10 of those 16 did both parties appear,
and only eight of the ten produced a resolution on the merits (as
opposed to an order for a special inspection). Only in two of the last
group did the resolution reflect the hearing officer's judgment between
the conflicting claims of the parties (as opposed to a negotiated
settlement).
These figures reflect no discredit to DCA, since a negotiated
settlement (whether provoked by the L letters, a phone call from
Goodman, a notice of hearing, a special inspection report, or by the
hearing officer) is normally preferable to a decision imposed from
above. Furthermore, the complaints sample reveals the consumer redress
hearing process in its most interesting aspects statistically. It dem-
onstrates not only the probabilities facing a consumer who complains to
DCA about a problem with a home improvement contractor on each level
of involvement with the hearing process, but more importantly provides
a basis for comparing the results such a consumer would be likely to
achieve at DCA with those attainable in small claims court.
However, a sample of two completely adjudicated cases is hardly
enough to explore some structural issues raised by DCA's jurisdiction
to order its home improvement licensees to make redress to consumers,
such as (1) the types of problems amenable to solution by use of such
orders, (2) the methods by which the hearing officers acquire the
evidence upon which they act, (3) the specific forms of redress which
they order in different types of cases, (4) the ways DCA goes about
enforcing its orders and the efficacy of these techniques, and (5) a
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comparison on each of these dimensions both with "normal" judicial
adjudication and with small claims courts.76 Fortunately, there was an
easier way for me to uncover a substantial lode of adjudicated home
improvement cases than going through a few hundred more random home
improvement complaints. DCA compiles each month's collection of formal
decisions (as opposed to those made on "case disposition forms"),
placing the resulting booklet in the DCA library as a "public record".
The collections of decisions for October, November, and December of 1978
provided the high-grade ore I needed.
Of the 184 decisions in disciplinary consumer redress cases which
DCA issued in these three months, 39, or 21%, were in home improvement
consumer redress cases. For two of the cases in the sample there were
two decisions (reflecting two different hearings in the case). Thus,
there were 39 decisions, but only 37 cases, in my decisions sample.
The decisions are numbered Dl through D39; where there were two
decisions in one case, these are referred to as D6/D20 or D7/D31. Of
the 37, eight were the result of negotiated settlements.77  Twenty-six
were decisions on the merits, 17 giving the consumer at least part of
what she wanted, and nine dismissing the complaint entirely. The three
remaining cases were, for one reason or another, never decided on the
merits. For each case in the sample I noted the same information as I
had with the cases in the complaints sample. In 13 of the cases, where
the file did not demonstrate the extent to which a DCA order had been
carried out, I called the consumer to verify this.
As expected, the cases in this sample reflected a variety and
complexity of DCA procedures that were barely revealed (if at all) in
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the complaints sample. Some involved a special inspection (before or
after an initial hearing), some a disciplinary hearing (followed by a
fine and/or license suspension and/or revocation), some more than one
hearing on the merits (with part, but perhaps not all, of the necessary
work having been done in the meantime), and two Article 78 proceedings
(both unresolved). The presence of written decisions which analyzed
the consumers' claims on the merits provided a basis for distinguishing
what the consumer wanted from what she was entitled to. It allowed me
to compare the relief the consumer was officially awarded with the
relief she actually received. 78
D. Hearings
While the complaints sample provided statistical information about
the consumer redress hearing process, and the decisions sample provided
insights into the structure of this process, neither sample cast any
light on what the hearings themselves were like. For this I had to sit
in on hearings, and between March 20 and July 9, 1979 I did, for a
total of 43 hearings in 41 cases. I have numbered these Hl through H41;
the second hearings which I attended in two cases are numbered H11A and
H23A, respectively. While I did not sit in on all home improvement
hearings during this period, I tried to attend any hearing that was held
while I was in the building. To do this, I checked the calendar at the
beginning of each week, marking off the times when home improvement
hearings were scheduled. Prior to the beginning of any morning or
afternoon session at which such a hearing was scheduled, I would check
with the waiting room receptionist that the hearing had not been can-
celed or adjourned. If it was still on, I would either go into the
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hearing room (if it was expected to begin soon) or ask the receptionist
to phone me at my desk near the complaints files as soon as the case
was called (which he generally did). The hearing officer or the tape
machine operator would generally fill me in if I had missed part of a
case, but for the great majority of the cases in this sample I sat
through substantially the entire hearing. I took notes as each hearing
proceeded, recording the names of the parties, the gravamen of the
complaint, a summary of the testimony of the parties and their witnesses,
choice bits of dialogue, and anything that seemed interesting about the
behavior or attitudes of the participants (including the hearing
officer).
A month or more after each hearing, I searched out the case file
to determine the decision or order which had resulted from the hearing,
as well as any other entries in the file, before or after the date of
the hearing, which might help elucidate what went on at the hearing or
indicate what the final resolution of the complaint might be. In this,
as in the previous two samples, I continued checking through mid-August
all case files in which I had reason to expect that further entries
would be made. However, unlike the previous two samples, I made no
effort here to call the consumers to verify the final resolution on
the theory that so many of these cases were still at an intermediate
stage (e.g. a special inspection had been ordered) that I could not hope
to obtain a reasonably complete view of how the cases finally turned
out by phoning at that time. Nonetheless, by mid-August I was reason-
ably sure from evidence in the files how 36 of the 41 cases would be
resolved. These 36 cases are particularly useful to this study for the
light they cast on the relationship between the evidence adduced at the
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hearing and the relief which the hearing officer orders. 79 My exper-
ience in sitting in on these hearings is also relevant to my discussions
of the costs to the consumer and the contractor of participating in
this process,80 and of the appropriateness of extending this process to
other contexts and other jurisdictions.81
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IV. Statistical Analysis of Results in the Two Forums
This chapter will present in tabular form, analyze, and then
compare the results achieved for the consumer in the cases which
comprise the small claims court sample and the DCA complaints
sample.
A. Small Claims Court
On the following pages: Table 1: Results of Cases in Small Claims
Court Sample
Table 1A: Cases Where Contractor is Licensed
Table 1B: Cases Where Contractor is Not Licensed
Table 1C: All Cases Combined
VTABLE 1: Results of Cases in Small Claims Court Sample
TABLE 1A: Cases Where Contractor is Licensed
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Inquest Unclaimed
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Notes to Table 1:
a. The criteria which I have used for this category are (1) that the
consumer received something more than a temporary patch job as a result
of bringing her claim, so long as (2) she did not insist to me that
whatever she received did not even come close to being a fair measure
of redress for her grievance.82
b. This classification includes only cases where the consumer received
nothing, and only where there was no adjudication adverse to the
83
consumer.
c. This "OTHER" category includes cases in which the consumer obtained
redress independent of the small claims court proceedings, as well as
miscellaneous cases and cases which have been ejected from the "YES"
and "NO" categories for reasons explained in the previous two notes.
d. In this case, SC15, the consumer sought compensation for damage to
her family's property, including a painting, as a result of the
defendant's allegedly incompetent and incomplete installation of sheet-
rock. After filing suit in small claims court for $1000, the maximum
possible amount, she decided that her claim was worth more and that she
did not want to sacrifice the excess to stay within the court's juris-
diction. She therefore hired a lawyer and sued in Civil Court, thus
ousting the small claims court's jurisdiction.84
e. This case, SC29, is similar to SC15 in that the consumer also hired
a lawyer who brought suit in Civil Court. Here, the contractor had not
submitted plans to the Building Department or obtained a building permit
for work on the consumer's basement. The consumer had been cited for a
building code violation. At a hearing in Civil Court (six months after
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his small claims court complaint was filed), the consumer's lawyer
obtained a settlement whereby the contractor agreed to correct the
violation and obtain a building permit within 120 days.85
f. The consumer in SC34 was awarded $400 by an arbitrator. The con-
tractor paid, but, the consumer thought "the judgment was
asinine" and the "the arbitrator is a dope". She had paid more than
$100 for a cement job, which was cracking in numerous places. The
contractor admitted the cement he used might have been defective, and
had offered her $300 in settlement. The best price she could get on a
patchwork repair was $650, which she did not think would do the job. 86
g. This case, SC18, is the one in which the consumer lost on the merits.
She wanted a refund on an alarm system that began malfunctioning about
five months after it was installed. The problem was that she only had a
30 day warranty. The judge urged her to settle for $54 (what she had
paid the company for two futile service calls) but she wanted her money
back.
h. This case, SC51, involved a breach of warranty on a $110 porch roof.
The claimant went to court five times: once to file the claim, twice
for the calendar call (to be told that the notice of hearing had twice
been returned undelivered), once to pick up a copy of the notice in
order to have someone serve it on the defendant personally, and finally
for another calendar call to learn that the process server had not
filed an affidavit of service and the case would therefore have to be
dismissed (though he was free to refile it for another $2.00 and try
again). He may do that (he told me, six months after he first filed
the claim), or he may get a lawyer, or he may just give up.
i. One of these cases, SC38, the consumer voluntarily decided not to
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pursue for personal reasons. The other one, SC3, was completed, but
"not satisfactorily" .87
j. In SC53 the contractor returned in response to the court summons
and did some more work on the house (a frequent scenario). However,
whatever it was that the contractor was putting up later fell off,
making the question of whether the consumer received substantial satis-
faction a nice one.
k. In five of the seven cases the arbitrator signed the "settlement"
card. In one of these, SC46, the settlement -- to redo a waterproofing
job -- did not work out. The consumer went back to court, this time
before a judge who worked out a cash settlement, which he received.
Of the remaining two, one was settled before a judge; the other, SC55,
was settled courtesy of the clerk, who when the contractor decided he
did not want an arbitrator and went to the clerk to get the case re-
scheduled before a judge, persuaded both parties of the greater wisdom
of settling.
Analysis of Table 1:
Out of the total of 53 cases in the sample (Table 1C) the infor-
mation in 23 of them was inadequate. I could not determine whether
the consumer ever received substantial redress. In seven more of the
cases (detailed in notes d,e,f,g,i and j of the Table), no determina-
tion which would reflect on the efficacy of small claims court could
be made. In 12 (52%) of the remaining 23 cases the consumer received
substantial redress, while in 11 (48%) she did not.
The denominator of these ratios could be increased by redistribu-
ting some of the "NO INFORMATION" cases between the first two categor-
ies, on the basis that all "Notice returned, undelivered" cases are
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placed in the "Received no redress" category and all the "Dismissed,
no appearance either side" cases and all the "Settled in court" cases
are placed in the "Received substantial redress" category. These
redistributions can be justified by logic (an undelivered notice is
unlikely to produce contractor compliance), by the experience of
others,88 and by induction from the cases in this sample in which the
results are known (there are no examples to the contrary with respect
to any of the three redistributions). There would then be 37 cases for
which the question "Did the consumer receive substantial redress?"
could be answered in a way that would reflect on the efficacy of the
small claims process. Of these, 19 (51%) would be "YES", and 18 (49%)
"NO", thus confirming the proportions originally obtained.
My purpose in studying the fate of claims against home improvement
contractors in small claims court was to provide a baseline for compar-
ing the fate of similar claims submitted to DCA. Given this, since the
DCA processes for dealing with licensees and non-licensees are distinct,
I worked out separate tables for cases where the contractor is licensed
(Table 1A) and cases where he is not (Table 1B). The variable of
whether the contractor is licensed turns out to be of critical impor-
tance. Of the 11 licensee cases in which I could determine whether the
consumer received substantial redress and in which this determination
was relevant to appraising the process, 10 (91%) were "YES" and only
one (9%) was "NO", whereas the corresponding figures for the 12 non-
licensee cases were 2 "YES" (17%) and 10 "NO" (83%). Making the same
redistribution of "NO INFORMATION" cases as I did with respect to the
combined results: out of 16 licensee cases 14 (88%) were "YES" and two
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(13%) were "NO", while out of 21 non-licensee cases five (24%) were
"YES" and 16 (76%) were "NO'.' The results of these computations are
set out in Table 2.
TABLE 2: Analysis of Table 1 by Proportion Receiving Substantial
Redress (Excluding "NO INFORMATION" and "OTHER"), With
and Without Redistribution of "NO INFORMATION"
Did the Consumer
Receive Substantial
Redress?
Proportion*Receiving
Substantial Redress,
Without Redistribution
Proportion*Receiving
Substantial Redress,
With Redistribution
(CASES WHERE CONTRACTOR IS LICENSED) (TABLE 2A)
91% (10/11)
9% (1/11)
(CASES WHERE CONTRACTOR IS NOT LICENSED)
17% (2/12)
83% (10/12)
(ALL CASES CONBINED) (TABLE 2C)
52% (12/23)
48% (11/23)
88% (14/16)
13% (2/16)
(TABLE 2B)
24% (5/21)
76% (16/21)
51% (19/37)
49% (18/37)
*Note to Table 2: Proportions have been rounded to the nearest %.
The same pattern clearly emerges with or without the redistrib-
uted "NO INFORMATION" cases. As a whole, consumers had indifferent
success suing home improvement contractors in small claims court.
They achieved substantial redress only half the time, but consumers
did extraordinarily well when they sued licensees, getting what they
wanted seven-eighths of the time. Conversely, they did extraordinarily
badly when they sued non-licensees, obtaining satisfaction no more
than a quarter of the time.
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
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B. DCA
TABLE 3: Results of Cases in Complaints Sample b
Contractor's Status
(Total of
Did the Consumer a NL, NL-L,
Receive Redress?- NL NL-L L-NL and L-NL L
(RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL REDRESS, DUE TO FILING COMPLAINT)
Hearing Not
Involved 0 1 (7)
After Notice of
Hearing, but
Before Hearing
At, or Subsequent
to, Hearing
(Total)
cn.a.
n.a. n.a.
(6) co) Il C(7))
(RECEIVED NO REDRESS, THOUGH PRESUMABLY ENTITLED)-
Contractor Out-
of-Business
Remainder
(Total)
9 0
14 1
C13) Cl)
1 (10)
3 (18)
C4) C(28)) C5) C33)
(OTHER)
No Information
Consumer not Seeking
Redress
0
0
Resolved Independ-
ently of DCA g 2
Complaint Dismissed n.a.
Complaint Apparent-.
ly Without Merit 
- 1
Partial Redress 2
(Total) C53
0
2
1
n.a.
0
0
C3)
2
0
0
(2)
(2)
(3)
2
1
2
n.a. (n.a.)
0
0
C2)
(1)
(2)
2
5
C(10)) C16') 26)
34 4 7 (45)
TOTAL
16 23
n.a.
n.a.
(n. a.)
(n. a.)
5
5d
C26~)
5
5
C33)
3
2
13
20
4
3--
5
4
3
7
6
TOTAL 47 92
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Notes to Table 3:
a. This has the same meaning as it did in Table 1. Here,
there was somewhat less need to rely on consumers' reports of what
happened because DCA records are much more thorough than small
claims court records, and frequently contain "objective" evidence of
whether work had been done.89
b. The criteria for the four categories of "contractor's
status" are set out in Section III B, above.
c. "n.a." = "not applicable".
d. This included three cases (L38, L58, and L65) which were
settled at the hearing, and two cases (L70 and L92) in which the
hearing officer decided for the consumer.
e. I have separated out the "contractor out-of-business"
category since a different set of reforms (e.g. bonding requirements)
would be needed to attempt to make this group of contractors amenable
to DCA or other dispute resolution processes than might theoretically
suffice in the case of people still in the home improvement business
in New York City. I have included in the "contractor out-of-business"
category only those cases where a DCA inspector ascertained that the
contractor had actually moved without forwarding address or gone
entirely out of this business. Those who had merely adopted a new
trade or corporate name have been placed in the "remainder" category
since there is no reason in principle (though there might be in law)
why they could not or should not still be pressured into honoring
their earlier contracts.
f. The three cases in this category were NL-L5, in which the
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consumer wanted, and obtained, a special inspection report for use
in defending a claim brought against her in small claims court; L43,
in which the consumer had written DCA requesting information about
his rights vis a vis a contractor, and was angered to discover that
this had been metamorphosized into a complaint and then a notice of
hearing (which, at his request, the Department cancelled); and NL-L78,
in which the elderly consumer's daughter wrote DCA to inform them
that she had called another contractor to work on her mother's roof.
This contractor arrived instead, and did more work than necessary, in
a slipshod manner -- she was not, however, seeking any relief.
g. Of these five cases, three (L16, NL46, and L55) were re-
solved by the parties before DCA had a chance to act. The remaining
two (NL-L73 and NL74), both of which involved contractors who were
beyond the effective jurisdiction of DCA (because they were located
outside New York City limits and were not licensed at the time of the
complaint), were settled (the former by a small claims court judgment,
the latter by the threat of judicial action) after DCA had communicat-
ed to the consumers its inability to obtain any relief for them.
h. Three of these (L17, L21, and L90) may well have been situ-
ations in which the consumer was trying to cheat the contractor out
of the last payment due him. In each of these cases the contractor
readily agreed, in response to the L letter, to do the remaining work
if the consumer would pay the amounts owed. The consumer not agree-
ing, hearings were scheduled. The consumers did not appear at the
hearings called in L17 and L21, resulting in dismissals. The con-
sumer did appear at the hearing in L90, at which a "settlement" was
worked out in which "within five days after the receipt of $250 from
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the consumer, the licensee is ordered to (do four minor finishing
items)". As a result of further correspondence between them the
contractor thereafter agreed to do a fifth item for the consumer for
the same price. The consumer never paid up, and upon the contractor's
request Deputy Commissioner White wrote the consumer that the case
would be dismissed if he did not carry out his responsibilities under
the settlement. When I could not reach the consumer I called the
contractor, who told me that he never received the money, and insisted
that the consumer's purpose all along was to build a record to support
withholding his last payment.
There is, however, no suspicion of improper consumer motivation
in L81, the remaining case. The consumer complained that her newly
installed awning leaked. The contractor came back several times to
fix it, both before and after receiving the L letter, but the consum-
er still insisted it leaked, and was now ugly from the excessive
caulking as well. Goodman sent Sendyka to check, and his report con-
firmed both parts of the consumer's complaint. The consumer, perhaps
finally tiring of this process, did not appear at the hearing, result-
ing in the dismissal of her complaint.
i. The three cases were NL35, L45, and L63. NL35 involved a
home improvement job, done in November, 1976, which included painting.
The contract provided for a 10-year warranty on the paint and a one-
year warranty on the labor. In June, 1978, the consumer complained
to the contractor that the paint was chipping. The contractor quite
properly offered to provide the paint but not the labor. The con-
sumer refused and complained to DCA. DCA sent the consumer an
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exhaustion letter (there being no opportunity for it to adjudicate
cases where the contractor is unlicensed), but the consumer's claim
seemed invalid on its face.
In L45 the consumer complained about a bad roofing job. The
contractor replied promptly to the L letter, stating that the leak
was not coming from the repaired area and that the consumer still
owed them $1350 on a $2150 job. A copy of this reply was sent to
the consumer, who was not heard from again. Goodman made two efforts
to contact her by telephone and then closed the file. The failure of
the consumer to reply seems sufficiently damning in this context.
Finally, in L63 the consumer complained that the contractor
had not completed a $5000 basement renovation, leaving two or three
panels and the doorbells uninstalled. The contractor responded to
the first letter from the Jamaica field office that he had made two
appointments with the consumer and had waited for him for two and a
half hours -- please advise! Another letter from the field office
elicited a story of a further such incident. Jamaica then referred
the case to the main office, and an L letter produced a copy of a
letter sent to the consumer by the contractor asking the consumer to
"please contact us."
DCA sent the consumer a seven-day letter three weeks later and,
receiving no response, closed the file three weeks after that. The
consumer told me when I called him six months later that he had
called them four or five times, that they never appeared for their
appointments, and that "I can't stay home every day waiting for them".
While there is a dispute on this record as to who is responsible for
the missed appointments, the consumer did not in his conversation
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with me cast any doubt on the contractor's good faith, which suggests
that the contractor was telling the truth at least about the fact of
his efforts (if not also about the time he arrived). Given that,
and the contractor's apparent willingness to try again, the consum-
er's failure to obtain redress seems to be at least as much the
result of his own unwillingness to make the necessary arrangements
and accommodations as it is the contractor's.
Analysis of Table 3:
Of the total of 66 cases as to which the question whether the
consumer received substantial redress could be answered in a way
which is indicative of the effectiveness of DCA processes (that is,
of those cases in the first two rows on Table 1), the answer in 33
(50%) was "YES" and the other 33 (50%) was "NO". Out of the 31
licensee cases in this group, the answer in 26 (84%) was "YES" and in
five (16%) was "NO". Out of the 29 non-licensee cases in the group,
the answer in six (21%) was "YES" and in 23 (79%) was "NO". If the
contractors in the "NL-L" status and the "L-NL" status are added to
those in the "NL" status, on the basis that the members of all three
groups were not licensed at the time of the complaint and therefore
had to be handled by DCA's non-licensee procedures, there were a
total of 35 cases in this "not licensed at the time of complaint"
category as to which the question of whether the consumer received
substantial redress could be significantly answered. Of these, the
answer in 7 (20%) was"YES" and in 28 (80%) was "NO". The results of
these computations are set out in Table 4. Since this question can
be significantly answered in 72% of the cases in the complaints
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sample (as opposed to only 43% of those in small claims court sample),
and since there were only four "NO INFORMATION" cases in the com-
plaints sample (as opposed to 23 in the small claims court sample),
no attempt will be made to increase the subsample size by redistrib-
uting the "NO INFORMATION" cases.
TABLE 4: Analysis of Table 3 by Proportion Receiving
Substantial Redress (excluding "OTHIER")
Did the Consumer
Receive Substantial
Redress Proportion Receiving Substantial Redress
(CASES WHERE CONTRACTOR IS LICENSED) (TABLE 4A)
YES 84% (26/31)
NO 16% (5/31)
(CASES WHERE CONTRACTOR IS NOT LICENSED -- "NL" ONLY) (TABLE 4B)
YES 21% (6/29)
NO 79% (23/29)
(CASES WHERE CONTRACTOR IS NOT LICENSED--"NL","NL-L","L-NL")
(TABLE 4B*)
YES 20% (7/35)
NO 80% (28/35)
(ALL CASES COMBINED) (TABLE 4C)
YES 50% (33/66)
NO 50% (33/66)
The same pattern clearly emerges whichever definition of "not
licensed" (Table 4B's or Table 4B*'s) is used. As a whole, consum-
ers had indifferent success bringing complaints against home improve-
ment contractors to DCA, achieving substantial redress only half of
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the time. However, consumers did extraordinarily well when they
sued licensees, getting what they wanted five-sixths of the time.
Conversely, they did extraordinarily badly when they sued non-
licensees, obtaining redress only a fifth of the time.
C. Comparison of Results Obtained in the Two Forums
Comparing Table 2 with Table 4, there is no significant dif-
ference between the results obtained in the two forums, whether one
focuses on cases involving licensees, non-licensees, or both. This
conclusion is not affected by my attempt to increase the sample size
in Table 2, or by my ambivalence about which contractors to include
as non-licensees in Table 4.
The fact that two quite different processes could produce such
similar results suggests that they are pressing asymptotically
against some externally imposed limits. Furthermore, the fact that
both forums do equally well in dealing with DCA licensees, and
equally badly in dealing with non-licensees, suggests that these
limits derive from characteristics of the contractor population.
It also implies that the licensee and non-licensee sub-populations
differ greatly from each other with respect to these characteristics.
That is, unless the fact of having a license is causative of a
greater willingness to settle or comply when faced with small claims
court proceedings, the differential success of small claims brought
against licensees would demonstrate that the possession of a
license is an indicator of some more basic characteristics, which
largely determine the contractor's response to either type of
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dispute settlement process.
The only possible causal connection between having a license
and demonstrating a greater willingness to settle or comply (herein-
after referred to as a "differential amenability") when faced with
small claims court proceedings would derive from DCA's General Rule
7 (Appendix C), which requires licensees to either pay, arrange for
payment of, or appeal small claims court judgments within 30 days
from their entry.
This rule is enforced in two ways. First, licensees applying
for their biennial renewals must certify that they are not "at the
time of filing" in violation of this rule, and must therefore either
lie on their certifications or pay their judgments at least every
two years. Second, if a consumer's judgment remains unpaid and
unappealed after 30 days, she may bring a complaint to DCA alleging
violation of this rule, which will trigger a consumer redress hear-
ing, a DCA order that the contractor pay the judgment and, if the
contractor remains intransigent, follow-up orders suspending and
then revoking his license. One could therefore try to explain the
differential amenability of licensees to small claims court pro-
cedures (in terms of settling as well as of paying judgments) by
arguing that, since the licensee knows that DCA will eventually
make him pay his outstanding small claims court judgments, his
motivation to fight small claims which he knows to be justified
will be eliminated or at least greatly reduced. Under this argument,
the fear of DCA sanctions applied against their licenses is the
cause of the licensees' differential amenability to small claims
court procedures.
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The argument has several important weaknesses. It gives too
much credibility to the potential DCA sanctions. Consumers may
never learn about the availability of the DCA process to enforce
their judgments. They may be so disgusted with the fact that their
judgment has not gotten them any money that they do not bother to
file a DCA complaint, or if they do, they may then not bother coming
to the consumer redress hearing. If the consumers do not complain
to DCA within a couple of months of getting their judgments, the
licensees would probably be safe from discovery if they "neglect
to mention" the outstanding judgments when applying for renewals.
Another major complaint that consumers have with contractors
is delay. Contractors frequently bridle at deadlines, and develop
a wide variety of strategems for "buying time". The assumption of
the argument that a contractor who knows that he will have to pay
up eventually would just as soon pay up now contradicts experience,
particularly if he is the sort of contractor who would seriously
contemplate defying a judicial judgment.
Also, the motivational analysis implied in the argument simply
seems wrong, at least as applied to licensees. My strong impression
after talking with many consumers who have received redress from
licensees is that the principal reason the licensees either settled
or complied with an order is that they were law-abiding and reason-
ably responsible people who would never seriously contemplate
behaving differently. This impression was buttressed by the
unanimous opinion of DCA employees involved in the complaint,
enforcement, and adjudication processes with whom I spoke; by the
response of licensees whom I interviewed; as well as by my own
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response to observing licensees in the 43 DCA hearings I attended, and
to reading the correspondence in the 82 additional case files I ex-
amined which involved licensees. Thus, the argument that fear of DCA
sanctions, rather than internalized standards, keeps the great major-
ity of licensees in line even when faced with small claims court
proceedings, is simply not persuasive.
The question then becomes, "What characteristics which would
tend to produce amenability to dispute-resolution processes are
present to a significantly greater degree among licensees than among
non-licensees?" Conversely, "What characteristics which would tend
to produce recalcitrance in the face of dispute resolution processes
are present to a significantly greater degree among non-licensees
than among licensees?" I have already mentioned that licensees tend
to be law-abiding and reasonably responsible people. This is hardly
surprising. It is possible though illegal to do business as a home
improvement contractor in New York City without a DCA license, a fact
attested to by the fifty-fifty distribution of licensees and non-
licensees in the combined small claims court and complaints samples.0
While there are some sanctions against performing home improvement
contracts without a license, and for some types of home improve-
ment businesses (such as those specializing in jobs that require
building permits) these sanctions would make it quite difficult to
avoid getting a license, for a wide range of specialties it is not a
practical necessity. For example, in the complaints sample both
licensees and non-licensees had been involved in contracts for roof-
ing and gutters (L14 & NL11), aluminum siding (L56 & NL74), storm
windows (L27 & NL53), awning installation (L58 & NL1), bathroom
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modernization (L83 & NL42), and both major (L67 & NL66) and minor
(L79 & NL36) kitchen renovations.92 Since both the contractors who
apply for a license and those who do not at least frequently appear
to be facing similar objective circumstances, the difference in their
behavior must at least frequently reflect differences in their
respect for the law (the belief that the law should be obeyed, a
habit of actually obeying it, and perhaps a belief that one is a
good person for believing and acting this way). Their respect for
the law, shown in their obtaining the required license, would also
tend to result in their carrying out formal DCA and small claims
court orders, and perhaps also in their carrying out informal
suggestions by DCA officials, such as Goodman, Sendyka, and the
hearing officers.
Furthermore, while a sense of personal responsibility for their
undertakings (a belief that people are entitled to receive what was
promised them, a habit of carrying out one's promises, especially
when called to task, and perhaps a certain degree of pride about
behaving this way) is not logically entailed by their demonstrated
respect for the law, it is psychologically consistent in the sense
that both attitudes follow from a willingness to pay a price in
terms of self-interest (narrowly defined) in order to meet the just
demands of others. While in none of the cases in which a presumably
justified complaint (to DCA or small claims court) was filed was this
sense of contractor responsibility so strong that he took care before
the complaint was filed that the consumer would have no cause for
filing one, it should not be discounted as a motivation for settle-
ment even after the consumer has made a formal complaint. Such a
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complaint is an unambiguous indication of the extent of the consum-
er's unhappiness with the contractor's performance. This may fre-
quently be the decisive factor in triggering the contractor's sense
of responsibility and energizing him to do something about the
problem.
There is reason to believe that non-licensees are relatively
deficient in the characteristics of respect for the law and sense of
personal responsibility for their undertakings. Non-licensees are
distinguished by the fact that they have violated one legal require-
ment, while some may not know about the licensing requirement, and
some others may have violated it not out of disrespect but out of
lethargy (a need to be prodded before they do anything), probably
most of them have made a conscious decision weighing their legal
obligation against the $100 out-of-pocket cost and the bother of fill-
ing out forms. This conclusion is supported by the fact (from Table
3) that out of 38 cases in the complaints sample in which contractors
received NL letters only four resulted in the contractor obtaining
a license as of nine months later. This demonstrates that attempts
to increase contractor awareness of the licensing requirement, in-
cluding prods specifically addressed to individual violators, produce
only marginal increases in compliance with this requirement, and
strongly suggests that only infrequently is the absence of notice or
of specifically aimed prods the true cause of contractor non-compliance.
If avoiding inconvenience and saving $100 are sufficient to
outweigh any qualms non-licensees may have about violating a legal
requirement, the legal obligation to comply with small claims court
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judgments is not likely to fare any better. Similarly, the moral
force of DCA's implicit request in the NL letter that the contrac-
tor satisfy the consumer's grievance (which accompanies the generally
ignored explicit instruction that the contractor obtain a license) is
unlikely to have much effect.
True, it would be logically consistent for a contractor to have
little or no respect for the law (and hence not obtain a license when
it is not in his personal interest to do so) yet to feel a sense of
personal responsibility for his undertakings, and some of the non-
licensees probably fit this description. Non-licensees may, for
example, lump the licensing requirement with a lot of other "bureau-
cratic" regulations which they regard as "impractical", that is, as
too expensive, complicated, and time-consuming for a small business-
man to comply with and still make a living. But a similar (if less
politically respectable) argument could be made for not finishing,
or repairing, their undertakings, or appearing in court when their
performance of these undertakings has been challenged, or paying
judgments which the court might award: such "responsible" behavior
is likely to be financially unrewarding, time-consuming, and dis-
tracting from their current activities in their pursuit of earning
a living. Since licenses are not very expensive and getting them
is not very difficult, I would think that most contractors who do
not carry out their obligation to get them (whatever their rational-
ization) would also likely not carry out their obligations under
their contracts, once these obligations became onerous.93
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V. Qualitative Analysis of Remedies Available to the
Home Improvement Consumer
The previous chapter demonstrated that a consumer in New York
City who has a grievance against a home improvement contractor has
an equal chance of obtaining substantial redress whether she goes to
small claims court or to the Department of Consumer Affairs. None-
theless, it is quite possible that within the broad category of
"received substantial redress" lie significant differences in the
quality of relief typically received by consumers, which differences
may consistently favor those consumers who went to one or the other
forum. This possibility will be explored in the present chapter.
The quality of the remedies which these forums offer will also be
evaluated.
The methodological issues involved in determining the quality
of redress which a forum offers are more complex than those involved
in determining the extent to which it offers significant redress at
all. The question of which remedy is "best" in a given situation
depends both on which remedy is most "just" in that situation, and
which one is most "feasible". Neither of these criteria can itself
be completely defined. The "justice" of the situation turns on a
number of factors including but not limited to: the nature of the
contract; the reasonable expectations of both parties at the time of
the signing and at various critical times thereafter; what was or
was not done; who was responsible for any eventual defects in per-
formance; and the present desires of the consumer (e.g. to cancel
the contract, to require the contractor to complete it, or to be
92
paid the cost of having someone else complete the contract). The
definition of these factors, and the weight to be given each one, may
come from common-sense notions of what is "unfair", from analogical
reasoning based on legal and other precedents, from statutes and
administrative regulations, and/or from more abstract ethical
reasoning.
The ingredients of feasibility are no more easily defined.
The following are all clearly relevant: general readiness of the
contractor to settle or to carry out the tribunal's orders, his
differing degrees of readiness to concur in different types of settle-
ments or of orders he may be given; what the consumer really wants
and what she will settle for; and the history and depth of the mis-
understanding and/or antagonism between the parties. This list is
also clearly incomplete. The analysis of feasibility is the analysis
of opportunities for effective action, and nuances of variations
along unpredictable dimensions may produce vastly different oppor-
tunities.
Standards for judging the remedies offered by these "alterna-
tive" dispute resolution forums might arguably be obtained by exam-
ining the remedies offered by a "regular" dispute resolution forum
--a court of general jurisdiction. Therefore, the analysis of the
appropriate remedies for contractors' breaches of home improvement
contracts will begin by examining in Section A the remedies that
could be offered by such a court. With this as a background, the
remedial principles applied by New York's small claims courts and by
DCA will be discussed in Sections B and C respectively.
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However, the components of justice and feasibility are too
complex to permit a fair evaluation of the remedies administered by
small claims courts and DCA simply by comparing them with those ad-
ministered by courts of general jurisdiction and commenting in the
abstract on the range and limitations of each set of remedies. There-
fore, Section D will provide a close analysis of the remedies actual-
ly offered by DCA or by small claims court, supporting the analysis
with reference to the facts presented in a number of cases from the
four samples. The focus will be on the extent to which the remedies
are adapted to the problems which they address. Finally, Section E
will consider ways of improving the remedies and the remedial proc-
esses in both forums.
A. Remedies Available in a Court of General Jurisdiction
In a court of general jurisdiction, the lawyer for the plaintiff
in a civil action would have the initial responsibility for describ-
ing and characterizing the relevant facts and for indicating the
relief to which his or her client is thereby entitled. The attorney
for the contractor would then respond to the allegations and requests
for relief in the "complaint" with an "answer". Usually the answer
consists of a denial or profession of ignorance as to most of the
allegations, and frequently adds the argument that even if the
allegations were true, the plaintiff would not be entitled to the
relief she requested, or perhaps to any relief at all. If the case
is not settled or dropped, or lost "on the merits" after a failure
to prove that facts entitling the plaintiff to some relief exist
(this failure could occur either at trial or in the course of some
pre-trial procedure), a judge (sometimes assisted by a jury) has to
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decide whether the law of contract remedies entitles the plaintiff
to the relief requested or, if not, to some lesser or different type
of relief.
The law of contract remedies was essentially developed by
common law and equity courts in England and the United States by
the end of the nineteenth century. Briefly, today, if the complaint
is that the contractor accepted a deposit but never did the work,
the plaintiff may, if she wishes, get her deposit back, either on
the theory that the contractor's conduct manifests his decision to
scrap the contract (regardless of whether he continues to protest
his intention to perform), or that his failure to begin performance
within a reasonable time ought in fairness to let her off the hook.
She may, however, choose instead to seek "contract damages" meas-
ured by the excess of what it will cost her to have someone else
perform the contract over the balance she would have had to pay
the defendant to complete the job, plus any demonstrable losses she
may have suffered as a result of the delay. Interest from the time
of her loss is added to this recovery, as it is to all restitution-
ary or compensatory monetary judgments. Also added to all civil
judgments are court costs, such as filing, service of process, jury,
and statutory witness fees. Attorneys fees are not included in
these costs, which is the reason why courts of general jurisdiction
are usually not practical forums in home improvement or most other
consumer cases.
If a substantial beginning was made on the work (equal to at
least the deposit), but the work was abandoned before completion,
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the consumer's only option is to seek damages (measured by the cost,
of having someone else complete it less any amount she still owes
the contractor, plus any provable losses resulting from the delay).
As was the case with the "work-not-started" situation, she will not
be entitled to any relief (i.e. not have a "cause of action") if
the delay has not been "unreasonable", unless the contractor has
otherwise communicated his intention not to complete the contract.
Courts will defer to deadlines specified in the contract in deter-
mining whether a delay is unreasonable, and intangible losses from
delays become provable if the contract has a "liquidated damages"
clause (setting a figure for the damages which would result from a
breach) addressed to this issue. Of course, contractors do not
ordinarily volunteer to insert either enforceable deadlines or
liquidated damages clauses in their contracts, and it is only the
most knowledgeable and careful consumers who insist on such contract
language.
If the contract has been completed, but completed improperly,
damages measured by the cost of having someone else fix the bad work,
plus any consequential damages (such as the cost of repairing water
damage from a roof leak, and perhaps of a hotel room while the house
dries out) are the consumer's only alternative. Similarly, if all
work was apparently done properly and on schedule, but defects appear-
ed during the contractor's warranty period, the consumer's damages are
again measured by the cost of having someone else do the repairs,
plus any consequential damages. If no warranty period is specified,
so long as warranties are not specifically disclaimed, a court will
imply a warranty for a reasonable period, based on a minimum life
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expectancy of a workmanlike job.
What is peculiar about the law of contract remedies in each of
these situations is that, regardless of whether the consumer's com-
plaint was that the work was not begun, not completed, or was done
improperly, the court will order the contractor to pay the consumer
money rather than to do the necessary work. That is, the consumer
does not have the option of obtaining, as all or part of the relief
to which she is entitled, an order requiring the contractor to
"specifically perform the contract" to do the work, complete it, or
come back and fix it. A judge would remind a consumer's attorney
who pressed for such an order that an order of "specific performance"
is an "equitable remedy" (that is, among the remedies previously
given by courts of equity), that equitable remedies were not avail-
able if there was an adequate remedy "at law" (that is, available
from a court of law), and that this restriction on the availability
of equitable remedies remains despite the demise of separate law
and equity courts. Monetary damages -- the sole remedy "at law" in
all these cases -- are generally considered adequate because some
amount of money will be sufficient to induce another contractor to
do the required work.
The extent to which the limitations on a court of general
jurisdiction's remedial powers would preclude the award by such a
tribunal of the optimal form of relief in a home improvement case
will be discussed in detail in Section D, below. The fact is that
such a tribunal is not free to choose between awarding damages or
specific performance in a particular case on the basis of which
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remedy is preferable, and that this constraint on a judge's freedom
to choose specific performance is not itself historically the result
of a reasoned policy decision that damages are the preferable remedy
wherever they are a possible remedy. This suggests that the
orthodox legal remedy will at least sometimes be suboptimal.94
An even more important limitation on the relief afforded by
courts of general jurisdiction is the exclusion of the consumer's
attorney's fee from the court costs which the consumer can recover
from the contractor if she prevails on the merits. Unlike the re-
striction on specific performance, this exclusionary policy is the
creation of American legislatures and courts, and is contrary to
the English rule. The justification generally given for this
exclusion is that it avoids the discouragement of possibly meritor-
ious but chancy lawsuits which would result from requiring unsuccess-
ful plaintiffs to pay defendants' attorneys' fees. The underlying
assumption is that the consumer-wins and the consumer-loses situa-
tions must be treated equally, at least unless the legislature inter-
venes to make a policy choice to treat the situations differently.95
The policy of refusing to compensate consumers for their
attorneys' fees also applies in small claims courts and before the
DCA, but its sting is much less in both these "alternative" tribunals
since consumers can generally navigate quite well through either one
without the aid of an attorney.96
Courts of general jurisdiction, on the contrary, are designed
to be used by lawyers rather than laymen, and a lay consumer who
brought a case "pro se" in such a tribunal would stand little chance,
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at least if the contractor retained a lawyer to contest the suit
rather than settling directly upon receiving the summons. The pro-
hibitive cost of retaining an attorney to bring such a case, in
light of both the limited resources of most consumers and the
moderate amounts at stake (in most cases), is the principal reason
why courts of general jurisdiction are impractical forums for these
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cases.
B. Remedies Available in Small Claims Court
The basic principle of small claims court remedies is that the
same rules apply as in a court of general jurisdiction except that
the judge or arbitrator hearing the case can award "money only" up
to $1000 plus court costs. If the claim is worth more than $1000
the consumer must, as a practical matter, either write off the
amount above $1000 or find a lawyer to bring the case in Civil
Court.99 If there is really no adequate remedy at law, the consumer
must sue elsewhere.
While the act creating New York City's small claims courts
instructs them to do "substantial justice",100 any implication that
this empowers these courts to decide for themselves the meaning and
requirements of "justice" is negated by the qualifying phrase,
"according to the rules of substantive law".101 This provision has
been interpreted by the courts to authorize informality in procedure
but no loosening of substantive rules.102
Small claims court arbitrators are free as a practical matter
to use whatever guides they think best in reaching their decisions.
This is because no transcript is made of the hearing before them,
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no statement of reasons is included with their decisions, and their
decisions are in any case by statute nearly unreviewable so long as
they stay within the $1000 jurisdictional limit.103 Nonetheless,
they seem to do their best to apply the law rather than do rough
justice, even in cases where they appear to understand that law and
justice have diverged.
I witnessed a repeated example of this in the application of
the rule applied in the Brooklyn small claims court forbidding
recovery on a property damage claim unless the complainant either
brings in a paid bill for the repair or an expert witness to testify
to the value of the loss.104 There were several instances where
credible complainants appeared sometimes with non-expert witnesses
at "inquests" -- the defendant having not appeared -- only to be
told that the case must be adjourned or dismissed for failure to
produce the proper evidence. Given the difficulties the claimants
would face even if the default judgment were to issue, 105 this added
burden of replacing the damaged item or hiring an expert, and in
either case returning again to court, seems unnecessarily harsh. It
seemed so to two different arbitrators on one evening, each of whom
went to the arbitrator assignment room to double-check with the
clerk that that was really the rule, before returning to his hearing
room to give the claimant in the case before him the bad news.
It is not surprising that arbitrators act this way, since
lawyers are trained from the first week of law school that the
"equities" of a particular case must often be sacrificed in the
interest of maintaining a legal rule which, in the general run of
cases, will supposedly produce a better result.
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A spirit of compromise and common sense does enter into the pro-
ceeding, but only in the areas of procedure, pre-trial encouragement
of settlements (which frequently require the defendant to do work
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rather than pay money), appraisal of conflicting testimony and dis-
count of possibly inflated damage claims. Judges in courts of
general jurisdiction also encourage settlements (often with what seems
to many lawyers an excessively heavy hand). Judges and juries
also regularly evaluate and discount testimony, so that the special
flexibility of small claims courts really resides entirely in its
procedures.
C. Remedies Available at the Department of Consumer Affairs
The Commissioner of Consumer Affairs is empowered by the New
York City License Enforcement Law of 1973 "upon due notice and hearing"
not merely to invoke disciplinary sanctions for violations of the
City's licensing laws and regulations, but also to "arrange for the
redress of injuries caused by such violations." 107 Home improvement
contractors are prohibited by the applicable licensing law from:
"Abandonment or willful failure to perform, without
justification, any home improvement contract or
project engaged in or undertaken by a contractor;
or willful deviation from or disregard of plans or
specifications in any material respect without the
consent of the owner."1 08
There is no definition of "redress of injuries" in the statute,
the regulations, or the Guide for Hearing Officers recently issued
by DCA. Nor is "redress of injuries" a legal term of art, so no
inference can be drawn of an intent by the City Council to incorpor-
ate legal or equitable remedial doctrines by reference. Nonetheless,
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there is a firm belief among DCA hearing officers that they have no
authority to award "damages". This belief reflects the difficulty
which lawyers (at DCA as well as elsewhere) have with the notion of
an official non-judicial tribunal adjudicating cases between private
parties in the manner of common law courts.109 However, while
avoiding "damages", the characteristic remedy of common law courts
in contracts cases, the hearing officers feel free to give other
forms of relief, especially restitution and specific performance.
The result is that DCA'a jurisdiction in these cases, as actually
exercised, ends up greatly resembling that of the former equity
courts but (since the hearing officers and their supervisors do not
think of themselves in these terms) without any restrictions for
cases in which there would be an adequate remedy at law.110
Typical consumer relief ordered by the DCA includes ordering
the licensee to finish the job or make repairs within a given time
from the date of the order (sometimes conditioned upon the consumer
making provision for paying the contractor amounts due him under
the contract), or make restitution to the consumer of a deposit or
of part or all of the contract price paid (the recovery sometimes
being measured by the cost incurred by the consumer in having some-
one else do the job). The restriction against awarding "damages"
prevents any awards measured on the basis of the harm to other
property of the consumer resulting from the contractor's breach
("consequential damages"). It also stops awards based on wages lost
or frustration incurred while waiting futilely for the contractor to
appear ("incidental damages"), or based upon an agreed-upon penalty
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for missing a deadline ("liquidated damages"), even if the amount so
awarded would be less than the total amount the contractor has
received from the consumer.
Restitution of a deposit paid but not earned, or of amounts
up to the contract price paid but not completely earned looks similar
to a damage remedy. It has however always been treated by the law as
a different, less dignified remedy, based as it is on ignoring the
promises and comparing the values of the performances actually ex-
changed. Even the cases where the relief was measured by the cost
of having someone else redo the job (cases D6 and D11 in my decision
sample -- the only two cases in my samples which were on appeal to
the courts!) arguably conformed to the restitutionary model, in that
the contractors were ordered to disgorge that part of payment they
received from the consumer (in D6, the whole thing) that did not
represent work done by the contractor that was of any value to the
consumer. The fact that a damage (benefit of the bargain) theory
would have produced the same dollar amount does not detract from the
restitutionary character of the remedy, since the two remedies will
generally produce the same result in this situation unless the cost
of redoing the job exceeds the total amount paid to the original
contractor for the job, as might well happen as a result of inflation
or of a below-market contract price by the original contractor. It
is only if DCA were to award the consumer the full cost of having
the job done right in the latter case that it would have left the
realm of restitution and entered solidly into the supposedly for-
bidden territory of damages. This they have not yet done. On the
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other hand, DCA does the economic equivalent of this when they order
a contractor to complete, redo, or repair a job that has become
unprofitable to him because of inflation, misestimate, or assorted
mix-ups.
D. Analysis and Comparison of Remedies at DCA and in Small
Claims Court
Some of the cases I studied appeared -- with benefit of hind-
sight -- to have resulted from simple mistakes and misunderstandings.
The contractor's receipt of notice from small claims court of the
consumer's claim against him,111 or of an L-letter or an NL letter
from DCA,112 may be sufficient impetus for him to reestablish
communications with the consumer and to resolve the problem. 113
Occasionally, however, the intervention of a third party may be
needed to unblock the dialogue. This function can be performed
equally well by a DCA hearing officer or a small claims arbitrator.
Where the consumer has paid a deposit but the contractor re-
fuses to begin work within a reasonable time, she is entitled to the
restitution of her deposit and the cancellation of the contract.
While both remedies are available from DCA,115 small claims court,
limited as it is to claims for "money only", can give only restitu-
tion. If the contractor (or a finance company to whom he had
assigned the contract) were then to sue the consumer for failure to
carry out her part of the bargain, she would have to reassert the
claim on which she had prevailed in small claims court in order to
defeat the action against her.116 This is not, however, likely to
be a major problem.
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Where the contractor has not started work and the consumer has
arranged with a second contractor to do the job, DCA's policy of not
awarding damages prevents the consumer from recovering in this forum
the amount (if any) by which the price of the second contract ex-
ceeded that of the first. While such damages are theoretically
available from small claims court, they are difficult to obtain in
practice. The consumer must show that the price charged by the
second contractor was "reasonable" and that she had "mitigated her
damages". Since estimates of home improvement jobs frequently vary
by more than 2:1, this requirement leaves plenty of room for argument
(e.g., "You did not obtain enough estimates." or "Your contract with
us was implicitly for a minimal workmanlike job, whereas your second
contract was with someone who caters to the 'carriage', or decorator
trade* therefore, your second contract was for a substantially
different job!"). Furthermore, this remedy, unlike restitution, is
unlikely to be offered by the contractor as a quick settlement.
On the other hand, where the contractor has not started work
and the consumer still wants him to do it, DCA has the theoretical
advantage in being able to order the contractor to perform the job.
Normally, however, it is imprudent to force someone to start a job
on one's house after he has refused -- better to get someone else,
118even at a higher price. Furthermore, the ethical argument that
the consumer is entitled to something more than restitution in this
situation is less than overwhelming.119 At all events in the three
sample cases in which I ascertained that the consumer obtained a
remedy in these circumstances, the remedy was limited to return of
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the deposit and (in one instance) an order to cancel the contract.120
Where the shoe is on the other foot, with the contractor press-
ing to do the job (or at least to collect his profit) while the
consumer wants to cancel, the principal problem is locating a legal
privilege enabling her to escape her apparent obligation. The common
law gives the consumer no such privilege unless she can demonstrate
an appropriate fault (fraud, anticipatory breach, etc.) on the part
of the contractor. DCA regulations, on the other hand, do give the
consumer the unrestricted right to cancel and retrieve her deposit
within three business days after she signed the agreement.121
As it happened, in each of the five cases in the samples in
which the consumer "wanted out" and the contractor "wanted in" and
in which I could determine the outcome DCA was the chosen forum.
The DCA regulation provided the sole legal basis for cancellation,
and the case turned on the factual question, "Did the consumer cancel
in time?"122 While the consumer's right to the return of her deposit
under the DCA regulation (though not her right to the cancellation of
the contract) could in theory be asserted just as well in small
claims cout, she is likely to do better at DCA where the hearing
officers are doubtless more familiar with this DCA-created right
than most small claims arbitrators and judges.
Where the contractor has: completed part of the work but
shows no sign of coming back to do the rest; completed the job but
not entirely satisfactorily; or even completed the job in a satis-
factory manner but it ceased to function properly in the course of
the warranty period,123 the search for the best possible remedy is
likely to be more complicated. Important factors which must be
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considered in this search include the present habitability of the
consumer's home, the possibility of calculating under the contract
a definite price for the work that was done, that was done right,
or that remains in satisfactory condition, and the feelings of
each party about the other party and the job.
In many cases in which more work needs to be done on a job,
the contractor renders an extended remedial search unnecessary by
doing the needed work promptly upon receiving from either forum the
initial notice of the complaint.124 In other cases the work so
undertaken is not itself satisfactory, yet is sufficient to dissuade
the consumer from pressing her complaint further. 125Another possi-
ble result of the initial notice is that the contractor returns the
consumer's money, though this may not have been what she wanted.126
Where the initial notice does not inspire contractor action, DCA is
capable of applying additional pressure short of actually holding a
hearing, while small claims court has no such capability. The DCA
pressure may take the form of a phone call from an employee of the
Home Improvement Division, a visit by an inspector (to an unlicensed
contractor), or a formal notice of hearing (to a licensee). Such
pressure sometimes provided the impetus for the contractor to get
the job done. 127
Where the consumer's home, or an important part of it, is
presently uninhabitable, the consumer needs to get the work done
promptly. Neither DCA nor small claims court can move quickly enough
with a mandatory remedy, forcing the contractor to do the necessary
work or to pay the consumer enough to enable her to hire someone
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else to do it, to satisfy her needs. If a voluntary response from
the contractor to the pleas of the consumer or the initial communi-
cations from the court or DCA is not forthcoming, the consumer will
have to lay out more of her own money to obtain the necessary ser-
vices from another contractor. Her remedy then is to seek to recoup
from the original contractor the excess of what she had to pay for
the second contract over the amount she still owed (if any) on the
first.
Where habitability is not a problem the consumer is still
entitled to make another contract now and seek reimbursement later,
but she has other options as well. These include seeking to compel
the original contractor to do the necessary work, doing nothing
until she obtains restitution for money paid the contractor for work
not done (or not done right) or contract damages based on the
anticipated cost of having another contractor do the work, or else
dropping the whole matter.
Where the consumer has not paid the contractor more than the
value of the work he has done (or done right), she usually has no
need for further relief. If she has paid more than this value and
can establish the amount of the excess, her remedy is similar to
what it would have been had the contractor done no work and she was
seeking the return of her deposit. Since restitution is an ordinary
judicial remedy it would definitely be available in small claims
court. Although I did not encounter any cases in which restitution
was awarded by DCA where the contractor had done some work, the fact
that it is available there in return-of-deposit situations makes its
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availability in this analogous situation likely.
If (assuming that a price for the incomplete or unsatisfactory
poriton of the work can be found in the first contract) the consumer
has had the work done by a second contractor who has charged her
more than the amount specified in the original contract for the same
work, or if the consumer has not yet had the work done but can pro-
duce expert testimony to how much more it would cost, she can recover
the difference (her "contract damages") only in a court, including a
small claims court. As in the analogous situation where no work
had been done by the original contractor, her need to prove mitiga-
tion of damages may make pursuing this relief more trouble than it
is worth.
Where separate prices for the incomplete or unsatisfactory
work cannot be identified in the original contract, it is difficult
to determine which party (if either) owes the other money. Even if
the consumer believes that she has paid for more than she has re-
ceived, she may have difficulty proving this in a court action or
DCA proceeding seeking restitution. She can have someone else
complete the job and then seek contract damages in small claims
court if she is willing to lay out her own money and take the risk
of not being (fully) reimbursed later. Full reimbursement might
not be attained if the consumer cannot serve the contractor, con-
vince the court that her interpretation of the first contractor's
responsibility for the work was accurate, convince the court that
the amount she spent on the second contract was "reasonable", or
collect on her judgment. Otherwise, she can hold off on doing the
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work, and hire an expert to testify in small claims court as to
either the difference between the amount she paid and the value of
the work that was done (restitutionary claim) or the difference
between the amount she owed on the first contract and the cost of
completing the work (contract damage claim).
In most cases in which more work needs to be done on a job,
seeking an order that requires the contractor-defendant to pay the
cost of having a second contractor do the work is unnecessarily
indirect, expensive and/or risky. The simpler, cheaper, and safer
remedy would usually be to seek an order requiring the original con-
tractor to complete or repair the job, while holding off making
arrangements for another contractor to do it. The three principal
problems with this remedy are that, for reasons already discussed,
it will not work if the house is uninhabitable, it is not available
in every forum, and it may not appear attractive where the parties
are strongly antagonistic.
The absence of a specific performance remedy in small claims
court often leaves the consumer who does not live in New York City,
has dealt with an unlicensed contractor, or simply does not
know about DCA , without the best possible remedy, or sometimes
without any effective remedy at all.128 Specific performance may,
however, be the result of a settlement worked out at small claims
court. Three of the six settlements in my S3-case small claims court
sample were of this type. 129
Specific performance is, of course, available at DCA. It was
the usual relief granted in the DCA cases which I studied, the
typical settlement agreed to by the parties at DCA hearings, and was
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usually carried out130 (sometimes with, 131and sometimes without,132
further prodding by the consumer and/or DCA). Except in cases in
which the contractor had reason to doubt the consumer's readiness
to pay once the work was completed, the contractors I observed at
the hearings appeared to regard such orders as fair.133
A contractor is better off with this remedy than with contract
damages, since the latter requires that he pay another contractor's
retail price. An order to complete or to repair can be satisfied
for the cost to the trade of labor and materials, or perhaps even
less, as where his personal efforts are involved and he is less than
fully employed. The contractor also has the advantage over another
contractor of already knowing the job requirements, thus eliminating
for him a time-consuming step.
DCA handles the problem of a contractor's worries over whether
the now-alienated consumer will pay in a number of ways. One such
method, described below, involves reducing the level of antagonism
between the parties. If, however, the hearing officer shares the
contractor's concern that the consumer may still not pay, he may
make the order that requires the contractor to perform conditional
upon the consumer placing the remainder of the price in an escrow
account, 134or upon the consumer simply paying the contractor in
advance. 13 A requirement that DCA's special inspector certify the
completion may also figure into the resolution.136 Finally, DCA may
deny relief entirely where it is convinced of the bad faith of the
137
consumer.
The antagonism between the parties is, nonetheless, the prin-
cipal deterrent to seeking an order for specific performance, and a
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major impediment to obtaining the benefit of such an order where one
is issued. The problem goes beyond the contractor's worries about
getting paid when he finishes. One or both parties may be irritated,
138frustrated, disappointed, perhaps even frightened, as a result of
the other party's performance to date. Typical consumer complaints
include missed appointments, unanswered phone calls, and sloppy work.
Typical contractor complaints include belated changes of mind, un-
reasonable interpretations of the contract specifications, as well
as tardy payments. At the beginning of the hearings I attended,
consumers' attitudes towards their contractors ranged from ever-
hopeful, through skeptical, to adamant. Contractors' attitudes
ranged from sheepish or eagerly cooperative, through wary, to incred-
ulous.
The consumer who is awarded specific performance but who is
not reassured about the intentions of the contractor is unlikely to
feel as though she is getting much relief. Similarly, settlements
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are unlikely where mutual suspicion is high, and an order to the
contractor to resume a relationship with someone whom he distrusts
is likely to be viewed as foolish or unfair, tempting him to ignore,
evade, or subvert it.
The remedial problems posed by continued antagonism between
the parties are greater where specific relief is ordered than where
legal damages are involved. The former requires that the parties
once more deal directly with each other, usually face-to-face, where-
as the latter can be satisfied with a check in the mail (or if not,
then through the intervention of a third party, like a sheriff or a
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marshall). It is therefore important that DCA hearing officers do
their best to reduce the antagonism between the parties.
While this seems a tall order where the hearing officer only
sees the parties for about one hour, a surprising amount of effective
conciliation actually went on at the hearings I witnessed. One
hearing officer was a particularly deft mediator and conciliator.140
In at least five instances I observed parties who had entered his
hearing room tense and glowering at each other leave looking greatly
relieved and discussing amiably with each other the arrangements for
doing the necessary work. He accomplished this result by patiently
eliciting points of agreement, by stating and restating any infer-
ence of good faith by either party which could be drawn from the
evidence at the hearing, and by refusing to let either party dwell
on the slights and insults which he or she suffered in the course
of their relationship.
The contribution of appropriate procedures toward making a
given "paper" remedy effective is not limited to making the parties
feel better about each other. Many disputes involve good faith
disagreements about "facts", such as whether the quality of the
materials and the contractor's work was up to the industry standard,
the cause of a leak or a draft, or the extent of the responsibility
for subsequent problems which the contractor assumed in the contract.
Where official determinations are based on accurate factual percep-
tions expertly evaluated, they are likely to be viewed as fair and
accurate by the parties, form the basis of settlements, and even
help solve the underlying problem (as well as help resolve the
disputes).
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To the extent that the "fact" in question depends on legal
knowledge and analysis (as it does where all questions of what has
occurred on the job site have been answered and only the issue of
the contractor's legal responsibility remains), the decision-makers
in both DCA and small claims court have direct access to the com-
tract document. Their expertise in evaluating it is generally equal
and adequate. Where the issue concerns the extent or sufficiency of
the work that was done or the cause of any subsequent problems, how-
ever, the nature and quality of the fact-finding process is very
different in the two forums. Small claims court judges and arbitra-
tors must rely on the testimony of the two parties, and that of lay
and occasional expert witnesses brought by the consumer, and of employ-
ees of the contractor. Even if the lay witnesses testify in per-
fectly good faith, they may not be able to offer more than a guess
as to the industry standard for materials or workmanship, or as to
the cause of any problems occurring after the job was completed.
The contractor, his employees, and any experts whom the parties
might produce may have accurate knowledge, but it is frequently dif-
ficult for the fact-finder to assess that accuracy. Usually it is
impossible to know whether they are telling the truth.
DCA, on the other hand, has the benefit of its special in-
spector, an employee experienced and knowledgeable in construction
matters, who can visit the job site and report what he has seen,
his judgment as to whether the work conforms to contract specifica-
tions, and his judgments as to the cause of any subsequent problems.141
In a number of cases in my samples the critical factor in the
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success of DCA's mediation efforts 142 and its mandatory remedial
143processes appeared to be the availability of the special inspector.
At those hearings in which the inspector testified or his reports
were accepted into evidence without objection, the special inspec-
tor's judgments as to causation and the conformance of the work to
the contract specifications, though not always undisputed, 144 were
always the best evidence avalable on these issues.145 In the one
case in my samples in which the special inspector's judgment was not
accepted by the hearing officer, the disagreement was not over these
issues but rather over the "legal" question of the appropriateness
of a remedy in a given factual situation.146
In practice, the enforcement mechanisms available to each
agency cast their shadows forward, accounting for at least some of
the "voluntary" settlements and compliance with orders which were
described earlier in this section. Sometimes, however, the contrac-
tor holds out until some sanction is actually imposed. Thus, in
some of the cases in the samples, DCA's ability to fine licensees,
and to suspend, revoke, and refuse to reinstate licenses, seems the
difference between the consumer's obtaining a remedy and her doing
without. 147
In other cases DCA's saber-rattling apparently did no good.148
The truly unscrupulous contractor often has the upper hand over DCA. 1 49
In still other cases the contractors appear to calculate carefully
how little they can do and still avoid sanctions.150 Finally, a
contractor may bring an Article 78 proceeding to obtain judicial
review of an adverse order, which may result in each party ending
up as badly or worse off than if s/he had settled on the other party's
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terms at the beginning.151
The attempts to apply sanctions to enforce small claims court
judgments also produced mixed results. Sheriffs' executions were
responsible for recovering in two of the 53 cases in the small claims
court sample. Attempts to collect through this process were, however,
definitely unsuccessful in four more.152 Also, DCA will attempt,
under its General Regulation 7,153 to enforce unpaid small claims
court judgments issued against its licensees.154
The most efficacious remedy against obdurate contractors is
provided by neither DCA nor small claims court. Rather, it is self-
help, accomplished by rigidly refusing to let the contractor ever
have significantly more in payments than the value of the work which
he has already completed. 155
One situation where even this sort of care will not necessarily
protect the consumer is one in which the contractor has, by action
or inaction, caused damage to property not the subject of the con-
tract. "Consequential damages", like "contract damages", are not
awarded by DCA.156 The consumer must absorb them, persuade the con-
tractor or his liability carrier (if any) to pay them, or go to court.
Relief can, in principle, be had at small claims court up to its
$1000 limit. 157
One class of consumer for whom there is rarely an adequate
remedy in any forum is the consumer who is frightened of the con-
tractor. Such people occasionally venture an initial complaint,
but their fear, whether or not justified, makes it difficult for
them to follow through if they do not quickly obtain satisfaction. 158
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E. Recommended Changes in DCA and Small Claims Court Powers
and Procedures
Many of the consumers in my samples had only the vaguest
notions of what the relief mechanism they were invoking was equipped
to do. This theme came through clearly in my reading of small claims
court "Request for Information" forms and of the consumers' com-
plaint letters to DCA. The accuracy of their notions about the
alternative avenues of relief which they have not invoked is surely
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in general even less. While the level of public knowledge about
relief mechanisms could be significantly increased by a massive
public education campaign, the same could be said for the level of
public knowledge about other, more important, matters as to which
the citizenry should be well informed, but is not. Since most
consumers cannot be expected to become experts on remedial processes,
the more promising approach would be to increase the flexibility and
efficacy of each major consumer relief mechanism.
For the largest category of home improvement complaints, the
optimal remedy would normally be a sequenced combination of DCA's
characteristic "Go back and finish (or fix) it!" followed by the
small claims court's "Pay the consumer the cost of having someone
finish (or fix) it!". The first part of the sequence alone would
160
usually be adequate. The latter part of the remedy would need to be
invoked only where the contractor had proven himself either incompe-
161tent or unwilling to do the required work. The proof of incom-
petence or unwillingness might be adduced at the first hearing
either by the position which the contractor takes at the hearing
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("I absolutely can't do it", or "I absolutely won't do it"), or by a
very strong showing based on his previous behavior. In my judgment,
this remedy is so much more preferable to damages, and the possibil-
ities for conciliation at a properly run hearing are so great, that
a tribunal should be very sure that specific performance will not
work before ordering a monetary remedy at the initial hearing. How-
ever any substantial evidence of incompetence or unwillingness
following an initial order of specific performance should, at the
consumer's option, result in a prompt judgment for damages. It is
unfair to a consumer who has already been wronged by a contractor's
initial breach to make her endure more of the same conduct once it
becomes clear that the tribunal's order has not provided sufficient
impetus for change.
Although both small claims court and DCA have on occasion
jerryrigged this sequenced remedy,162 neither tribunal has the clear
power to order both parts of it. Granting both forums the requisite
authority would not require providing either one with additional
enforcement mechanisms. The initial order in small claims court
could provide that:
Defendant shall take the following steps within __days:
Claimant may any time thereafter notify the Clerk of this
Court if the specified work has not been properly done.
The Clerk shall schedule the case for a rehearing at the
earliest date convenient to the claimant, and shall notify
both parties. If at the rehearing the claimant proves that
the specified work was not properly done, judgment shall be
entered for the claimant in the sum of $ /the best
estimate of the cost of procuring the specified work and
materials, plus $200 penalty, plus normal court costs,
should be entered here as part of the initial order7.
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The initial order at DCA could provide that:
The licensee shall take the following steps within days:
The consumer may any time thereafter notify the Calendar
Division if the specified work has not been properly done.
The Calendar Division may, after consultation with the
hearing officer who heard the complaint initially,
schedule a Special Inspection and a rehearing as soon as
possible thereafter; otherwise, it shall schedule a
rehearing as soon as possible. If upon rehearing, the
Department concludes that the specified work has not been
properly done, it shall order the licensee to pay the
consumer the sum of $ /The best estimate of
procuring the specified work and materials should be
entered here as part of the initial order7, and shall
also order the licensee to pay the Department a civil
penalty of $200. The failure of the licensee to pay
both sums within 15 days of the order to do so shall
result in the revocation of his license.
I recommend that legislation be passed granting all small
claims courts in New York State the power to make and enforce orders
of the type suggested, and confirming the power of DCA to make and
enforce orders of the type suggested.
The suggested legislation, if passed and implemented, would go
some distance toward improving the responsiveness of contractors in
both forums. The $200 penalty, assessed if the work is not done
within the specified time regardless of the contractor's excuse, is
likely to reduce foot-dragging by those who are subject to such
orders.
This proposed legislation does not, however, affect contractors
who are effectively outside the jurisdiction of both tribunals:
those non-licensees who are difficult to locate for service of proc-
ess or who have no substantial easily identified assets. I know of
no way, short of unreasonably expensive public education or law en-
forcement campaigns, either to put these contractors out of business
or to make them amenable to consumer redress efforts.
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VI. Cost/Benefit Analyses of the Two Forums
The purpose of DCA's home improvement contractor consumer
redress hearing procedure is to provide an instrument for consumers
with legitimate grievances against contractors to obtain an appro-
priate remedy from them. One function of small claims court -- the
function which I have studied here -- is to do the same thing. The
extent to which these forums actually provide such remedies for these
consumers was the subject of the two preceding chapters. This
chapter will consider the costs to the consumers, the contractors
and the taxpaying public of obtaining relief in these forums. I will
also attempt to compare the costs and benefits of each forum in an
effort to determine whether they are worth maintaining and emulating.
A. Costs v. Benefits to Individual Consumers Using Each Forum
(1) Small Claims Court
The price of suing a contractor in small claims court is small:
a $2.00 filing fee, plus $1.40 for a certified mail notice to the
defendant, which the defendant will be ordered to reimburse if the
claimant prevails on the merits. However, the total cost to the
consumer of obtaining this service (her "procedural cost") is of
course higher than the price which she must pay for it. A physical
appearance at the clerk's office (by the claimant or a friend) is
necessary in order to file the claim: this will typically involve
a dollar's worth of public transportation. Since this trip can
ordinarily be accomplished during lunch hour, or otherwise fitted
into one's schedule (if necessary, during the one evening each
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week that the clerk's office is open), it need not result in lost
wages. If the matter is not settled before the hearing date, a
courtroom appearance (usually with at least one family member,
friend or witness in tow) becomes necessary. The consumer will not
normally lose wages, since the court meets in the evening, but at a
minimum she will have to spend two or three more dollars in trans-
portation. A settlement or judgment at this point, if carried out
without further ado, will still have been obtained at an out-of-
pocket cost under $10.
In fact, out of the 50 small claims court cases in my sample
in which the claimant did not voluntarily remove the case from small
claims court, the consumer never appeared for a court session in 22,
appeared only once in another 20, while in six she appeared twice and
in two more thrice. Perhaps more significantly, of the eleven cases
pursued through small claims court in which the consumer definitely
received substantial satisfaction, four involved out-of-court
settlements, six required one court appearance, and only one required
two such appearances. Thus, the average number of court appearances,
both for all claimants and for the subclass of successful ones, is
somewhat less than one.
In six of the cases a sheriff's execution was issued, which
cost the claimant $10. In two of these the executions were defin-
itely successful, with the result that the claimant received from
the contractor -- in addition to the amount awarded on her claim--
$10 for the execution plus the $3.40 for filing fee and notice. In
two more of these cases the executions were unsuccessful, leaving
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the plaintiff to bear the $13.40 in addition to her losses on the
underlying claim, and any incidental expenses in attempting to
collect. I do not know the claimant's success in the two remaining
cases. Other than the first two cases mentioned, there were only
two cases in which she realized on a judgment awarded her in a
contested arbitration and therefore recovered her $3.40. The
remaining eight cases in which the consumer definitely received
substantial redress all resulted from in-court or out-of-court set-
tlements, none of which included an allowance for court costs.
One case in which I do not know whether the consumer eventually
recovered on her inquest judgment, she had to hire a professional
process server. He served process on the defendants twice, the first
time mistakenly addressing it to their corporate name, but charging
$20 per service, nonetheless. The $40 was added to the costs by the
arbitrator, and will be recovered by the consumer if the sheriff is
successful in his execution. In five other cases the claimant men-
tioned to me that she or he had attempted to serve process after the
clerk's office's mailed notice was returned unclaimed. I do not
know whether any of these cases involved the use of a paid process
server (in New York any adult other than the claimant is permitted
to attempt service), but in any case none of these efforts was suc-
cessful, and hence any such cost would not be recovered.
I do not know whether any claimant reimbursed her witness for
any expenses beyond transportation. I assume the claimants generally
paid for the subway tokens, and may frequently have felt obliged to
pay for dinner as well. The most valuable witnesses are often
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licensed home improvement contractors. Unless such a person has
done the repair work and given the consumer a paid bill, or is
willing to come into court to testify that the defendant-contractor
botched the job to the claimant's injury of X dollars, the consumer
may not be permitted to recover in a case in which the competence
of the defendant or the cost of repairing inadequate work is at
issue.163  There is normally no reason why such an "expert" would
testify on a consumer's behalf without compensation, though the
compensation might sometimes come in the form of an agreement by
the consumer to hire him to do the work once the defendant-contrac-
tor loses and pays. Yet, the issue must sometimes resolve into the
dilemma of pay-the-witness-or-lose-the-case.
None of the consumers were represented by lawyers. In the
two cases originally filed in small claims court in which the
claimants later retained lawyers, the lawyers filed claims in day
court for over $1000, thus removing the cases from small court jur-
isdiction. I doubt any consumer in the 50 cases which remained in
small claims court (after one other case was voluntarily dropped)
ever paid a lawyer's fee with respect to the case.
I have not attempted to monetize the value of the consumer's
own time and inconvenience in coming to court to file the claim and
then perhaps again for the scheduled hearing. Some consumers doubt-
less relish this experience: only two out of 86 people questioned
in a Consumer Reports survey of small claims court consumer-plain-
tiffs responded that they would not use the court again, and several
seemed delighted at discovering their competence to vindicate their
own rights.164 Some others, especially among those for whom it
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proved futile, may have ended up resenting the entire process.
Most of the people I spoke with who did not succeed in collecting,
blamed this on the inadequacy of their evidence or on the shifti-
ness of the defendant-contractor in avoiding service or execution.
Very few spoke bitterly of the court or its processes, or mentioned
wasting their time. While an argument could therefore be made that
the time consumers spent at the court should be treated more as a
form of civic education (a benefit) than as part of the investment
they were required to make in their attempt to obtain redress (and
hence by itself a detriment), most people would probably see it as a
net "aggravation". Nonetheless, the problems of monetizing the
benefits, the detriments, or the resulting "net detriment", in a
convincing manner are probably not solvable.
The total procedural cost to the typical consumer, to the
extent that this cost can be monetized, ranges from $4.40 where
the case never goes to hearing (for filing and notice fees and one
round-trip on the subway) to perhaps $20 where the case goes to hear-
ing and an unsatisfied execution issues (for filing and notice fees,
three round-trips, a modest supper for the witness or friend, and
the fee for the sheriff). A rough estimate of the average cost
would be based on the 22 cases not voluntarily removed or discontin-
ued in which the consumer never appeared for a hearing (at $4. 40 per
case), four cases in which the fees were definitely recouped, but
only after the consumer (perhaps accompanied by a friend or witness)
had appeared for a hearing (at $6.00 per case, $1.00 for transporta-
tion to file the claim and $5.00 to cover estimated average costs of
attending the hearing), the 16 other cases in which the consumer
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appeared at one hearing ($4.40 + $5.00 = $9.40 per case), the six
cases which required two appearances (at $14.40 per case), and the
two cases requiring three appearances (at $19.40 per case), plus $40
in unrecouped sheriff's costs and $40 in so-far-unrecouped process-
server costs for the entire sample. The total, $476.40, divided by
the 50 cases, yields an average cost to the consumer of $9.35 per
case. By way of contrast, in the 11 cases in my sample in which
the consumer definitely received either monetary redress or redress
which I can easily monetize, the average recovery was $401 and the
median recovery $270. Even considering the fact that about half of
all claimants probably receive nothing from this process, the mon-
etary cost of going through it was a good investment. Furthermore,
when compared to the costs which taxpayers have to bear to support
the small claims courts (see section C(l), below), the share of the
costs allocated to the claimants does not seem unreasonable.
(2) DCA
The price of bringing a complaint against a home improvement
contractor before the DCA is zero: this is true regardless of
whether the complaint results in nothing more than an "exhaustion"
letter (at one extreme), or in a special inspection, a contested
hearing, a remedial order, and an article 78 proceeding going up to
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (at the other). The
minimum cost of bringing such a complaint is not much larger, since
a single letter to DCA suffices to get the complaint docketed and
sent to the Home Improvement Division. If this letter contains a
copy of the contract, an L or NL letter will be sent forthwith to
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the contractor, who may in turn provide the necessary relief.
Usually, if a copy of the contract is enclosed, it is only because
the consumer learned of this requirement upon calling the DCA
consumer complaint line. If it is not, DCA will send the
consumer a form letter requesting the copy which necessitates that
the consumer send a follow-up letter enclosing it. In any event, the
cost of postage on the initial letter, plus a phone call or postage
on a follow-up letter, plus xeroxing both sides of the contract, is
no more than $0.50.
Thirty-six of the 92 cases in the complaints sample actually
began not with a letter to DCA but with a personal visit to either
the main office in lower Manhattan or one of four field offices in
other boroughs. The cost of filing these complaints is probably
two subway tokens ($1.00) but some consumers may live within walking
distance of an office. Since a consumer filing a complaint in person
would probably take her original contract with her, the cost of
xeroxing this (which DCA then picks up) and of mailing it in is
eliminated. Also included in this sample were four cases referred
by the New York State Attorney General's office and three by the
Nassau County Consumer Protection Division. These were handled by
DCA the same way as complaints mailed directly to DCA. Most of them
probably began as letters to one or the other of these agencies, but
some may also be "walk-ins". Either way, the cost to the consumer
of filing these complaints is probably not much more than the cost
of approaching DCA directly.
An actual DCA hearing could be more expensive for a consumer
with a daytime job than a small claims court hearing, since DCA
126
hearings are held only during the day, only on week-days, and (what
with waiting for the case to be called) take up a full morning or
afternoon. But this is not as serious a problem as might appear.
Out of 92 cases in my complaints sample, in only twelve did the
consumer ever attend a hearing, and in only three of these cases did
the consumer have to attend two hearings. Of the 33 cases in which
the consumer definitely received substantial satisfaction, in five
of them the consumer attended a hearing: these five include one case
in which the consumer attended two hearings. Thus, the average
number of hearings per complaint filed is .163; the average number
of hearings per complaint successfully resolved is .18. But my
impression from the 43 hearings I sat in on in compiling my hearings
sample is that in only about half the hearings is the consumer -- or
someone in his or her entourage -- employed on a full-time basis.
If we assume that those who are missing a half day's work lose a net
of $40 in docked wages, the total of wages foregone in the complaints
sample is $300, the average wage lost per complaint filed is $3.26,
and the average wage lost per complaint successfully resolved is
$3.64. However, the prospect of losing a half day's wages keeps
some consumers from pursuing their complaints through a hearing:
one consumer in my complaints sample who did not appear at a sched-
uled hearing gave me this as her reason.
As happened in small claims court, consumers who appeared at
DCA hearings frequently brought along spouses, relatives, and/or
neighbors. I believe it is quite unlikely that in any of these
cases more than one person on the consumer's side was foregoing
income to attend. The company served primarily as moral support,
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occasionally as witnesses to what happened, somewhat more often an
spokesmen or translators. Indeed, three times in my hearings sample
the consumers themselves did not even appear: once the daughter
came instead, once the son, and once a neighbor who had been involved
in negotiating the original contract. DCA permits this practice
which further reduces the inconvenience and likelihood of lost wages
attendant upon the hearings. In only one case in this sample did the
consumer bring along a paid witness (a plumber). Unlike at small
claims court, the absence of expert witnesses at DCA is no impediment
to recovery by the consumers, since a special inspection is ordered--
and paid for at the City's expense -- wherever the quality of what
was done or the extent of necessary repairs is at issue: that is, in
those cases where small claims court might require the claimant to
furnish an expert witness.
Attorneys, like expert witnesses, are unnecessary at the hear-
ings, and end up acting (and doubtless feeling) like fifth wheels.
In only three of the 41 cases in the hearings sample were the con-
sumers represented by lawyers or paralegals. Of these, only one
consumer (a well-to-do Manhattan matron) actually paid for her
attorney. The second consumer (a municipal employee) was represented
by an attorney provided by his union under a judicare (legal insur-
ance) program. The third consumer (a Spanish-speaking woman) appear-
ed with a paralegal, doubtless supplied by a legal services office,
whose function at the hearing was principally to translate. While
the attorney in the first case expressed outrage that the hearing
officer ordered a special inspection rather than disciplining the
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contractor or ordering relief, and the attorney in the second case
did her best to examine and cross-examine the witnesses and to make
careful opening and closing arguments (and expressed outrage that
the hearing officer was not keeping the proceeding "orderly"), their
exercise of legal talent in no way affected the results of the
hearings.
To calculate the average out-of-pocket cost to a consumer
pursuing a complaint against a home improvement contractor before
DCA, one adds the $36 expenses of the 36 consumers in the complaints
sample who filed their complaints by walking in to a DCA office, the
$28 spent by the 56 consumers who filed their complaints by mail,
$30 transportation costs (for the consumer and one accompanying
person) for those who attended hearings, $300 in lost wages due to
the hearings, $40 for the plumber whom one consumer brought with
her, and $100 for the attorney whom another consumer brought along.
The total, $534 divided by the 92 complaints, yields an average cost
per complaint of $5.80. This is about 60% of the $9.53 average cost
of pursuing a small claims court case against a similar defendant.
While the benefits are rarely directly in cash, and therefore
are more difficult to monetize than those from going to small claims
court, both the statistical (chapter IV) and qualitative (chapter V)
comparisons of the two forums indicate that consumers are at least
as satisfied by the results in DCA as they are with the results from
small claims court. This conclusion is reinforced when the non-
monetizable costs of attending hearings are added. The average
number of hearings per case at DCA (15/92 = .163) is less than one-
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third of that at small claims court (30/50 = .6). Since there is
no reason to believe that sitting in the waiting room at DCA is more
annoying than sitting in the courtroom or waiting room at small
claims court, that participating in the hearings at DCA is any more
upsetting, or that the DCA process is less "educational", the average
non-monetary costs per consumer associated with such hearings are
therefore less at DCA.
B. Costs to Contractors of Responding in Each Forum
(1) Small Claims Court
While the defendant is supposed to pay the claimant's court
costs if the claimant prevails (filing fee, notification postage,
and sheriff's fee, if any), this only happened four times in the 28
cases in which I could be sure of the final result. Of these, two
were inquests followed by sheriff's executions, resulting in costs
of $13.40; the other two were arbitrators' judgments voluntarily
paid by defendants, thus limiting the costs to $3.40. The average
court costs paid by defendants in the 28 cases was therefore $1.20,
and any defendant could most probably have cut his procedural cost
to zero by settling before judgment (settlements never -- in my ex-
perience -- included court costs).
The one required court visit by the claimant, to file the
claim, has no analogue for the defendant. Furthermore, while defen-
dants ought in theory attend as many hearings as the claimants, in
fact they do not: out of the 52 cases in which the record was
adequate to determine whether the defendant appeared, he appeared
in only 16 (31%), compared with appearances in 28 (54%) by the con-
sumer. In two of these cases the defendant appeared twice, and in
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one he may have appeared three times. Still, that is only 20
appearances in all for 52 cases, for an average of .39 appearances
per case. Cases in which they did appear in court were, however,
more expensive on the average -for defendants than for claimants.
While none of the claimants who remained in small claims court
were represented by lawyers, in five of the cases appearances by an
attorney for the defendant was noted on the file card. Strikingly,
four of these cases resulted in settlements (out of the seven settle-
ments in the entire sample), while the fifth resulted in an arbitra-
tor's judgment for the consumer, but only for one quarter of the
amount she requested. Since these cases all involved courtroom
appearances (however brief), it is doubtful that the defendants got
by with less than a $100 lawyer's bill. At this rate, this comes to
$31.25 on the average for the sixteen cases in which defendant
appeared in court, though only $10 per case when spread over the 50
cases in the entire sample (excluding those voluntarily removed or
discontinued by the consumer), If the defendant's incidental ex-
penses (fares, possible compensation to anyone he might bring along
to testify) averaged $15 per appearance (probably high), this could
come to $18. 75 per defendant who appeared (since some came to court
more than once), but only $6.00 over the 50 cases. Defendants' time
might also be reasonably monetizable, since appearing in court is
one of the costs of doing business. At $15/hour over an average of
two hours per court visit (including their transportation time),
defendants could reasonably view their 20 visits as costing them-
selves a total of $600, or $37.50 per defendant appearing in court,
though only $12.00 when spread over the 50 cases.
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In summary, if a defendant appears ($30) along with an employee-
witness (say, another $30) and an attorney ($100), and the case goes
to judgment for the consumer (shifting the $3.40 court costs to the
contractor), his procedural costs might be $163.40. This figure
includes no allowance for a second court visit, since a second appear-
ance was unnecessary in all the cases where defendant had retained
an attorney. The average defendant who appeared would spend $31.25
for his (fractional) attorney, $18.75 for incidental expenses, and
$1.20 for court costs, and could charge up $37.50 for his own time,
for a total of $88.70. Neither this average figure, nor the maxium
figure of $163.40, is so large compared to the average ($401) or
the median ($270) recovery,166 or to the average ($2091) or the
median ($1536) contract size,167 as to be a serious obstacle to a
contractor's defense. However, those who settled before the hearing
and those who evaded either notice or execution did not have to in-
cur any costs with respect to the small claims court proceeding.
The average defendant, including those who settled before hearing
and those who successfully evaded either notice or execution, paid
$10 attorney's fees, $6.00 for incidental expenses, $1.20 for court
costs, and could reasonably have charged himself $12.00 for his own
time, for a total of $29.20.
(2) DCA
Home improvement contractors pay the City $50/year for their
license. In section C(2), below, the extent to which this fee
should be attributed to the cost of operating DCA's dispute resolu-
tion procedures (versus its licensing procedures) will be considered.
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Whether a larger fee covering a greater proportion of the cost of
DCA's home improvement contractor dispute resolution procedures
would be justified will also be discussed. Since DCA's consumer
redress procedures could be replicated in a jurisdiction in which
the license fees recoup none of the costs of these procedures, the
present discussion will focus on the marginal costs to the contractor
of having to respond to a DCA complaint.
The minimum costs to the contractor occur if he can end the
case with a letter or phone call to the Home Improvement Division.
This will usually not do the trick unless he has also done some-
thing to assuage the consumer, such as doing the work she requested
or explaining the nature of the misunderstanding (if any). Assuming
the consumer is entitled under a fair interpretation of the under-
lying contract to the work she requested, if the contractor does
that work under DCA prodding this will not be treated as a prodedural
cost. This is a cost the contractor should incur regardless of the
procedure. The minimum cost is therefore two phone calls or letters
(one to DCA, the other to the consumer) --under $1.00. Even if the
contractor does not react until he receives a notice of hearing, his
costs need not be any greater so long as he settles the controversy
before the actual hearing. Out of the 44 licensees in the sample
who were still in business at the time the complaint was filed, 29
(66%) did not, so far as I can tell, incur greater procedural costs
than that.
Actually, 17 of the 25 non-licensees in the sample (excluding
those who were out of business) did not even bother responding to
DCA's NL letter. For them the costs of responding to the consumer's
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complaint came close to zero, with the exception of the solitary
contractor who ended up paying a fine of $25 for doing business
without a license (though still doing nothing with respect to the
consumer's complaint). Based on this sample, the average cost of
doing business without a license is slightly more than $1 per
complaint.
Procedural costs were somewhat greater for licensees where the
Home Improvement Division arranged a special inspection, the con-
tractor attended along with the special inspector, and the case was
settled on the spot. The cost involved here is merely that of
meeting Inspector Sendyka at the consumer's home, involving perhaps
an hour-and-a-half, or $22.50 of the contractor's time. There was
only one such case in the complaints sample.
Substantial procedural costs were incurred in only 14 of the
cases in the sample (32% of the cases in which licensees were still
in business) in which the licensee appeared for a hearing. In four
of these cases the licensee actually had to appear for two hearings,
a total of 18 hearings for the group. While the hearings rarely
took more than an hour, and often much less, there was frequently
an hour or more wait before the case was called. When this is com-
bined with (say) a half-hour subway ride either way to and from the
hearing, they probably consume an average of two-and-a-half hours
of the contractor's working day, which at $15/hour comes to $37.50.
Add to this the $1 in subway fares.
Of course, contractors do not always come to these hearings
unaccompanied. I took careful notes of who arrived for each side
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in compiling my hearings sample. Out of the 41 hearings in which
the contractor (or someone on his behalf) arrived, in five the
company's principal representative brought a partner or employee
with him, in a sixth case he brought a partner, an employee, and a
lawyer, and in three he brought his wife (apparently just for moral
support). Assuming that the partners' and employees' time was also
worth $37.50,168 that the lawyer billed $100, and that the opportun-
ity cost of the wives' time was not directly monetizable, the total
cost of the entourage comes to $362.50 + $10 subway fares = $372.50.
In one other case, an attorney appeared as the only representative
of the contractor to contest DCA jurisdiction over the case. Averag-
ed out over the 41 hearings, allowing $26 for the principal represen-
tative in each case (except $100 for the attorney in the last
mentioned case), this comes to $36.89 per hearing.
The average cost per contractor who appeared at a hearing was
actually $47.43 rather than $36.89, since out of 14 cases in the
complaints sample in which the contractor came to at least one hear-
ing, in four he came to two hearings at an average cost of $36.89
each. Furthermore, in six of these cases (the four in which a
second hearing was necessary, plus two more that were settled at the
subsequent special inspection) a special inspection was ordered at
the initial hearing, adding perhaps $22.50 to each contractor's costs,
and raising the average cost to the contractor who appears at a hear-
ing to $57.50.
This latter figure is still substantially lower than the $88.70
cost to the average defendant who appeared in small claims court.
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The difference is fully accounted for by the fact that in five of the
sixteen cases in which the contractor appeared in small claims court
he did so accompanied by his lawyer, whereas in only two of the 41
cases in the hearings sample did a lawyer for the contractor appear.
The most expensive case for the contractor in the hearings sample
was one in which the lawyer, two partners, and an employee-witness
appeared at a presumed cost of $215.50. This was an example of
naivete on the part of the partners and their lawyer. They came pre-
pared to win a major testimonial battle when the form and language of
the written contract spoke so tellingly in their favor that the
hearing officer bothered to hear their oral testimony only to save
their attorney from embarrassment.
I doubt that attorneys were any more necessary in the five small
claims court cases in which defendants retained them (except the two
cases in which plaintiffs' retained attorneys who removed the cases
to day court). It appears that a substantial proportion of people
sued in small claims court feel uncomfortable defending themselves
without the aid of an attorney, while the great majority of licensed
contractors feel that they can navigate a DCA hearing without pro-
fessional assistance.
On the other hand, the rough analogue of the removal to day
court in small claims court practice is the appeal (in the form of
an Article 78 proceeding) to the state Supreme Court of a DCA decis-
ion. No such appeals occurred in any of the 92 cases in the com-
plaints sample. Indeed, the only two cases in any of my samples in
which Article 78 proceedings were definitely brought, Dll and D6/20,
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involved highly unusual DCA orders requiring the contractors to pay
their respective consumers over $1000 each for breaches of warranty.
While I have no way to estimate accurately the attorneys' fees in
these cases, I doubt they were under $1,000 each. However, since
no Article 78 proceedings were involved in the complaints sample,
and since the two that were brought were very unusual and were
apparantly triggered only by DCA orders for monetary compensation
greater than the $1000 small claims court limit, I will not make any
allowance for bringing such an appeal in calculating the contractors'
costs of responding in the DCA forum. This parallels the exclusion
of the two cases transferred to day court from the calculation of
costs in small claims court proceedings.
To summarize, adding the $1/complaint average cost of responding
(or not responding) to DCA's initial L or NL letter (multiplied by
92 complaints), plus the $22.50 cost of attending a special inspec-
tion in one case, to the $799.02 total hearing costs for the
fourteen contractors who attended such a hearing, divided by the
92 complaints in the sample, yields an average procedural cost to
the contractor of $9.93 -- substantially below the $29.50 of the
average contractor-defendant in small claims court. This includes,
as did the corresponding small claims court figure, cases involving
both licensees and non-licensees, as well as cases resolved at all
stages of the proceedings, independently of the proceedings, or not
at all.
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C. Costs to the Taxpayer of Maintaining Each Forum
(1) Small Claims Court
The cost data on which the calculations in this section are
based was obtained from interviews with Phoenix Ingraham, Chief Clerk
of the Civil Court of the City of New York, and with people in his
office. The data are for June, 1979, as are the comparable data for
DCA which will be considered in the next section. The data are for
the city as a whole. The entire costs of the Civil Court, with the
exception of the small contribution from filing fees, were formerly
picked up by the City. This responsibility is in the process of
being transferred to the State. The details of this transition will
not be considered.
There are presently 44 staff people working in the Manhattan,
Harlem, Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens small claims courts, excluding
judges, their law assistants, and court reporters. These staff
people (principally clerks and uniformed court officers) earn a
total of $912,014, including fringe benefits, per year. The Staten
Island small claims court, which holds hearings only every other
week and handled only 3,202 cases out of the city-wide total of
62,463 in 1978, makes use of the regular Civil Court staff in that
borough. Assuming it takes the same manpower to handle a given
small claims caseload in Staten Island as it does in the other
boroughs, the equivalent of 2.38 people would have to be assigned
to this task,169 adding $49,278 to the figure previously arrived at,
for a total of $961,272.
The Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens courts sit four nights per
138
week, the Bronx court three nights, the Harlem court one night, and
the Staten Island court an equivalent of one-half night for a total
of 16 nights per week. A second judge sits two nights each week in
the Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens courts, raising the total of
judicial sittings to 22 nights per week. While I could not get
precise information on judicial workloads, my understanding is that
four nights per week would be considered a full load. This means
that when allowance is made for extra staff to provide coverage
during vacations (since the courts are open throughout the year),
the equivalent of six full-time judges are needed to man the small
claims courts. Each judge earns about $46,000 and has a law assis-
tant who earns $17,500. Adding 28% fringe benefits, these 12 extra
people add $487,680. Furthermore, five court reporters, working
five nights per week, are needed to cover the judicial hearings: at
approximately $25,000 each, including fringes (exact salaries were
not available), this adds another $125,000 to the personnel costs at
the six courts, for a total of $1,573,972.
To this must be added a share of the expenses of the central
administrative office of the Civil Court. To determine the appro-
priate share of the time of the central office staff to be allocated
to administering the small claims courts, it will be assumed that
this is the same as the proportion of the total number of Civil
Court personnel (excluding the central office staff) which is devot-
ed to the small claims courts. The total number of Civil Court per-
sonnel in June 1979 was 746; less 46 central office staff, this
comes to 700 people. Of these, an equivalent of 63.38 did small
claims work, for a proportion of 9.054%. Applied to the central
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office staff, this suggests that the equivalent of 4.16 of them
worked exclusively on small claims court matters. At an average
salary, including fringes, of $20,728 (derived from the average
salary of the 44 staff people actually assigned to the small claims
courts), this comes to $86,166. The same proportion of the Chief
Judge's salary (approximately $64,000, including fringes), adds
$5,784 to this amount, for a total central office cost of $91,950.
Added to the personnel costs at the six courts, this produces a
total personnel cost for the New York City small claims courts of
$1,665,922.
The entire non-personnel costs for the Civil Court, excluding
only rent, for the 1978-79 fiscal year was $640,000. On the assump-
tion that the same proportion of this (9.054%) should be assigned to
small claims court functions, this cost (for supplies, unreimbursed
postage, telephone calls, etc.) amounts to $57,946. At the present
time New York City owns most or all of the courthouses, and pays for
their maintenance (plus any rents) on a budget line separate from
the Civil Court's. The Civil Court administrative staff had no
estimate of the rental expense which should be imputed to it.
However, it is possible to estimate an imputed rental in the follow-
ing manner. DCA pays $264,000 per year for less ample space across
the street from Manhattan's Civil Courthouse, where the central
administration of the Court is also located. DCA houses approxi-
mately 300 employees in this space, for an annual rental of $880 per
employee. On the assumption that the lower density of small claims
courts would be balanced out by the lower rental costs in the area
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surrounding the courthouses in the other boroughs, this would be an
appropriate per employee rental charge for Civil Court space. With
the equivalent of 67.54 employees devoted to small claims court
functions, an appropriate imputed rental charge would then be $59,435.
When the non-personnel costs, including imputed rental charges,
are added to the personnel costs for the small claims courts, the
total comes to $1,783,302. There were 62,463 claims filed in New
York City small claims courts in 1978. Assuming approximately the
same rate of filings in June 1979, the total cost per claim was
$28.55. With the claimant paying $2.00 of that in the form of a
filing fee, the amount picked up by the taxpayers was $26.55.
Upon examining 4500 consecutive cases filed in the Brooklyn
small claims court, I found 53 consumer claims filed against home
improvement contractors. Such claims therefore constitute 1.178%
of the total in that sample. While Brooklyn may not be typical of
all boroughs in this respect, I have no strong reason to believe it
to be atypical.170 If this proportion holds for the city-wide 1978
caseload of 62,463, approximately 736 cases were of this variety.
If each one cost the taxpayers $26.55, the total public subsidy for
small claims brought in 1978 by consumers against home improvement
contractors was $19,541. While higher filing fees would reduce this
subsidy, substantially higher fees would tend to defeat the purpose
of small claims courts.
The foregoing analysis has been based on the assumption that
overhead should be distributed evenly among all claims. This assump-
tion makes sense unless the concern is with the marginal cost of
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handling the cases involving home improvement contractors, assuming
that the small claims courts are otherwise in place and functioning
just as they are. If all or part of the flow of claims against home
improvement contractors could be shifted between small claims court
and some other forum (such as DCA), then concern with the marginal
cost would indeed be the appropriate one. The marginal cost of a
typical case is no more than about $0.30, and even this expense is
not incurred unless a hearing has been held, in which case two
postage stamps are needed for the notices to the parties of the
decision.
Even if the entire load of cases brought against home improve-
ment contractors was removed from the courts' dockets, the resultant
drop in caseload would not be sufficient to cause a reduction (or
delay an increase) in the number of personnel assigned to these
courts. Moreover, if even 75% of the $57,946 in non-personnel costs
was directly related to the size of the caseload, the savings in that
category from dropping the home improvement cases would only be $512
($57,946 x 75% x 1.178%), while the court would lose $1472 in filing
fees. Conversely if, instead of dropping the existing home improve-
ment caseload, the 1841 home improvement complaints handled by DCA
in 1978 were somehow shifted to the small claims court caseload,
this would only cause a 2.95% increase in the latter -- probably not
enough by itself to require any increase in small claims court staff,
and only a $1282 increase in the non-personnel costs (as compared to
a $3682 increase in filing fees). This conclusion is, however, very
sensitive to the assumption that the increased caseload would have
no effect on personnel costs. If just one more clerk had to be added,
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as might well be the case in an overloaded court, the marginal
cost of the shift would increase by an average of $20,728. Whether
a shift of the home improvement contractor caseload in either
direction is possible or desirable will be discussed in the final
section of this chapter.
(2) DCA
Except where otherwise indicated, the data in this section were
obtained during an interview on June 21, 1979 with Mr. Paul Cooper,
Assistant to the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs for Management and
Budget.
The cost analysis of the DCA dispute resolution procedure is
complicated by the presence of a licensing process which is a pre-
requisite for the operation of the dispute resolution procedure but
not really part of it. Another complication is the significant
contribution which is made by the license fees paid by home improve-
ment contractors and salesmen toward covering both sets of procedural
costs. The total and per complaint costs of the procedures exclusive
of licensing costs will be considered first. Next, the total costs,
including those for licensing will be calculated. Finally, the
effect of the contribution presently made by the licensing fees, the
possibility and appropriateness of increasing these fees, and the
likely effect of doing so upon the costs borne by the public will be
examined.
As of June, 1979 DCA had a total of 325 employees. Personnel
costs for the various functions -- licensing, docketing, calendar,
etc. -- can be determined quite precisely by totalling the salaries
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of the employees assigned to each function, then adding 38% for
fringe benefits and an additional 2 % for municipal services with
respect to personnel and payroll provided by agencies other than
DCA. The total other-than-personal-services ("OTPS") costs, exclud-
ing computer costs and the cost of the hearing transcription service
contract, was $750,000. In the following analysis the assumption
will be that OTPS costs (with the two exclusions already noted) are
distributed among different departmental functions in the same ratio
as are the number of employees.
There are approximately 20 DCA employees who perform functions
analogous to those of the central staff of the Civil Court. At
approximately $100,000 for the Commissioner plus his two Deputies,
and an average of $12,000 for the 17 remaining employees, plus 40.5%
in fringes and payroll costs, this "departmental overhead" comes to
$427,120. This overhead will be distributed among the various
functions in the same proportion as personnel costs and OTPS.
DCA's home improvement contractor dispute resolution procedure
normally begins in the Complaints Division. Employees there docket
the written complaints received at DCA headquarters. Four people,
earning a total salary of $45,000, perform this docketing function.
Out of the 20,337 complaints docketed by DCA in 1978, 1841 (9.05%)
involved home improvement contracts.
The DCA's efforts to resolve these complaints informally are
handled by the Home Improvement Division, which also has four em-
ployees earning a total of $45,000. Though it is difficult to divide
the consumer redress functions of this Division from its license
enforcement functions, a rough estimate of each may be obtained by
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reference to the complaints sample. All of the cases from the com-
plaints sample which involve licensees (47) made use of only the
complaint resolution functions of the Division, while in the remain-
ing cases (45) some effort was made both to resolve the complaint
and to press the contractor to obtain (or renew) a license. If the
latter cases are therefore treated as half complaint resolution cases
and half license enforcement cases, the Division's complaint resolu-
tion functions constitute roughly 75% of its workload.
A home improvement complaint, like any other complaint to the
DCA, may instead originate with a personal visit by a consumer to
one of the field offices. If so, a DCA employee assigned to that
office will make an effort to resolve the complaint informally before
referring it to headquarters. There are an equivalent of 11.5 em-
ployees assigned to these offices. They earn approximately $115,000.
Since there is no reason to believe that the proportion of home
improvement cases in their caseload is any different from the pro-
portion of such cases docketed at headquarters, it will be assumed
that 9.05% of the time of these employees is devoted to such cases.
Any complaint against any DCA licensee which the department
cannot resolve informally is eventually referred to the Calendar
Division to schedule a hearing. Seven people work in the Division,
earning total salaries of $82,000. Since the purposes of this
Division are to schedule hearings, maintain the records of the cases
scheduled for hearing, and provide various follow-up services on
cases which have been heard, the composition of their workload is
closely reflected in the calendars of hearings which they prepare.
I counted the number of home improvement contractor cases (which
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are clearly marked as such) and the total number of cases in the
calendars for 10 weeks.172 Out of 618 cases in total, 182 (29.45%)
were home improvement cases. I therefore assume that about 30% of
the Division's work is devoted to such cases.
Two hearing officers, who earn a total of about $40,000, hear
the cases on this calendar. The same proportion (30%) of their case-
load therefore consists of home improvement cases.
The Director of Adjudication and her staff consists of the
equivalent of 4.5 people, earning a total of $58,000. About half of
their work involves supervising the work of the Calendar Division
and of the two hearing officers who hear cases involving licensees
(the other half involves supervising other hearing officers who hear
other types of cases). Therefore, the proportion of home improvement
cases which they handle is only half that which the Calendar Division
handles, or 15%.
Table 5A will present, for each function (docketing, Home Improve-
ment Division, field offices, Calendar, hearing officers, and Office
of the Director of Adjudication), the following annual cost data:
(1) personnel costs (including an additional 40.5% for fringe benefits
and municipal personnel services); (2) a figure for OTPS costs plus
departmental overhead, based on the fraction of the 325 DCA employees
assigned to that function multiplied by $1,177,120 ($750,000 OTPS +
$427,120 overhead); (3) the numerator of the forementioned fraction
which will be indicated in parentheses; (4) total yearly costs;
(5) proportion of these costs attributable to home improvement con-
sumer redress functions; and (6) amount of costs so attributable.
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Table 5B will compute the cost of DCA's consumer redress process
by adding: (1) the sum of the portion of the costs of the six func-
tions attributable to home improvement consumer redress functions
from Table 5A; (2) 30% of the cost of the tracscription contract
($30,000); (3) the entire cost of the contract with the special in-
spector ($17,000); plus (4) an amount representing a rough estimate
of the costs of the efforts of the City Corporation Counsel's Office,
of DCA's Consumer Advocate's Office, and of the person at DCA who
works as liaison with the Corporation Counsel's Office, which are
devoted to home improvement consumer redress cases ($12,000). This
figure, the total yearly cost of home improvement consumer redress
functions (excluding licensing costs), will then be divided by the
number of complaints against home improvement contractors in 1978
(1841) to produce a figure for average cost to the taxpayer of DCA's
handling this type of complaint.
If the cost per complaint in Table SB were compared with the
cost to the taxpayers per claim in small claims courts ($26.55), it
would appear that the DCA process is much more expensive. Such a
comparison would, however, be premature. The license fees paid by
home improvement contractors and salesmen make a substantial con-
tribution to this cost (even after subtracting DCA's licensing costs),
and a strong argument can be made that these fees could and should be
increased to cover virtually the entire cost of DCA's consumer
redress process.
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TABLE 5: DCA Costs of Handling Home Improvement Consumer Redress Cases
Table 5A: Cost Components (In Dollars per Year)
(2)
OTPS + DCA
(3)
(# of
Overhead Employees)
(4)
Total Costs
(5)
Portion
Attributable
(6)
Amount
Attributable
Docketing
Home Improvement
Division
Field Offices
Calendar
Hearing
Officers
Director Adj'n.
& Staff
63,225
63,225
161,575
115,210
56,200
81,490
14,488
14,488
41,652
25,353
7,244
(4)
(4)
(11.5)
(7)
(2)
77,713
77,713
203,227
140,563
63,444
9.05%
75%
9.05%
30%
30%
16,299 (4.5) 97,789 15%
Function
(1)
Personnel
7,033
58,284
18,392
42,169
19,033
14,668
w w L w w w
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Table SB: Cost Computation (In Dollars per Year)
(1) Sum of "Amount Attributable", from Table 5A column 6......................$159,579
(2) Attributable portion (30%) of transcription contract ($30,000).............. 9,000
(3) Contract with special inspector............................................. 17,000
(4) Attributable portion of remaining DCA costs (estimate)...................... 12,000
Annual cost of DCA home improvement consumer redress process.
(Excluding licensing costs or revenues).........................................$197,579
oo
Cost to taxpayers of above process (Excluding licensing costs and revenues)
per complaint (1841)............................................................$ 107.32
0 S W 1 1 W W W
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Before considering the effects of licensing costs and revenues
on the annual cost and cost per complaint figures in Table 5B, how-
ever, the meaning of these figures should be explored. Clearly,
one complaint more or less would add or subtract merely the cost of
a few postage stamps and perhaps a few phone calls. Adding the full
small claims court home improvement caseload (736), if that could
somehow be done, would increase the number of home improvement com-
plaints DCA handles by 40%, but would probably increase DCA's costs
by only about $31,000 (on the assumption, based on my observations,
that the Home Improvement Division and the hearing officers would
be sufficiently hard-pressed by the additional workload to make
proportionate increases in their staffs necessary, while the remain-
ing functions could be handled by existing staff). Similarly,
eliminating DCA licensing of home improvement contractors would
eliminate the Home Improvement Division ($58,284) and 30% of the
hearing officers' duties ($19,033, assuming that one hearing officer
could be assigned other duties for part of his time), more doubt-
fully 30% of the Calendar Division budget ($42,169) and 15% of
that of the office of the Director of Adjudication ($14,668). It
would not, however, significantly affect docketing and field office
expenses since the complaints would continue to come in, though
perhaps at a slightly reduced volume, and would have to be processed
in the same way that complaints filed against other non-licensees
presently are. Indeed, one more person (about $20,000, including
associated expenses) would probably have to be added to the Com-
plaint Division staff to perform the type of informal mediation
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presently done by this Division where complaints are filed against
non-licensed vendors. The net savings to the taxpayers would there-
fore be approximately $115,000, or $62 per complaint, making opti-
mistic assumptions. Of course, the entire $197,579 would be saved
by shutting down DCA entirely. But either of these cost-cutting
measures would have serious effects on the City's consumers, since
there is no reason to believe that all
know enough or be persistent enough to
small claims court. The wisdom of any
will be discussed in the next section,
contributions of licensing revenues to
discussed.
Licensing costs can be calculated
costs of the other DCA functions which
or even most of them would
bring their complaints to
such cost-cutting measure
after the actual and possible
meeting these costs has been
in the same manner as the
were considered. There are
60 employees in the Licensing Division, earning a total of about
$1,011,600, including fringe benefits and the costs of municipal
personnel services. The portion of the OTPS and the departmental
overhead attributable to the Division is $217,314. To this and the
personnel costs must be added half the computer costs, or $34,000,
for a total annual cost of $1,262,914. The Department issued
approximately 49,000 licenses in 1978, of which 2,942 went to home
improvement contractors and 3,523 went to home improvement salesmen.
The two categories together thus comprise about 13.19% of the
Licensing Division's workload, on the assumption that the complexity
of the processes for issuing them is about average for DCA (they
may in fact be somewhat less complex than most). Multiplying the
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annual cost of operating the Division by this fraction yields an
annual cost for issuing licenses to home improvement contractors
and salesmen of $166,578. To this should be added the 25% of
the efforts of the Home Improvement Division which are devoted to
pressuring unlicensed contractors to obtain licenses ($19,428),
and perhaps $8,000 for the combined efforts of people elsewhere in
the Department, the Corporation Counsel's office, and the Criminal
Court, also designed to produce the same result, which yields a
gross cost to the taxpayers of $194,007 for requiring licenses for
these business categories.
Annual licensing revenues, at the present fees of $50 for a
home improvement contractor license and $25 for a home improvement
salesman license, yielded $235,175 in 1978. This left a $41,168
surplus to be applied to the cost of operating the complaint reso-
lution/consumer redress process with respect to these categories.
If it is so applied, the annual cost to the taxpayers of this
process drops from $197,579 to $156,411, and the cost per complaint
drops from $107.32 to $84.96. This amount is still large when
compared to the $26.55 cost of handling a small claims court com-
plaint.
However, if the license fee for a contractor were raised to
$100/year, and no change were made in the license fee for salesmen,
the total revenue from these two categories of licensees in 1978
would (on the assumption that demand for contractor's licenses was
totally inelastic within this price range) have been $382,275. Sub-
tracting the $194,007 licensing costs from this leaves $188,268 to be
applied against the $197,579 cost of operating the complaint resolution/
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consumer redress process. Given the fact that the average contract
size for licensees in my complaints sample was $2832, compared with
an average contract size for non-licensees of $1565, the additional
$50/year required on the assumption of an increase to $100 of the
license fee seems an insignificant increase in their cost of doing
business, making the assumption of demand inelasticity plausible.
Allowing a 10% decrease in the number of contractors renewing
(which might well be ample), the revenue under the new fee schedule
would be $352,875. Assuming no corresponding decrease in licensing
costs, this would leave $158,868 to be applied against the $197,579
dispute resolution cost, leaving only $38,711 to be covered by the
taxpayers. Dividing this by the 1841 complaints brought against
home improvement contractors brought to DCA in 1978, yields an
average cost per complaint to the taxpayer of $21.03. This latter
figure is in the same ballpark -- indeed 20% less -- than the
$26.55 per claim which taxpayers foot for small claims court.
It is perfectly appropriate for home improvement contractors
to bear the additional $50/year burden for helping to support this
process, as the results of my complaints sample demonstrate.
Thirty-one of the consumer complaints against licensees were vin-
dicated in the sense that the consumer received complete or partial
redress for his grievance, whereas in only six cases of complaints
against licensees was the complaint either dismissed or apparently
without merit. Though in some of the former cases the contractor
may have afforded "redress" without having been legally obligated
to, in most of these cases the contractor was at fault, at least
to some extent. It is entirely just that a category of businesses
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bear the major part of the cost of a mechanism designed to insure
that they carry out their obligations. Furthermore, even in those
cases where the contractor prevails he has generally received a
benefit -- a public vindication, which decreases the likelihood
that the consumer will pursue him in other forums or will disparage
his reputation to other potential customers.
D. The Two Forums Compared: Summary and Recommendations
The average case brought by a consumer against a home improve-
ment contractor in New York City's small claims court cost the con-
sumer $9.53, the contractor $29.20, and the taxpayers $26.55. These
amounts are small compared with the average recovery of $401 and
the median recovery of $270, even when these recoveries are dis-
counted to take account of the fact that only about half of the
apparently deserving consumers received them. It is difficult to
imagine how a court could operate more efficiently and inexpensive-
ly, and quite impossible to believe that anyone concerned with
justice would want to eliminate this most accessible of courts or
to narrow its jurisdiction. Even if a non-judicial tribunal could
provide the same remedies at lower cost for the identical popula-
tion, to intentionally deny meaningful judicial access to a sub-
stantial segment of the public in our extremely court-centered
society might be widely interpreted as a decision to exclude them
from a basic privilege of citizenship, and would at the least be
politically unwise.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that a non-judicial tribunal could
provide the same remedies at lower cost. Since the marginal loss
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to the court of revenue from filing fees were it deprived of juris-
diction in home improvement cases would be greater than the likely
marginal savings in costs, the only proposal which would be certain
to reduce the net cost to taxpayers of this service would be' to
shut individual courts or the entire small claims court system.
While adequate non-judicial alternatives can be provided in specific
categories of cases (including home improvement cases), such alter-
natives do not presently exist with respect to most categories, and
any conceivable set of alternatives each of which has a specific
subject matter jurisdiction will fail to exhaust the small claims
court's non-subject-matter-specific jurisdiction. While a "non-
judicial" tribunal which had no limitations on the subject matter
under its jurisdiction and which offered at least the same remedies
as small claims courts do presently could perhaps be established,
it is difficult to understand how that tribunal would differ from
the present small claims court (or from some possible improved
version thereof). 173
The average complaint brought by a consumer against a home
improvement contractor at DCA cost the consumer $5.80, the contrac-
tor $9.93, and the taxpayers $84.96. These amounts are, respective-
ly, 61%, 34%, and 320% of the corresponding costs in small claims
court. The 61% figure actually overstates the relative costs to
the consumer at DCA, since the $9.53 specified as the cost of suing
in small claims court does not include two sets of non-monetizable
costs. The first set are those surrounding the obligatory trip to
file the claim, which costs are probably greater than the costs of
writing a letter to DCA (else more consumers than presently would
155
walk their complaints in to a DCA field office rather than write
them in). The second set are those involved in having to appear
at a hearing -- an experience undergone only 27% as frequently by
DCA complainants as by small claims court claimants.
On the other hand, these figures may well understate the
absolute and relative cost to the contractor of the DCA process.
If the $41,168 surplus of licensing revenues from home improvement
contractors and salesmen over the licensing and enforcement costs
attributable to these categories is divided by the 1841 complaints
brought against such contractors and salesmen, their license fees
contribute $22.36 to the cost of resolving each complaint. If this
is added to the contractors' direct costs of handling each such
complaint, their total expense relative to each complaint is $31.31,
or 124% of their cost of responding (or not responding) to a small
claims court summons.
The cost to the taxpayer is highly dependent on the contribu-
tion made by contractors' and salesmen's license fees. If the
contractor's fee goes up to $100/year, the cost to the taxpayer
drops to $21.03/complaint, 79% of the corresponding cost in small
claims courts and only $38,711 in total. Of course, this simply
shifts the incidence of the cost to the licensees, raising the
contributions from their license fees to the complaint resolution/
consumer redress process to $86.29 per complaint (assuming a 10%
drop in number of contractors renewing), and raising their total
expense relative to each complaint to $95.24.
Nonetheless, this is precisely where the cost of complaint
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resolution should fall. As mentioned in the previous section, five
times as many complaints are resolved in favor of consumers as are
(or clearly ought to be) resolved in favor of the contractors.
There is no reason why anyone but the contractors themselves should
pay the costs of rectifying their inadequate performances. Further-
more, the additional $50/year is a small increment in their cost of
doing business, and is unlikely to affect their individual standards
of living or their willingness to continue doing business in New
York City. On the other hand, it is not large enough in and of
itself to affect the prices they charge for their services, and is
therefore unlikely to be passed on to the consumers.
There remains the question why this service should be preserved,
or instituted in a city which does not have it, if small claims
court can provide a similar service at a lower total cost per com-
plaint. There are several answers to this question.
First, although the proportion of consumers using either
process whose complaints were substantially satisfied was approx-
imately the same, the quality of DCA's fact-finding, mediation and
conciliation processes, as well as the appropriateness of its
remedies to the problems presented, were generally better. 174
Second, many more consumers who have had problems with home
improvements, 1841 vs. 736 (250%), make use of DCA than make use of
small claims court where both are available. The two processes are
presented very differently to consumers -- one as "Call in (and
then write us) about your consumer complaints and we will enforce
the City's consumer protection laws on your behalf, just as we're
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hired to do", the other as "If you want to sue someone this is the
place to do it". There is no reason to believe that most of the
consumers who are willing to let DCA "carry the ball" for them
would if DCA could not help them be willing or able to take the
initiatives necessary to prevail in small claims court: first suing
the contractor (requiring at a minimum traveling to the court
clerk's office and laying out 3.40), then assembling legally suffi-
cient evidence and appearing at the hearing (unless the contractor
settles first), and finally investigating the contractor's assets
and presenting this information plus $10 to the sheriff (unless
the contractor pays the judgment voluntarily). Nor is there any
reason to abandon the consumers who are not sufficiently aggressive
to navigate small claims court successfully. The great majority of
the consumers are, after all, victims of injustices. They should
not be expected to make additional investments, learn new skills,
and so forth, simply to obtain what is their due.
Third, DCA's consumer redress hearings are an inextricable
part of its process of enforcing behavioral standards upon home
improvement contractors. The Home Improvement Business Law
(Appendix A), DCA's Regulations Relating to the Home Improvement
Business (Appendix B), and General Regulation 7 (Appendix C), all
impose requirements designed to prevent fraud, overreaching, and
other unfair practices. Violations come to the attention of DCA
only through consumer complaints. While DCA could enforce the
more technical requirements, such as those requiring certain in-
formation to appear on the contracts, without further involvement
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of the consumer and without providing her with any redress, the
more substantive requirements, such as that requiring the contrac-
tor to refrain from "Abandonment or wilful failure to perform,
without justification, any home improvement contract...',175 can
hardly be enforced without the consumer's active cooperation. It
is difficult to imagine a more effective incentive to encouraging
this cooperation than the consumer's belief that she will benefit
from demonstrating the contractor's misfeasance. True, the prac-
tice of ordering consumer redress upon the proper showing in indi-
vidual cases does not guarantee that contractors will adhere to
the legal standards in future jobs, since they can instead do
nothing in each instance until a complaint is brought, or even
until a DCA sanction is about to be imposed. Nonetheless, it both
serves as a forceful reminder of the applicable standards to those
who would be disposed to obey them and as a mild deterrent (via
the time, bother, and embarrassment of responding to DCA complaints)
against violating them.
Fourth (and finally), consumer complaint handling is an ordin-
ary and appropriate function of local, county, and state government.
Consumers today expect that someone in government will at least
write a letter or make a phone call on their behalf if they allege
that a businessman has defrauded them or otherwise treated them
badly. A government which attempts to abdicate this responsibility
entirely may not save much money, since it cannot avoid devoting
some manpower to dealing (one way or another) with consumers who
insist they have a right. New York City deals with consumer com-
159
plaints by directing them to the DCA field offices or to the
Complaint Division. Either way, DCA not only dockets each com-
plaint filed but also assigns an employee to attempt to resolve
it. If home improvement complaints were no longer differentiated
and handled by a distinct division, they would have to be handled
by inspectors working for the Complaints Division. As mentioned
in the previous section, this would probably require an additional
employee and associated expenses, as well as continuing the exist-
ing docketing and field office expenses in this category, for an
average cost of $24.67 for handling a complaint. While this is
far less than the $107.32 which it presently costs if licensing
revenues are not factored in, and significantly less than the
$84.96 cost per complaint when the excess of present licensing
revenues over costs is considered, it is more than the $21.03 per
complaint which the taxpayers would have to bear if the current
licensing system were retained but the fee for contractors was
raised to $100/year.
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VII. Conclusion: Applicability of Consumer Redress Hearings
by Licensing Authorities to Complaints Other Than Home
Improvement Contractors
A. The Advantages
The process examined in this study -- a consumer complaint
resolution process culminating in consumer redress hearings,
decisions, and enforcement activity, all administered by the
authority which licenses the businesses being complained against --
has several advantages not shared by other consumer dispute resolu-
tion processes.
First, the fact that the licensee's stake in his license is
much larger than his stake in any particular dispute should produce
a high level of compliance with the authority's orders, at least in
those occupations and industries in which the retention of one's
license is a practical as well as legal necessity.176 With respect
to other businesses, such as the home improvement business in New
York City, a license is valuable but, as a practical matter, not
absolutely necessary. However, the licensing authority has consid-
erable leverage even with this group: my experience with the three
DCA samples is that none of the home improvement contractors who
had once bothered to obtain a license was indifferent to the pros-
pect (or reality) of losing it.
Any existing licensing authority whose licensees deal with
consumers could, if it were so authorized, use its leverage over
licensees to obtain justice for consumers in appropriate cases by
means of a process such as the one described in this study.
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Licensing authority could also be granted over any presently
unlicensed occupation or industry which deals with consumers ex-
pressly to establish this type of redress process. Furthermore,
means of increasing the leverage of agencies such as DCA over
existing categories of licensed businesses could be devised. They
might include, for example, increasing the number of inspectors
serving summonses on non-licensees, increasing the penalties
actually imposed on persons convicted of operating without a
license, or publicizing the fact that unlicensed contractors are
not permitted to use the courts to recover from the consumer for
unpaid work. 177
Second, the ability of the agency to perform on-site inspec-
tions (where relevant), and to draw on the expertise of its staff
in evaluating the available information with respect to the matter
under dispute, should produce more accurate decisions.1 78
Third, it is a very inexpensive forum for consumers. DCA's
procedure is 40% less expensive for consumers than that of small
claims court,179 but only a small fraction of the cost of hiring a
lawyer and going to a court of general jurisdiction (as a consumer
would have to do, absent DCA, if her claim exceeded the small
claims court's $1000 monetary limit). DCA has no upper monetary
limit on its subject matter jurisdiction, and there is no reason
why one should be imposed.180 True, decisions requiring the
licensee to spend substantially more than $1000 are likely to be
appealed to the courts, but the cost of defending its decision in
the courts is paid by the agency rather than by the consumer.
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Fourth, the agency is able to ensure that its regulations with
respect to the particular occupation or industry (which may be both
detailed and different from those applicable to other businesses),
are applied in the resolution of disputes. A small claims court
judge or arbitrator, or other tribunal without a subject-matter-
specific jurisdiction, might not know about these regulations and
might instead apply "general" -- and less appropriate -- prom-
ciples 181
Fifth, the agency is in a position to take a consumer com-
plaint which has both remedial and disciplinary implications and
deal with both aspects in-house.182
Sixth, the agency is also in a position to monitor the com-
plaints against individual businesses, enabling it to distinguish
licensees who occasionally, inadvertently, and excusably violate
the consumer protection provisions from those who repeatedly commit
the same violations and perhaps make the same excuses (the latter
being prime candidates for further investigations looking towards
possible disciplinary actions). 183
B. The Disadvantages
There are, of course, several possible disadvantages to
establishing this type of consumer redress process.
First, it may entail additional costs to the taxpayers. These
costs will be greatest where the occupation or industry is not
presently licensed, there is no licensing authority handling similar
types of activities whose jurisdiction could be expanded, and there
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is no governmental organization systematically handling complaints
about the occupation or industry in question that could be given
licensing and redress authority as well. Where the activity is
licensed, or some government agency is presently handling complaints
about it, some of the costs of this process are already being borne.
Even where the full cost of the process would have to be covered
from fresh sources, the analysis in section VI.C. (2) of the cost to
the public of DCA's process for dealing with complaints against
home improvement contractors suggests that this cost could, and
should, frequently be covered by a modest license fee.
Second, it may mean one more bureaucracy. Whether this will
be a new or substantially expanded bureaucracy, rather than simply
an added function for an on-going one, depends of course on what is
already in place. Even where a new bureaucracy is entailed, it
would be a combination of a court and a law enforcement agency --
two exceptions to the current popular distaste for expanded govern-
ment. The tendency of the DCA process is to relieve court congestion,
while providing inexpensive and effective justice for people who
cannot afford lawyers, or do not wish to have one.
Third, it may permit unfair exertion of overwhelming govern-
mental power against the small business. This is the obverse of
the leverage advantage: the very reasons why the licensee has to
take this process seriously can be pleaded as an argument against
establishing it. The validity of this argument turns on the fair-
ness of the process itself. DCA's process, with its detailed
notice well prior to the hearing, its impartial hearing officers,
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all testimony under oath, recorded, and if necessary transcribed,
with opportunity to bring counsel and to confront, cross-examine,
and rebut adverse witness, along with its right to a judicial
review, is as fair a process as exists in our legal system. A
process with less procedural safeguards might, however, allow an
arbitrary government official to force a licensee to agree to a
settlement not required by legal principles.
Fourth, the agency may be captured by the industry it is
trying to regulate. There is certainly a subtle process by which
familiarity with an industry's problems, and with some of its more
likeable representatives, blunts one's initial consumerist zeal.
An example is the lower performance expectations for aluminum re-
placement windows held by DCA's special inspector and its hearing
officers than by the consumers who appeared complaining of conden-
sation and drafts. Consumers tended to view the officials' accep-
tance of the inevitability of certain problems with this type of
window (an acceptance which apparently followed from years of
experience with the problems) with the greatest distrust. It was
not my impression that the hearing officers tilted unfairly either
way -- though after reading many files and attending many hearings
I had become surprisingly sympathetic to the industry's problems
and to its more likeable representatives as well. The consumers
in some cases may have done better before a less knowledgeable
tribunal, but that does not mean that they were entitled to one.184
There may, on the other hand, be more serious problems of "capture"
in industries in which powerful and prestigious companies, trade
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associations, and law firms are involved.
Fifth, the agency may be distracted by the consumer redress
cases from its more basic law enforcement mission. There may be
a problem of resource allocation, though the last three mentioned
"advantages" suggest various types of efficiencies which result
from combining both missions in one agency. More fundamentally,
a redress-oriented process encourages the agency to obtain satis-
faction for the existing complainants, even at the expense of
permitting a dishonestly inclined business to continue in oper-
ation.185 Similarly, a marginal operator who makes a policy of
satisfying those consumers (but only those consumers!) who complain
to the agency will be more likely to earn the agency's respect and
gratitude than to trigger its suspicions and a disciplinary in-
vestigation.
This problem is real enough, but abstaining from formal
consumer redress endeavors is unlikely to solve it. Even a "pure"
law enforcement agency will sometimes be presented with the choice
between retrospective relief for those already injured and prospec-
tive relief for those who have not yet been affected.186 Further-
more, limitations on prosecutorial resources will rationally lead
to focussing on offenders who have produced the greatest apparent
damage; if threats to go to the agency are the "magic words" which
mobilize the errant businessman into action, the damage which he
has done to all those who uttered the "magic words" will not be
apparent to the authority.
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Finally, the cagy and determined scofflaw is likely to avoid
both the agency's consumer redress efforts and its disciplinary
efforts.187 For the relatively law-abiding businessman, on the
other hand, the reminders of the law's requirements, and of its
possible sanctions, in the course of consumer redress proceedings
would usually be adequate to ensure greater adherence to these
requirements in the future.
C. Criticisms that Cannot be Made of the DCA Process:
The Relationship of this Study to the Continuing
Critique of Licensing
Any proposal to extend licensing to yet another occupation
confronts a hostile intellectual environment. Occupational licen-
sing schemes have been frequently, vigorously and effectively
criticized on the bases that they may unjustifiably restrict the
constitutionally protected liberty to engage in the legimate
occupation of one's choice,188 that the consumer protection
functions which their supporters claim for them may have little
reality other than as public relations,189 and that their princi-
pal effects are typically to protect licensees from competition
at the consumers' expense.190 These criticisms are similar to the
ones which have been made, to great intellectual and political
effect, of the role of federal regulation in transportation, bank-
ing, and other industries. 9
A careful examination of DCA's licensing of home improvement
contractors and salesmen reveals that none of these criticisms
apply to it.
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First, the restrictions imposed by this license requirement
upon would-be home improvement contractors or salesmen are minimal.
Unlike many of the criticized licensing schemes, there is no
requirement that the applicant be a citizen of the United States
or a resident of the licensing jurisdiction -- much less that he
have been such a citizen or resident for a specified period before
applying;192 none that he have had prior experience in the busi-
ness;193 none that he have had formal training;194 and none that
he pass an examination. 19 Nor has the contracting field been
divided into specialties, thus requiring a multiplicity of licenses
(or of licensees within one's employ) to carry on a non-specialized
home improvement business.196
What is required is a modest license fee ($50 for a two-year
salesman's license, $100 for a two-year contractor's license),
three photographs of oneself, a trip to a police station to get
fingerprinted (permitting DCA to check for a possible criminal
record), a straight-forward application form, and a trip to DCA
headquarters to file it. Applicants for contractors' licenses in
addition file copies of trade name or partnership certificates or
corporate papers (where applicable), of their workmen's compensa-
tion insurance certificates, and of their state sales tax identifi-
cation numbers - - all documents which state laws other than the
licensing law require them to have. Licenses can be denied only
for failure to meet these requirements, for failure to pay small
claims court judgment which had been outstanding for more than 30
days at the time of the application, 97 or if the applicant is not
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"over 18 years of age and of good character."198 The mere possession
of a criminal record does not, however, disqualify an applicant in
the absence of a "direct relationship between one or more of the
previous criminal offenses and the specific license.. .sought" or of
"an unreasonable risk to property.. .or the general public". 199
While these requirements are of course all restrictions of sorts
upon the liberty to engage in the legitimate occupation of one's
choice, none of them are unjustifiable.
Second, had there been any doubt before this study of the
reality of the consumer protection functions served by DCA's
licensing in the home improvement area, such doubt is no longer
possible.
The licensing law states that
It is the purpose of the city council in enacting this
article to safeguard and protect the homeowner against
abuses and fraudulent practices by licensing persons
engaged in2 te home improvement, remodeling and repair
business.
Everything I observed while gathering data for this study, includ-
ing my conversations with DCA personnel, consumers, and contractors,
as well as observations of DCA files, hearings, and decisions, is
consistent with an understanding by all concerned that this is the
sole purpose which should guide the agency in interpreting and
enforcing the licensing law.
Third, because the application requirements are non-selective
and easily complied with, the requirement of a DCA license in
order to engage in the home improvement business in New York City
has little if any anti-competitive effect. Furthermore, what dis-
cretionary authority there is in the law is exercised not by a
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board composed of representatives of the "regulated" industry, as
is typically the case with occupational licensing, but by the
Commissioner of Consumer Affairs. Since the "restrictive practices
of licensed groups are usually designed within the groups, rather
than imposed on them from the outside",201 there is little likeli-
hood that the regulations adopted or procedures followed by DCA
would take an anti-competitive turn. In fact, there is no detecti-
202ble anti-competitive bias or effect in the DCA regulations or
procedures203 applicable to those engaged in the home improvement
business.
In a leading critique of "the abuse of occupational licensing",
Professor Walter Gellhorn concludes: 204
To say that licensing has been abused and overused is
not to say that prophylactic administration should be
abandoned. I do not advocate reviving the doctrine of
caveat emptor, nor do I, as a realist, suppose for a
minute that customers and clients who have been ill served
can be made whole by lawsuits against their miscreant
servitors. Litigation is too unwieldly to meet the needs
of those who have suffered minor injuries. What are
needed are measures that will provide protection against
those demonstrably deficient in capability or integrity
without in the process creating artificial limitations
upon career choices, work opportunities, and stimuli to
provide superior service at lesser cost. Among these
protective measures are permissive certification and
mandatory registration.
... .A far more comprehensive regulatory device /than
permissive certificationf is the simple registration of
anyone who desires to receive a particular occupational
license, with the automatic issuance of the license upon
registration. Engaging in the occupation without a
license, or obtaining it by misrepresentation, would be
made a serious offense, in order to stimulate prompt and
accurate registration. An appropriate state agency, not
linked with an occupational group, would be created to
receive complaints against licensees, investigate them,
and, if objectionable conduct is found, initiate proceed-
ings looking toward revocation, suspension, or other
appropriate discipline by a court or a special tribunal.
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A plan of this nature would, I believe, end the present
abuse of licensure that serves selfish interests by con-
stricting occupational freedom. It would recapture the
public power now delegated to multiple licensing boards
whose members are drawn from and owe allegiance to the
occupations they supposedly regulate in the public
interest. It would require that licensees be subject to
stern discipline, but only after carefully formulated
charges, fair hearings, and impartial determinations,
untainted by suspicion that the determiners' self-interest
has influenced their judgment. It would take away the
eligibility of those whose occupational unworthiness could
be demonstrated, but would not, as so many licensing laws
now do, place artificial roadblocks in the path of work
opportunities or squelch career aspirations by treating
predictive opinions as final judgments.
DCA's licensing of home improvement contractors and salesmen
is, I submit, an actual, operating, effective version of the hypo-
thetical mandatory registration plan which Professor Gellhorn justly
praises.
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Appendix A: New York City Administrative Code, Chapter 32, Articl
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CITY OF NEW YORK
DEPARTMENT Of CONSUMERAFFAIRS
ADMINiSTRi1VE CODE
CHAPTER 32
ARTICLE 42
HOME IMPROVEMENT BUSINESS -
f 325&0 Legislative declaration.-It is the purpose of the
;'I e n e Lac A iis article to safeguard aind protect theh o m er. a vn s b e an d f a ndu le nt p a c tic e s b y lic e nls in g
e e ed in e n i r ve mnt re modelig and repair
Den n _ ron." rneans an individual.
or cor)oriond!1, trade grou p
lnur r ahiinid :ym or huilding,
tion troI I is t 4 or i,-itgned to be used as a
reanc 'A or ellingpaer a incle hWt not be- limilted to
'he o r tn. e in. : i or i *mm1. of <iriv-
s fa1out shelters. basernents. and oth ,er improvements
c i rums or i)o !and which is adjaent to a dwelling house.
oItx iimprovement shail not include (i th e Construction of a
or wiork done by a contricor inscompliance
{ w ih Auarantee of completion of a new buliding project, or (ii)
t (:deof g ods or materials by a seller who neither arranges- to
peior erf perfoirims directly or indirectly any work or labor li
conectio.n with the installation of or appfilcadion of the goods (ir
or (iii) residences owned by or controUed by te state
or anV mn!11iia subdivision thereof, (iv) painting or decoratiig
oa ildng reslence, home or apartrment, wvhen not incidental
or related to home inpro'ement work as herein defined. Without
regard to the extent of affixatipu. "home iinprovement" shall also
inclide the installation of central heating or air conditioning sys-
teis, ceoral vacuum cleami-ng systems, storm windows, awnings or
nre or hurgiar alarms or conmnication systenis.
3, "uildig" means any structure containing no more than four
residtnce or dwelling uiits.
4. wvner mea s any homeowner. condom intum unit owner.
tenant, or any other person who orders, contracts for or purchases
he home improvenilt services of a contractor or the personx en-
titled to the perforrmance of the work of a. contractor pursuant to
a home improvenent contract.
5. "'Contactor" eans any perso or. x.Tesman, other than a
hoa fe emnplo'yee of the ownr. who owns, operates, maintains.
conducts. controls or transacts a home improvement business and
(
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who undertakes or offers to undertake or agrees to perform any
home improvement or solicits any contract therefor, whether or
not such person is licensed or subject'to the licensing reqnirements
of this article, and whether or not such person is a prime con-
tractor or sub-cogtractor with respect to the owner.
6. "Home improvement contract" means an agree'ment, whether
oral or written. or contained in one or more documents. between \
a contractor. and an i4wner; or contractor and a tenant, regardless
of the number of residence or d*elling units conttained in the
huiling in whlcih the tynant resides. provided said work is to be
pn, to or upon the residence or dwelling niit of such
1enalit, for fhe perforniance of a home inprovement and includes
all labor, services and materials to be furnished and performed
lereunder.
Licensee means a person permitted to engage in the home
ce rr.ises hcre the homiie ui prvement busi-
ne is transacted or cairried on.
. "Comminsier neans commissioner of consumer affairs*.
10 ±mieman" means any ineividual who negotiates or ofers
to eg ate a h im pruvemnt. ctract wI) an owner, or
solcts otherwise ende4S\ors to procure M petrsofn a homhe imn-
proiement contract fron an owner on behal of a contractor, or
for himself should the salesman be abo the contractor, whether
or not such person is licensed or subject to the licensing require-
m.mIs of this article.
g B32-352.0. License required.-(1) No person shall solicit, can-s
vass, sell, perform or obtain a home improvement contract as a.
comtrtctor or salesman irom an owner without a license therefor.
(h- A license issued purstiant to this article may not be con-
strued to authorize the licenses* to perform any particular type of
work or engage in any kind of business which is reserved to quali-
fed licensees under separate provisions of state or local law, nor
shail any license or authority other than s is issued or permitted
pursuant to this article authorize engaging in the home improve-
ment business.
§ B32-313.0. Fees; term.'-. The fee for a license to conduct a
home improvement business shall be fifty dollars and for each re-
newal thereof the fee shall be fifty -dollars.
The fee for a salesman's license employed by a home improve-
ment contractor shall be twenty-nive dollars and for each reneval
thereof the fee shall be twenty-five dollars.
2. The fee for issuing a duplicate license or for one lost, de-
stroyed or mutilated shall be ten dollars.
§ B32-354.0. '.License not assignable; posting required; removal.
-a. No license shall be assignable or transferable.
* SN-huld probably be licensee.
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HOME IMPROVEMENT BUSINESS
b. A license issued hereunder shall at all times be posted in a
conspicuous place in the place of business of the licensee.
c. Every licensee shall within ten days after a change bf con-
trol in ownership, or of management. or of change of address or
trade name notify' the Commissioner of each changd.
d. A duplicate license may be issued for one lo'stor mutilated
and shall bear the word "duplicate" stamped across its face.
e. Commission.-In addition to the powers and duties elsewhere
prescribed in this article; the commissioner shall have power:
(I) to appoint an adequate number of assistants, inspectors
and other employees as may be necessary to carry out the pro-
V:sions of this article, to prescribe their duties, and to fix their
conpensation within the amount appropriated therefor;
-2) to examine into the qualifications and fitness of applicants
1or hcenses under this article:
3) tov keep record of all licenses issued, suspended or re-
voked;
(4) at any time to require reasonable information of an appli-
cit ir licensee, and may require the production of books of
accounts, Financial statements, contracts or other records which
relate to the home improvement activity, quahfication or compli-
ance with this article by the licensee provided, however, that
said information and production of records is required of him
pursuant to its regular business and functions under this article.
§ B32-355.0. Application.-1. An application for a license or re-
newal thereof shall be made to the-commissioner on a form pre-,
scribed by him.
2. A separate license shall be required for each place of busiiess.
3. The application shall be filed only by the actual owner of-a
business, shall be in writing, signed and under oath; it shall con-
tain the office address of the business; the name and residence ad-
dress of the owner or partner and if a corporation, trade group or
association, the names and resident addresses of the directors and
principal officers.
4. The commissioner may require the names and residence ad-
dresses of any employees of an applicant. in addition to any other
information which he may deem advisable.
5. Each applicant shall be over '18 years of age and of good
character.
6. The commissioner shall investigate each applicant as to good
character before a license is issued.
§ B32-356.0. Rules and. regulations.-The commissioner may
make such rules and regulations not incapsistent with the provi-
sions of this article, as may be necessary with respect to the form
and content of applications for licenses, the reception thereof, the
irrvestigation and examination of applicants and their qualifications,
and the other matters incidental or appropriate to his powers and
duties as prescribed by this article and for the proper administra-
tion and enforcement of the provisions of this article, and to amend
or repeal any such rules and regulations.
/
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§ B32-357.0. Fines; suspension; revocation of licens..-The com-
missioner shall have the power to inpose a fine not to exceed two
hundred fifty dollars upon a licensee or suspend or revoke a license
or deny an application -for the renewal of a licensefor any one or
more of the follonfing causes:
1. Fraud; misrepresentation. bribery in securing a license.
2. 'The making of any false statement as to a material matter
in any application for a license.
3. The person or thie management personnel of the contractor
are untrustworthy or not of good eharacter.
4. The business transactions of the contractor have been or
are mari<ed by a practice of failure to timely perform or com-
plete its contracts, or the manipulation of assets or accounts, or
by fraud or had faith, or is marked by an unwholesome method
0r practice ot solicitation of business from owners.
.AFure to display the license as provided in this article.
-aliure to comply with any demand or requirement law-
fulty made by the commissioner.
7. When an ages or employee of a licensee has been guilty
of an act or oroission. fraud, misrepresentation and the licensee
has approved or had knowledge thereof.
8. Violation of any provision of this article or any rule or
regulation adopted hereunder or for performing or attempting
to perform any act prohibited by this article.
§ B32-358.0. Prohibited acts.-The following acts are prohibited:
1. Abandonment or wilful failure to perform, without justi-
fication, any home improvement contract or project engaged in
or undertaken by a contractor; or willful deviation from or dis.
regard of plans or specifications in any material respect without-
the consent of the owner;
2. Making any substantial misrepresentation in the solicita-
tion or procurement of a home improvement contract, or making
any false promise of character likely to influence, persuade or
induce;
3 Any fraud in the execution of, or in the material alteration
of any contract, mortgage, promissory note or other document
incident to a home improvement transaction;
4. Preparing or 'accepting any mortgage, promissory note, or
other evidence of indebtedness upon the obligations of a home
improvement transaction with knowledge that it recites a greater
monetary obligation than the agreed consideration for the home
improvement work;
5. Directly or indirectly publishing any advertisement relating
to home improvements which contains an assertion, representa-
tion or statement of fact which is false, deceptive, or misleading,
provided that any advertisement which is subject to and com-
plies with the then existing rules, regulations or guides of the
federal trade commission shall not be deemed false, deceptive or
misleading; or by any means advertising or purporting to offer
the general public any home improvement work with the intent
not to accept contracts for the particular work or at the price
which is advertised or offered to the public:
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6. Wilful or deliberate disregard -and violation of the building,
sanitary. fire and health laws of this city;
7. Failure to notify the conniIssioner of any change or con-
trol in ownership, imianagement Jr business name or loc'ation;
8. Conducting a home improvement business in any name
other than the one in which the contractor is 11ceased:
9. Wilful failure to comply with any ordet, .demand, rule,
regulation or requirement made by the connissioner pursuant
to provisions of this article;
10. As part of or in connection with the inducement to make
a home improveme,4 contract. n. persti shall promise or offer
or alow to a buyer any compensation or reward
fo- -he precnrenent of a home mprovtment coumract with
others;
a No salesman mayv concurrently represent more than
ne c .ntractor in the soilicitationl or neoLtiation of any one home
r contract Xrom an owne Tw uise o a contract
ShCh fail to d isciose a named C. nut ractor Principal, whed-
e' r )rpose of ring the contract to various cuntractors
* her tI the one the salesman purported to represent in nego-
tiation or otherwise, is prohibited. No salesman may he au-
thorized to select a prime contractor on behali uf the owner.
N salesman i accept or C4 any compensatin of any
kmo, for or on accouut of a hoe impro ement transaction.
tnfm or for aniv person other than the contractor whom he rep-
resents with respect to the transaction.
12. a. As a part of or in connection with the inducement to
enter any home improvement contract. no) person shall promise
or offer to pay. credit, or allow to any owner. compensation or
reward for the procurement or placing of home improvements
business with others.
b). No contractor or salesman shall offer, deliver, pay, credit
or allow to the owner any gift, bonus award or merchandise.
trading stamps, or cash loan as an iducement to enter a home
improvement contract.
c. A contractor or salesman may give tangible items to pro-
spective customers for advertising -or sales promotiovn purposes
where the gifts is not conditioned upon obtaining a contract for
hoie improveienit work: provided no such item shall exceed a
cost value of two dujiars and lifty cents and no owner and/or
other person shall receive more than one such item in connection
with any one transaction.
§ P32-339.0. Waiver.-No acts, agr.eements or statements of a
buyer under a home improvement contract shall constitute a waiver
of any provisions of this article intended for the benefit or protec-
tion of the buyer. Any home improvement contract. entered into
between a contractor and. the owner shall. be uenforceable if the
owner not later than forty-eight hours followiog the date thereof
gives written notice uf rescission to the c-tractor or his agent at
his place of biusiness given in the contract or by iailing the notice
of cancellation to the contractor to his place of business given in
the contract or by mailing the notice of canceliation to the con-
tractor to his place of business given in the contract by depositing
a properly addre-,ed certified letter in a United States post office(
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or mail box. but if rescinded after forty-eight hours, all defenses
in mitigation of damages and any right of action or defense that
arises out of the transaction can be offered by the owner. How-
ever, where the owner cancels a contract as stated above, the
contractor shall he entitled to the foflowing payments from* the
owner: Where the contract entered into is for a sum less than five \
hundred dollars. the owner shall pay to the contractor the sum of
twenty-five dollars; for contracts between the sum of dfive hundred
dollars and one thousand dollars, the sum payable shall be 6fty
dollars. and for all other contracts the sum payable shall be seven-
ty-five dollars.
$ B32-3J10. False or fraudulent representation; damages.-a.
Any contractor, canvasser or seller of home improvements who
shall knowingivl make any false or fraudulent representations or
statements or who makes or causes any such statements to be
made in respect to the character of any sale, or the party authoriz-
ing the same, or as the (uality, condition, or value of any property
offere'i him for sale, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
dem'-anr. an' npon conviction thereof, shall he punished by im-
prI0menIet out e-xceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars.
b. Any person who is induced to contract for home improve-
Incts in reliance on false or fraudulent representations or state-
ment.; k::i nr%-;:yV made, may sue and recover from such home
imprvment contractor or solicitor a p-nalty of five hundred dol-
lars in addition to any damages sustaiied by him by reason of
such statements or representations made by the contractor or by
his agents or employees.
- @ B322-361.0. Exceptions.-No contractor's license shall be re-
quired in the following instances:
1. An individual who performs labor or services for a con-
tractor for wages or salary.
2. A plumber, electrician, architect, professional engineer, or
any other such persons who is required by state or city law to
attain standards of competency or experience as a prerequisite
to engaging in such craft or profession, and who is acting ex-
clusively within the scope of the craft or profession for which he
is currently licensed pursuant to such other law.
3. Any retail clerk, clerical, administrative, or other employee
of a licensed contractor, as to a transaction on the premises of
the contractor,
4. This article shall not apply t(> or affect the validity of a
home improvement contract otherwise within the purview of
this article which is made prior to the effective date of the re-
spective provisions 6f this article governing such contracts.
5. Any home improvement, where the aggregate- contract
price for all labor, materials and other items is less than two
hundred dollars. This exemption does not apply where the work
is only a part of a larger or major operation, whether under-
taken by the same or a different contractor, or in which a divi-
sion of the operation is made in contracts of amounts less than
two hundred dollars for the purpose of evasion of this provision
or otherwise.
177
HOME IMPROVEMENT BUSINESS
B 32-362.0. Power to investigate.-The commissioner upon rea-
sonable cause should believe that any licensee or any other person
has violated any of the provisions of this article or any other law,
relating to home improvement business shall have the power to
make such investigation as ie shall deem necessary, and to the
extent necessary for this purpose, he may examine such licensee
or any other persons and shall have the power to compel the pro-
duction of all relevant books, records, accoutits, documents or
other, records.
§ B32-363.0. Hearings on charges; decision.-No license shall be
suspended or revoked nor fine imposed until after a hearing had
before an officer, or employee of the department designated for
such purpose by the commissjoner upon notice to the licensee of
at least ten days. The notice shall be served either personally or
by registered mail and shall state the date and place of hearing and
set forth the ground or grounds constituting the charges against
the licensee. The licensee or registrant shall be heard in his de-
fense either in person or by counsel and may produce witnesses
and testify in his behalf. A stenographic record of the hearing
sha be taken and preserved. The hearing may be adjourned from
time to time. The person conducting the hearing shall make a
written report of his findings and a recommendation to the com-
missioner for decision. The commissioner shall review such find-
ings and the recommendation and, after due deliberation, shall
issue an order accepting, modifyiig or rejecting such recommenda-
tion and dismissing the charges or suspending or revoking the
license. For the purpose of this article, the commissioner or any
officer or employee of the department designated. by him may
administer oaths, take testimony, subpoena witnesses and compel
the production of books, papers, records and documents deemed
pertinent to the subject of investigation.
§ B32-364.0. Judicial review.-The action of the commissiener
in suspending, revoking or refusing to issue or renew a license
may be reviewed by a proceeding brought under and pursuapt to
article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules.
§ B32-365.0. Violations and penalties.-l. Any person who shall
own, conduct or operate a home improvement business without a
license therefor or who shall violate any of the provisions of this
article, with the exception of violations referred to in § B32-360.0,
or having had his license suspended or revoked shall continue to
engage in such business, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction, shall be punishable by imprisonment for not more
than six months, or by a fine 'of not more than one thousand dol-
lars, or both such fine and imprisonment, and each such violation
shall be deemed a separate offense.
2. The corporation counsel may bring an action in the name of
the city to restrain or prevent any violation of this act or any con-
tinuance of any such violation.
B 32-366.0. Official acts used as 'evidence.-The official acts of
the commissioner and the department shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein and shall be entitled to be received in evidence
in all actions at law and other legal proceedings in any court or
before any agency, board, body or officer.
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§ B32-367.0. Separability clause.-If any part or provision of
this article or the application thereof to any person or circurn-
stances be adjudged invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction,
such judgment shall be confined in its operation to the part, pro-
vision or application directly involved in the controversy in which
such judgment shall h ve been rendered and shall not affect or
impair the validity of t remainder of this article or the applica-
tion thereof to other persons or circumstances, and the cotrncil
hereby declares that it would have enacted this article or the re-
mainder thereof had the invalidity -of such provision or applica-
tion thereof been apparent.
§ 2. This local law shall take effect October first, nineteen hun-
dred sixty-eight.
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Appendix B: Amended Regulations Relating to the Home Improve-
ment Business
DEPARTMENT OF CONS UMER A FFAIRS
Amendment to Regulations Relating to the Home Imuprovement Busimnes
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 1105 OF THE CITY
Ciarter that, due and proper publication in Tm.: Ca' RrcoRd'having =een made, and an
opporturity for comment having been duly afforded, amended regtdations regarding the
Home Improvement Business are adopted..pursuant to Section 773-40 of Title A of Chapter
32 of the Admiristrative Code of The City of New York effective September 15, 175, to
read as kvs:
AMENDED REGULATIONS RELATIN. TO HOME IMPROVEMENT
BU$1NESS
1. Cortcnt and Cancelation of the Contract
a) Every agrzenent to perfo;rin a home imrovmenent shl1 be evidenced by a
-- iter c-ntrct and eacih ho)me iiprovemnent contractor or salesperson shall furnish
e ruO y cmnphed legible copy of the entire home improvement contract
ts~ exxuie~ whch shal contain the dare of the traniaction the con-
~s name, oce ade ecphun: number and ;iense number; and the salcsper-
sa name and lionse numlber Jegily printed thereon. T he home improvement contract
shial~ ne i Er-giish and any other language, e.g., Spanish, that was principally used in
the oral sales presentation.
(b) Arty advertised represertation: including, bit not limited to, any charge,
guaranty, or warranty. shall be clearly stated and made a part of the hsme improvement
contract.
rc) Each home improvement contract shall contain a clause wherein thecontractor
agrees to ifurnish the buyer with a certificate of Wo7rknmen's Compensation Insurance
prior to commencement of work pursnant to 'he contract.
I (d) Each home improvernent contract ;shall contain, on the face of the contract, a
clause wherein the contractor agrees to procure all permits required by local law.
(e) Each home improvement contract shal' contain, in inmediate proxinuty to the
space reserred in the contract for the signature of the buyer, in bold face type of a mini-
mum size of 10 points, a statement in the following form:
YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS
TRANSACTION AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MID-
NIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY AFTER
THE DATE OF THIS TRANSACTION.-SEE THE
ATTACHED NOTICE OF CANCELLATION
FORM.. FOR AN EXPLANATION OF, THIS
RIGHT.
(f) The contractor or salesperson shall furnish to the buyer at the time s/he signs
the home improvement contract a completed form in duplicate captioned "NOTICE
OF CANCELLATION" which shall be attached to the contract and easily detachable,
and which shall contain in ten point bold face type, in English and in any other language
used in the contract; the name and address of the contractor, the date of the transaction.
the date until which the buyer may give notice of camellation. and the following state-
ment:
NOTICE OF-CANCELLATION
(enter date of transaction)
(Date)
YOU MAY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION.
WITHOUT ANY PENALTY OR OrLiGATTON,
WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS FROM THE
ABOVE DATE.
IF YOU CANCEL. ANY IMOPERTY TRADED
IN, ANY PAYMENTS MADE BY YOU UNDER
THE CONTRACT OR SALE. AND ANY NEGO-
TIABLE INSTRUMENT EXECU TED BY VYOU
WILL BE RETURNI) WITHIN 1 U BUSINE3S
DAYS FOLLOWING RECEIPT BY TH E SELLER
OF YOUR CANCELLATION OTI. AND
ANY SECURITY INTEREST AI[SiNG OUT OF
THE TRANSACTION WILL BE CANCELLED.
IF YOU CANCLL, YOU MUST Ml,-KE AVAIL-
ABLE TJTHE SELLER AT YOUR -E SIDENFCE,
IN SUBSTANTIALLY AS GOO) CONDITION
AS WHEN RECEIVED. AN' GOODS DE-
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LIVERED TO YOU UNDER THIS CONTRACT
OR SALE; OR YOU MAY IF YOU WISH. COM-
PLV WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
SELLER< RLGARDNG THE iRTURN SHIP-MENT UF THE GOODS AT THES S ,LE'S X
PENSE AND RISK.
IF YOU DO MAKE THE GOODS AVAILABLE
TO THE SELLER ANDTHE SELLER DOES
'1OT 1iCK TI1EM1 UP WIThIN 20 DAYS OF
THE DATE OF YOUR NOTICE OF CANCELLA-
TION. YOU MAY RETAIN OR DISPOSE OF
THE GOODS WiTHOUT ANY FURTIER OIILI-
GATInON. IF YOU VAIL TO MAKB THE GOODS
AV'AILABLE TO THF. S-I..LER, OR IF YOU
ARETO RELTUR-Z. THE GOODS TOTH
EL.L .. R AN i- .UL 00D SO. Tl EIN 'OUj RE-
MAIN LiABLE FOR PERFOR\1ANCE OF ALL
BLG NS UNDER THE CONTRACT.
TOCANCEL THIS TRAN,\ACTI)N. MAl OR
R A SiGNED ND DITID COPY OF
TI 61 CNCELLATION N01G 1 UR ANY
07-1OT R WRITTEN NOTICtF Oi- N') D TFLE-
G T {Name of sde'r A T1 : r'f ser's
-us. NOT LA t ER TH AN M1 DNiC HT
(Date)
1 MFR B1YCANC L TIS TR ANSACTI OIN.
(Buyer's sign:ture)
g The otractor or salesperson shall inform the buyer oratly at the time s/he
signs the contract, of is or her right to cancel.
(h) The crnractor or salesperon shall not misrepresent in any maitner the buyer's
righi to caicen
ki) U1t thi coitractor or salesperson has complied with regulations (e) (f) thebuyetr.,er any other piersona Obigated for any p1art of the contract price may cancel the
hone iprovement contract by notifying the con'tracior or salesperson at any time,
in any manmer aid by any means of his or her intention to cancel. The period prescribed
by Regulation I (e) shal! 4egin to nim from the time the contractor or salesperson com-
plies with sections Ile) (i).
( j) ihe buyer' not:cr of cancellation to the contractor or salesperson-n eed not
take the iorm pr-scibed and shall be sufficient if it indicates the intention of the buyer
nor to be bouznd.
(k) The contractur or salesperson shall not fail or refuse to honor any valid
notice of cancellation by the buyer and wilhin ten husiness days after the receipt of
such notice, the c-tntractor or ialesperson shPaJh (i) refund all payments made TInder the
contract, (ii) canceL amid i-rtin any negotiable iistrumient executed by dhe 'tver in
cour.ection with the contract : (ii i talce any action necessary or approprite to terminate
prompstly :rv scuritv interest created in the traisaction ; and, (iv) Within ten bsi-ness
day; of ereeipt uf the buzyer's notice of cance!!alion the coot ractor or saLesprsont shll
notify the buyer wherber the contractor mn to repossess or to abandoi any shipped
or delivered materials.(I) The conitactor or saesperson shall not negotittle, sell, transter or assign any
note oir other evidence of indebtedness to a finance compantiy or tiher third :,arty prior to
midnight of the fifth busnmcss day ilfolwing the day the cautract was signed.
I() A homie improvement contract may not ie cancelled if the huver initiated the
contract and requested Cmenm i of work without delay because 0o1 :1 eneriency,pro d t.)t the fu'er iiroshes the contractor with a separate dated aid signed Per-
.ora; stateteIt in the buyer's hardwriting describing the situation requiriiig immediate
emedy n pand .nd wativing the rigit to cance the contract
we W: thriee h-u-N . days.
(in 'or purpo(rt of this regulation- a busiess dlay is apy .'etdar day except
Sunday,-Ov' or o iir business holilavs N-w Year's [a,, Washington's fulrthday,
ia Day nd p Day, Labor Day, Coumbus Day. Vetera y ThaK-
giigDay, anld Chr.ot1ma~s [D.-y (
i
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"ese shall exhibit a current beerse to any nwver or prospective
buyer upon request, whether the request is madt At the salespersoi'- place of butsiness or
eLewhere in The City of New York.
3. A salesperson shall uotify the Depa'ritent of Consumer Affairs. by written con-
firmation from his or her e-mployer, within 4-i nlours of emoroyment. Where the saksperson
has more than one employer, each employer shall file writ:.en consent wit!h the tDepartnemt
of Conswmser Affairs, such consent to inceude the naire or names Of other em.yeqs of the
salesperson.
4. Advertising and Selling Practices
(a) Liciense number.
All advertising and sales literature must contain the license number of the con-
tractor. For purposes of this regulation, an alphabetical listing ina telephon'e directory
shall not be considered advertising.
(b) Prices and Illustrations.
Prices and descriptions of articles advertised shall be so placed in relation to any
il tat.ion thet they will not be deceptive or mislca 4 ing. Au advertisement shall not
be s. designed as tt give the im:ression that the orice or terms of 'he fcritared mer-
candise apply to other merchandise in the advectisement whst snch is r.ot the fact. An
dverisement shall rfnt be used which features merchandise at a price or terms dis-
plal;'-d, teether with iliustratins of higher-priced merchandke, so arranged as to give
de impression that tne tower price or more iavorahi, terst apply to the higher priced
rhandise, when such is not the fact.
(c) Headlines.
.igs shall be fre-: fron exaggeration or deception. For example, a heading
rtefer to a different mai-e, brand, gra.ie, or uality tlan the item or items ilus-
en or i.d imrmediativ, therewith shall nor be ased. andws ci captior' shal
cor:orm with the descript'in hi the tCxt.
(d) "Savings" nut a SAling Price.
A savings claim shall not be expressed in auiy manner which implies that the amormt
seei~ed is the selling price of the merchandise.
(c) Descriptim and illustrations oi advertised items or offers. Fhati accuxratefv
portray the products to he soid as to size. quality., (uantity and design
* (i). Materials.
Any deScription in advertising or selling ,L rnaterials to e urnished shall be
accurate ani there shall be no statement or implication that material wi be oq h par-
ticular type when such is not in fact the case.
g) AIvertised Price, Limitations.
When a price or specific credit terms are featnred in an adverti.sernent, the ad-
vertisement ihal accurately describe what is being Liered at, that price or term.s, ! e.g.
Where an item such as "10 feet by 16 feet Extension," "10- et by 15 feet Basnen,"
etc., is featured at a price or spe6fic credit terms, ihis shall mean. tha a *ajished ex-
tension basement. etc.;-Uwl he built at the advertised price or terms A ry imitations
or conditions on what will be suppliedi at the featired price or n credit -terrs shall be
clearly and conspicuously stated in immnediale coniunction with the featn'red statement,
eg.: "14 feet by 21 feet Frame Garage-Unpairte,. "10 feet by 15 feet Extension-
Shell Only.").
(h) Installation Charge.
If installation is extra, the advertising ghall clearly and conspicuously disclose the
fact in inmnediate conjunction therewith. Foi- example:
"Installation Extra"
"Plus Installation"
"Installation at Extra Cost"
(i) Accessories and Etxtra Chardze.
If the price advertised does not includ. all of t! accesstrnies which eithe-rappear in
the advertisement, or which are necessary to effiect proper installation andl the- use of the
itsr (such as hardware, panels, frames, etc.), the idver+isemenithall !tate that fact
c -t and prominently in closeconj unction with the advertised s-ince. Extra charges
k:- a no1 he used as a device to disguise the actual selling price"of merchandise.(3) D:livery Charges.
1i ar extra charge is required to make delivery oi any advertised home iimrrove-
r )nt or p:zt thereof, such requirmnent shall be clearly and conspicunusly stated the
advertisement.
(k) Factory to You," "No Dealers"
. Geneselsatcnens snch as "Factory to You," "Direet to You," "Buy frm Man-
facie rer," "Save the Middleinan's Proiit" or phrases of similar meaning shall not be
used arless the advertiser ik actually the maker or producer of' the merebandise ad-
vertised or oiered for %,lit
(1) Guaranty or Warranty.
1I reterence is made to a guaranty or warranty or the word "guaranteed" or
"warranted" is used, the terms, conditions, and period of time covered theretv sall be
clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the advertisement. The terms shalk indicate
wruber "!abor and material only," "repair." "replacement," or "fuil (partial) refund"
is off-red. Any limitations shall be disclosed in the advertisement.
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(m) Reasonable Fulfillment, "Lifetime."
Guaranty shall not extend for a period of time beyond the normal life of the item
or service, or in the case of guarantees against defective materials and workmanship,
beyond the time within which defective materials and workmanship are likely to show
up "Lifetime" and other long-term guarantees shall not be made.(n) Credit and Credit Charges. ,.
All statements and claims nregarding installment buying plans, and-fnance, credit
service, carrying or service charges, etc., including referentes to down-payments and,
amounts and frequency of pVmenti, shall he accurate and clearly understandale, and
made in good faith.
(o) Credit Terms.
Where any repayment price if offered. it shall be stated in specific amounts per;
Month
Price Reduciomr-
laims which state or imply a price reduction or savings from the advertiser's
previous price, whether as a dollar amount or perceniage, must be based on the adver-
tiser's usual and customary selling price for the item in the normal and regular course of
his busness. Such claim shall not be based on isolated or infrequent sales, on fictitious
list prices, or by "guesstimating."
(q) Phrases featuring a sale with a stated time limitation (e.g. "3-Day Sale)" shall
be used only when the advertised items are to be taken off sale and will revert to a
higher price or a reasonable length of time, immediately following the sale.
(r) Claimed Results.
iaims as to performance, protection, results which will be obtained by or realized
from a particular home unprovemnt product or se'rvice shall be based on known and
prtovabie iaci. Extravagant claanis suc as "cuts fuel bill 30 per cent," "outlasts. ."
the accusary oi which is dependent on factors over which the advertiser or seller has no
control, shonid not be used.
(s) Model Home and Referral Offers.
No-advertiseret shall promise to any buyer or prospective buyer that his or her
dwelling will serve as a so-caled "model home" or "advertising job," or other
similar representation, wherein the buyer or prospective buyer is led into believing that
s/he will be paid a commission or other compensation for any sale made in the vicinity
or within any specified distance from his or her home, or that the cost of the purchase
o0 any houme improvement product or service will thereby be reduced or fully paid.
(t) insured and Bonded.
Where claims of being insured and/or bonded appear in an advertisement, the I
nature of the insurance and/or bond shall be distinctly stated in the advertisement.
(it) Pricing.
If a price ("persquare foot," or other basis) is quoted in the advertising of resi-_
dential ahnmimnm siding which does not include all costs for labor, parts, and accessories
for the proper functioning and appearance of such installed product (e.g..starter-strips,
door and window trim, window head flashing, back-up pieces and corner pieces), it
shall be clearly and conspicuously qualified in conJunction therewith by some explana-
tory statement, such as "Panels Only-Necessary Accessories at Extra Cost."
5. In the performance of any Home Improvement Contract it shall be the non-delegable
duty and obligation of the prime contractor to secure or see to the securing of each and
every permit, license, certificate or occupancy, special exception or the like necessary to the
proper completion of such contract in accordance with applicable state or local building laws.
6. Each home improvement contractor shall maintain books of account. copies of all
contracts with buyers, and other such records as shall properly and completely reflect all
transactions involving the home improvement business. These records shall be maintained
for six years or the length of time of.the contract guarantee, whichever is longer.
7. A home improvement contractor must treat all funds received from a customer
'pursuant to a home i rovement contract as trust funds to be applied solely to the payment
of expenses directly re ted to the home improvement. Such funds may not be applied to the
payment of expenses unrelated to the home improvement unless and until the home improve-
ment is completed and all the expenses for direct labor, material and sub-contractors related
thereto have been paid by the contractor.
EXPLANATION
The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated a rule concerning a cooling-off period
for door-to-door sales. These amendments incorporate the Federal Trade Regulation Rule
into the Department of Consumer Affairs' regulation of Home Improvement Contractors.
The amended regulations also require disclosure in the contradt of the contractor's duty
vis i vis Workmen's Compensation Insurance and to obtain various permits required by
local law, as well as requirng certain record keeping procedures.
alS ELINOR GUGGENHEIMER, Cn-misin..
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DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS
Amwwimaf= to the Home Imroveaent Bun Regulations
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN PURSUANT TO SECTION 1105 OF THE CITYCharter-thxt due and proper publication in THF CrrY RESDP having been made, and an
ooportnety for cosmment having been duly afforded, amended regulations regarding the
Home u Business are adopted pursuant to Section 773-4.0 of Title A, Chapter
32 of the An the Code of The City of New York, effective November 30 1975, to
read-as follows:
AMENDMENT RELATING TO HOME IMPROVEMENT
BUSINESS REGULATIONS
& xcept as provided in paragraph f(m), the home improvement contractor shall
not Perfim or c or permit the performance of any of the folowing actions until after
the z.ree day cancelaticn period has expired and s/he is reasonably satisfied that the
casrener has not ezerised his or her right oi cancellation:(a) Disburse any money other than in escrow;
(b I Make ay physical changes in the property of the customer;
j) Perform any work or service for the buyer; or
Make any deliveries to the residrnce of the customer if the credto- has
remn or wWU acquire a security interest other than one arising by operation of law.
EXPLANATION
The Fera Consuer Credit Protection Act (15 USC 1635), which covers home
impovemwuts f1ietd by loans, prohibits the commencement of work within the three
ay cancelabton period. This amendment adds those provisions to our home improvement
contactor regniQis.
o30 ELINOR GUGGENHEIMER, Commissioner.
-199.1-
Reprinted from The 0C ty Record of October 30,
1975( Effective Novferibe- 30, 1975
(
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Appendix C: General Regulations of the DCA
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS
Amendment to General Rules and Regulations of the Department of
Consumer Affairs
BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME AS COMMISSIONER OF
the Department of onsiumer. Affairs under the provisions of Section 110i of the New
York City Charter and Section 833 oi said Charter, I hereby amend the General Rules
and Regiations of the Department of Consumer Affairs by the addition of the follow-
ing Regulation:
Regnation . Display of -sign. A licensee of the Department of Consumer Affairs
of The City of New York shall display and post conspicuously at his place of business.
at all tirres so as to be readily legible by patrons, a s'ign or placard not less than 12
inches by 1' inches a dimensicn with letters thereon not less than 1-inch high stationed
thereon
"This business is licensed by the Deparpnent of Consumer Affairs of The City
of New York, 80 Lafayette Street, New York, N. Y. 10013, Complaint Phone:
L e . (current license number)."
Regulate J. DisuPy of hcense. A !icensee or permittee of the Department of
Cn1sur.er A-ucrs of The City of New York shall be required to display and post his
c er -m rn a conspicuous pce nrn the premises or at such other place as
the n e of &nsumer Atair may Oe!gnate.
n de a ir ar; pssessio and display. A licensee or pert- een
w ho sad have been issued an idetication card pursuant to the Rules and Regulations
Of the Denartment of Consuner Affairs of The City of,New York shall carry such
card on 'is person at all times, anl shall display said identification card upon the
reqrt. of ree nt:tives of the Departmuent or other interested persons.
The fortgoing, m uendmrent shll tke effect 30 days after this publication.
BESS MYERSON GRANT, Comnmissioner.
Reprinted from the City Record of October 18, 1969.
Effective November 17, 1969.
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS
General Regulations 5 and 6
NOTICE 7S HEREBY GIVEN THAT PURSUANT TO SECTION 1105, OF THE
New York City Charter, preliminary publication for the purpose of comment in THE
CrrY REcoRD and filing with the City Clerk havjng been completed, the following general
regulations of the Department of Consumer Affairs are hereby promulgated, and shall
become e ffective January 4, 1l M.
Regulation 5. Licensee's duty to appear at departmental proceedings. A licensee of
the Department of Consumer Affairs of The City of New York shall personally respond,
by the appearance at the Department of an officer of a cor-porate licensee, a partner, or
the individual owner, bo notices of hearing involving departmental proceedings relating to
its laws, rules and regulations. Service of notice of hearing by ordinary mail directed to
the licensee*s place of husinesm, residence, or the residence of an officer or principal stock-
holder of a corporate licensee, shall be sufficient.
Regulation 6. Change of address of principals. A corporate licensee. partnership, or
individual owner, shall notify the Department of Consumer Affairs of The City of New
York in writing of any change of address of an officer, stockholder, partner or individual
owner.
December 2, 1970.
d4 BESS MYERSON GRANT, Commissioner.
Reprinted from the City Record .f December 4, 1970.
Effective January 4, 1971.
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DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS
GENERAL REGULATION 7
Notice of Adoption of General Regulation Relating to the Payment of Small Claims
Court Judgnenta
NOTICE. IS riEREBY GIVEN PURSUANT TO SECTION 1105 AND 2203 (e)
'o he _New *Yr Cuy Charter that, due and proper pui'blicatutrn iit Ta Crri RFecowa
having been made, and an opportunity for comment having been duly afforded, Genteral
R auion 7 rlarng to the payment of Smal Qaims Court judg "ets is adopted pursuant
c 7t A-d ofi Capter .34 of the Adrrinitraive Code 4.4 The City of
w : 7,n 7t read as follows:
GENERL~ MCULA TON 7--:zMALI. CL MS O-T JUDGMENTS
a) o person shIll he i-ued or allowed to hold or renew any license granted by
e rimeUsintl-" of u Afairs if I. shall be determined that fthere is any judgment
he ivi t.ourt of The Citv of New York, Small Ciairas Court Part (hereinafter called
'Srall iarn- Court ') outstanding against such person whic-h bab gone unsatisied
anr, a I 'd IA irTy (32) days ron the date of entry oi such judgnent, unless said judg-
. -:n 7Eii:,4 appealed or 1- :id in alimerts or -n a dferred lasis
. , or appcat fo ene u by, tih e r Con-.uraer
Af-aire shal: a, zte time of applicat'or for such licentse and at the time of filing for any
renewai ibereot. ztrify to said Department in writing either, fi) that there are not any out-
tandi. rgun tied SmalI Claims Court judgments against it, or (ii) such judgments do
ex.t but 4re rither the subject of a pending appeal, have been stayed or are being paid
-rsuant tan agmemniem: between te Icensee, or prospective licensee, and the judgment
r-disee or appscant for a license shalt in the sit::athi described in (ii)
be lst each such jt1gimnt showing the name and address of the judgmnrst creditor.,
tmIe amnurt of the judgment, the date of the judgmnwit ajL the- cou.nty in which the Small
airns Ccur- graiting the judgment is located. Where any jud~ment is being appealed
or lias been stayed te iictnsce, or applicant, shall attach to the certinicate referred to above
a coy of earn notice of appeal or stay. Where the licensee or applicant is paying any such
judgmtent ir installments or on a defirred basis pursuant to an agreement with a judgment
cr-,imr such licensev or applicant shall attach a copy of such agreement to said certificate
or each judgnent being so paid.
,: Any failure to supply the certificate called for herein, or any failure to make-a
: and *rut'ul disclosure of the information called for by this regulation, shall constitute
,grounds for the Department to deny a license, in the ece of an initial appikca.ion, orito
deny a renewa of a license to any licensee seeking sucli renewal.
EXPL INATION -
The Dep-artmtr of Consumer Affairs has found the Small Cairns Court an effective
formum xmr many consumers. Unfortrnately some merchants seek to undernine the effective-
of this court by ignoring its judgments and trying through :. variety of ways to
block the calection i>4 judgmrnents rendered by the court. The Department Mdieves such
':er'haits are not apersons to hold a Department license. Therefore, this regulation
would eitre mercanits to 'irnish .wih u With inforrnation about any Outstandin Small Claims
o.jurr judgments whenever tbey apply for a new licernse, or seerk to renew an existing license.
iages in Small Claims Court procedures make it feasible for the Departnerft to find out
ii A part .rular merchant is trying to cover up a record of ignoring court judgments.
-,0 ELINOR C. GUGGENHEYMER, Commissioner.
Reprinted from The City Record, Vol. CV,
Nca. 31504, p. 2121 dated June- 30, 1977.
EEffective July 31, 1977.
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Appendix ): License Enforcement Law of 1973
TIE CITY OF NEW YRK
DEPARTMTT OF CONSUMR AFFAIRS
LOCAL LAWS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
POR TE YEA 197
r ceby Mr. Fred~ir (by' Re'nes ' of Commssioner of Consumer Affairs)-
A LOCAL LAW to amend the administrative code of the city of New York, fla
relation to the licensing of various activities.
Be 4 ewatte by !he Cou-c4 as :
Sectio Li Thte A f ihapter thirty-two of the administrative ccde of the city of
New York is hereby repeaied and re-enacwd %o read as ioUows:
TEE A
Licow * wa L~a of lyC
9 ~.[ he co'.chn Smi. mafr de proction. and. relief of the public fromt
depi" unfair and uncoxsctoraxt pracidc, for the maintenance of standard of
integdty, oniesty and Lair dealing among -e;soas nmd organizations engaging in licensed
activsties, for the protection of the buith e i s-aet' d/ P people of New York City and
for other purposes requisite to promirlg the gneri -wehare, en.cfsing by the departcnent
f cnsFe Lon with respect to certain
trades. iniesses .=d industr - cond ~ ra "urthevr Oat, in order to secure the
above-merined ~prpc. and~ xenera'y to carry aut Iesosibilities for supervising and
reulatbg licensed activitie, tres busines and v-stries, the comtissioner of con-
sMner affirS requires powers, r d es ld acuorm whieb are equitable, flexible and
eficient. Finally, the council fndi 6 t sanctions and Penalits appix.d by the commissioner
and by the courts for the violation of a and rguana by individuals and organdaa-
tions engaging in various icens.d actvities, trades, binesses and industries, must be
- tufsciet to achieve these above-n .nftioned purposes of licensing.
1773-2.0 D.tmkiona.-Wherever used in this cbapter:
a. "Comauisioan " shall r.ean the commissioner of consumer affairs.
b. "Depetmsant" shall mean the department of consumer affai.
c, 'LiceAne" shall mean an authorization by the department of coaZnUerf
affairs to carry on various activities witbin its jurisdiction, which may tale the
fiorm of a licems peramit, registration, certiLication or sneh ;her form as -i desag-
nated under law, regulaion or rule.
cL "Orgiana==m= shall mean a business entity, including but not linited to
a eorporation, trust, estate, partnership, cooperative, association, irm, clIiaC society.
e. "Persa* thall mean a natural person or an orniatia 4
. "Trade na." shail mean. that name unider wrhich an gareatan or
person solicits, enage in, conducts or transacts a busmess or activo.jM-3.0 Contsetion of this w6de an4 other titLae of ts chapier-The provi-
sieus of this title and other titles contained m this chapter shat be liberasly onastrud in
accordance with the legislative declaration of the city council set forth in scetion 773-L..
773-4.0 Power of the -mjajoae t f ceaswme asasir with revpt toipsmaisg..-e. The commissioner shall have cognizance and control of the grant'
iame, transferring, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension and canceation ia h-
cenes issued under this chapter and under all other laws conferring sntc powers upon
him. The caimnsstener or the commissioner's designee sha coH4ct an ffes for all scib
licenses and permits and sbau otherwise enforce the provisions of thfi chapter.
b. The commisaaoner sai, as he determues necessary and apprupriate, gromulgate,
anend a1i rescind regulabons and rules:
. to carry out the powers and duties of he department;
2k to prevent and remedy fraud, misrepresentation, deceit and uoertinnbe
dealing, and to promote Lair trade practices by hmose engaging in heensed acutivem
3. to require adequate disclosure by those engaging in hicensed activities of both
the term and conditions ider which they perform icensed activities, adequate
disclosure of the true zames or true corporate names of licensees, and adequate
disclosure of applicable loca, state anA federal law pertinent to consmers' interests
regarding the conduct oif ti'ias licensed und this chapter;
4. to reqire that licensees Keep such iecords as he ary determine are necessary
or useful for carrying out the purposes- of the chap'er and, except as specifically set
forth in this cnapter, retam tam for three years;
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5. to ensure that an persons and organizations licensed under this chapter have
made appropriate financial disclosure, and that the premises complies with all legal
requirements necessary to engage in the licensed activity;
6. with respect to licensed activities, to protect the health, safety, convenience
and welfare of the general public; and
7. to ensure that those engaging in licensed activities do not discriminate against(
any person on the basis of age, sex, race, color, national origin, creed or religion in
violation of city, state or federal laws.
c. The eonmissiner sfall compile 'all regulations and rules promulgated by the
department and maintain a copy thereof, available for public inspection at his principal
office at such time as that office shall be open for business. A record of each license
issued idicang its kind and class, the license number the fee received therefor and such
other records as the r may require shall Le kept by the department
d. The comnissioner or the commissioner's deiignee shall be authorized to conduct
inestigations, to issue subpoenas, to receive evidence, to hear complaints regarding activi-
ties for which a license is or may belrequired, to take depositions on due notice, to serve
interrogatories. to bold public and private bearings upen due notice, to take testimony and
to promulgate, amend and modify procedures and practices governing such proceedings.
e. The corruussoner shall be authorized, upon due notice and hearing, .to suspend,
revoke or cancei any license issued by him in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and, except to the extent that dollar limits are otherwise specifically provided for
in this c:hapter the commissioner or the commissioner's designee may impose or institute
fines ci not r an three hundred and fifty dollars nor less than five dollars for each
:oiation =-s chlazer and regulations and rules promulgated under it; the commissioner
may arrange for the redress of injuries caused by such violations, and may otherwise
provde .!or compliancewith the provisions and purposes of this chapter and with regula-
tion and-ruipl promulgated ander this chapter. The commissioner or the corminianer's
designee shall be authorized to suspend the license of any person pending payment of
such fine or pending compliance with any other lawiul order of the department. The
coimissioner shall be authorized to impose a fine or to suspend a license or both for
a failure to apoear at a hearing at the department after due notice of such hearing. If a
licerse has been suspended, it shall be returned to the department forthwith upon receipt
of the order of suspension. Failure to surrender the license shall be grounds for a fine
ar revocatioa of the license.
f. The commissioner, upon due notice and bearing, way require that persons licensed
under this chapter who have committed repeated, multiple or persistent violations of this
chapter, conspicuously display at their place of business and in advertisements a notice
(of A form, content and size to be specified by the commissioner), which shall describe
the person's record oi violations of this chapter; -provided that, for each time such
display is required, the commissioner may require that such notice be displayed for not
less than ten nor more than one hundred days. -
§ 773-5.0 Judicial enforeoment.-a. Except as otherwise specifically provided
in this chapter, or in subsection (b) of this section, any person, whether or not he holds
a license issued under this chapter, who violates any provision of this chapter or any
regulation or rule promulgated under it shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for each
violation by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than five htndred dollars
or by imprisonment not exceeding fifteen days, or both; and any such person shaH be
subject also to a civil penalty in the sum of one hundred dollars for each violation, to be
recovered in a civil action.
b. Any person who engaged without a license therefor In an activity for which a
license is required by any provision of this chapter shall, upon conviction thereof, be
subject to the following sanctions:
. If he has never held a license for such activi he shall be subject to a Sne
of not less than twenty-five dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars or by im-
prisonment not exceeding fifteen days, or both; and any such person shall be subject
also to the payment of a civil penalty in the sum of the greater of twice the applicable
license fee or one hundred dollars, to be recovered in a civil action.
2. If he has never held a license for such activity, and has been convicted once
previously for engaging in such activity without a license, or if he has held suchlicense and his license has lapsed prior to his perfecting an application for a renewal,
he shall be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, or both; and he shall
be subject also to. civil penalty in the sum of one thousand dollars to be recovered
in a civil action.
Reprinted from The City Record. of June 36, 1973.
Approved by the Mayor on Jun 5, 1973.
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Appendix E: Methodology: Approach, Acceptance, Bias
This study, Informal Resolution and Formal Adjudication of
Consumer Complaints by a Licensing Authority: A Case Study, is based
on field research which I did during my sabbatical from Northeastern
University School of Law, from January through June, 1979.
My interest in studying New York City's Department of Consumer
Affairs was aroused by Philip Schrag's provocative article based on
his experiences there ten years earlier,205 as well as by my continuing
involvement in teaching a course in "Consumer Protection Planning" at
Northeastern. I gained entree to DCA via my friendship with Marjorie
M. Smith, who was a Deputy Commissioner of the Department at the
time of my study. Marjorie encouraged me to do a study of some aspect
of DCA operations, and helped me to obtain Commissioner Bruce Ratner's
permission and support.
After interviewing several knowledgeable DCA officials to evaluate
possible areas of study, I accepted the suggestion of Charles Greenman,
the then Consumer Advocate, to study the consumer redress hearing
process. The suggestion was particularly attractive to me since I had
long been convinced of the critical importance for consumer protection
of providing inexpensive and effective dispute resolution procedures,
yet had been unaware of the DCA process or of any similar one. A
check of the dispute resolution, consumer protection, and licensing
literatures confirmed the absence of any extensive description, much
less evaluation, of this or of any similar process.
Within the DCA hearing process, I soon decided to concentrate
on home improvement cases, which constitute between 35 and 40% of the
total. It was by far the largest single category,206 the one in which
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hearing officers were most comfortable awarding redress, and the
only one for which DCA had a separate administrative unit (the Home
Improvement Division) or its own expert to perform special inspections.
Access to the relevant DCA employees, all the necessary files
and documents and the consumer redress hearings, was made easy by my
connection with Marjorie Smith. Because of her, no one doubted my
authority. For example, I was given a desk to use near the complaints
file in the Complaints Department and a telephone with which to call
consumers to check out the results of their cases. To enable me to
sit in on home improvement hearings without my having to waste time
waiting for them to begin, the employee who called the cases agreed
to inform me at my desk whenever such a case was ready to be called.
Many DCA employees who saw me every day just assumed I worked there,
too.
In other words, my presence at DCA did not seem to alter the
normal work environment. If this were an efficiency study I would
have had to be very concerned about who knew what about me, and how
this might have affected their behavior. As it was, I was much more
concerned with the contents of the case files (most of which had been
assembled before I had arrived), general procedures (which were
obviously well settled, and were reflected in the case files), and
decisions that were written with an eye to outside criticism in the
first place. While hearing officers could have been on their best
behavior for me, 207they gave the definite impression of "doing their
thing". For instance, one of them regularly arrived 20 minutes late
for his hearings, as he apparently always did, despite his acute
awareness of my "official" connection. 208
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Consumers at the hearings never showed any curiosity about me.
Contractors sometimes realized I was an extra hand and raised an
eyebrow, but I have no reason to suspect that those who received an
explanation behaved any differently as a result. When I called
consumers I was not looking for their reactions to DCA but simply for
their statements as to whether the work was done or the refund made.
It is well that nothing turned on my independent status since, despite
my careful statement at the beginning of each conversation that I was
a law professor doing a study of DCA procedures, most of them seemed
to assume that I was working for DCA.
Access to small claims court was also not difficult. While I did
not know anyone there in advance, introducing myself as a law professor
studying small claims court quickly got me an interview with Phoenix
Ingraham, Chief Clerk of the Civil Court. He offered to help out
in any way that would be valuable, and began by introducing me to Tom
Slattery, the clerk of the Manhattan small claims court. Unfortunately,
Manhattan was not prime territory for home improvement contracts (at
the end of a morning looking for home improvement contractor cases in
their files, I had found only one such case in 150 file cards), I
therefore moved my operation to the Brooklyn small claims court where
the clerk, Stuart Feigel, after checking my bona fides with Ingraham,
gave me a desk to sit at next to the file drawers and, fortuitously,
just behind the counter clerk, where I was able to overhear the conver-
sations between clerks and would-be claimants. I was there for a
total of about 40 hours, spread over several weeks in March 1979.
Again, my main interest was in the contents of the files (and in the
responses of consumers to my calls inquiring about the end results of
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their cases, which calls I made from my desk at DCA). The file
cards had been filled out between July 24, 1978 and October 24, 1978,
and whatever was going to happen in most of the cases already had
before I arrived.
People who have behaved in a particular way in their jobs for
years are not likely to significantly change their personae and their
methods of operations when they realize they are being studied.
Typically, they do not think there is anything wrong with what they
have been doing, and they have little conscious control over their
personae, anyway. Furthermore, they are not likely to change if they
believe that nothing important to them turns on what the person doing
the study observes and concludes. Neither the evening court personnel,
nor those who worked in the clerk's office during the day, took me
very seriously. Most of them seemed to assume that I was simply a
graduate student writing at most a Master's thesis. I was clearly
not an official or even a friend of an official in the system, and
some of the clerks were short or even impolite to the claimants often
enough to indicate that they either discounted my presence or else
were unable to alter their long settled habits (such behavior might,
of course, have been more frequent had I not been there).
Many of the consumers whom I telephoned from DCA also could not
quite figure out who I was (a law professor, calling them??), and
a couple were suspicious that maybe I was someone in cahoots with
that thug-of-a-contractor, but they all gave me (most quite willing-
ly) the little piece of infomration I needed, which was whether
the work had been done, the settlement or judgment voluntarily paid,
or the sheriff's execution succesful.
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I do not see that consumers in either my DCA samples or my
small claims court sample had any reason to lie to me about whether
a payment owed them was actually made. Once a dispute between two
parties reaches the stage of a complaint to the licensing authority
or a claim filed in court, it is most unlikely that the defendant
will pay, whether in accordance with a settlement or in satisfaction
of an official order, without obtaining a receipt or cancelled check,
which the plaintiff would thereafter have great difficulty disputing.
Biased statements as to whether the work was done are more likely,
since (1) there may have been a disagreement or misunderstanding as
to what work needed doing, so that the "it" in their statement "it
was never done" might be different from the "it" that the hearing
officer, arbitrator, or the contractor (in agreeing to a settlement)
thought needed doing; and/or (2) "it" may have been done, but their
distrust of the contractor is so great that they do not quite believe
their eyes or are convinced it will fall apart tomorrow. They may
not want to commit themselves until they have had some time to see
whether it holds up.
I tried to control for this in cases where the contractor was
supposed to do some repairs or some more work and those in which the
consumer claimed the work was never done by asking whether the con-
tractor came back and, if so, what he did. If the consumer admits
that the contractor came back, she will usually admit he did some-
thing toward the required work, in which case I consider that the
consumer received "partial redress". At least for quantitative
purposes, I do not pretend to be able to make finer distinctions
195
than "substantial redress", "partial redress", and "no redress".
Access to arbitration hearings required a letter to Judge
Francis X. Smith, the Administrative Judge of the Civil Court, who
quickly sent his authorization to the clerk of the Brooklyn court
for me to sit in on these otherwise private hearings. The clerks
who work in the evening court are totally different from those who
staff the office during the day. They were very accommodating to
me the first evening I spent at the court, and largely ignored me
thereafter. Their behavior toward litigants did not change, being
throughout gruff, bossy, occasionally kind. I also spent one even-
ing at the Queens small claims court, where most of the personnel
did not know I was doing a study: they were, if anything, a mite
less gruff and bossy than their Brooklyn counterparts who did know
I was studying their operation.
The arbitrators, on the other hand, being lawyers, doubtless
cared what a law professor thought about them. While they put on
their "best" performances for me, I am sure these are the same per-
formances they would have put on without me. The system of arbitra-
tors works the same way that Tom Sawyer got his fence painted: the
court graciously permits practicing or retired lawyers to play judge
one evening each month without pay. While their abilities varied
considerably, all the arbitrators I observed clearly treated this
opportunity as a privilege and as a chance to show what wise and
judicious judges they would have made had they but received the call.
My own attitudes toward both the DCA and the small claims court
processes as well as toward the various people involved in them of
course find expression throughout the non-quantitative sections of
this paper, including the present one. This is not only inevitable
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but largely helpful. I came to admire the intelligence, dedica-
tion, and genuine concern for consumers of many of the people in-
volved, particularly at DCA. If some of that admiration comes
through in my writing, it is principally a reflection of the quali-
ties and accomplishments of the people who produced it. Similarly,
the criticisms I sometimes express, particularly of some small
claims court personnel, have bases in instances of insensitivity
which I observed in their dealings with the public. That said, my
judgements both of individual people and of the two systems as a
whole may be somewhat prejudiced by factors which I will now attempt
to trace.
I was and continue to be a friend of Deputy Commissioner Smith.
The Licensing Division and the Home Improvement Division are within
Deputy Commissioner Best's jurisdiction, and the Complaints, Calendar,
and Adjudication Divisions were within Deputy Commissioner White's
jurisdiction until he left in April, 1979. It is not clear to
me whose jurisdiction they fell under thereafter. While Marjorie
Smith clearly had some involvement in these areas (jurisdictional
lines between Deputy Commissioners being less sharp in practice than
they are on the organization chart), she had only been at DCA for
about a year at the time of my study. She was clearly not responsi-
ble for the way these Divisions were operating, and was genuinely
interested (and not entirely optimistic) about what I would find and
its policy implications. She would have been disgusted if I came up
with something she thought was a whitewash or a propaganda piece.
Most of the other people I felt close to at DCA similarly did not
see themselves as career DCA employees (many have already left),
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were genuinely interested in being helpful to my study, and had no
investment in reaching any particular conclusions.
On the other hand, it is easier for me to keep my critical dis-
tance from the career people both at DCA and at small claims court.
They were typically both pleasant and helpful to me. I think I have
done a good job here empathizing with them (understanding the cogni-
tive and emotional frameworks with which they approach their job
responsibilities), but their backgrounds and approaches are suffi-
ciently different from mine that I have had little difficulty treating
their job performances as objects of study to be evaluated by criteria
I have developed elsewhere (rather than treating these performances
as, at least in part, normative in themselves). Nonetheless, I am
not a complete stranger to gratitude, and I may have unconsciously
shaded my judgments in favor of the many people who were nice to me,
and of the efficacy of the jobs that they do.
Another factor cutting in the same direction is my own desire
to have uncovered a process that is effective, efficient, and broadly
applicable. If I have, this study becomes important, and so to some
extent do I. If not, while all is not lost, a promising opportunity
has been missed. By way of disclaimer, I cannot be sure that I have
not been more ready to accept evidence that DCA processes were working
well than evidence that they were working poorly, and conversely, more
ready to accept evidence that small claims court (which serves as a
baseline) was working poorly than evidence that it was working well.
However, predictable unconscious biases such as these can be counter-
acted. It was largely for the purpose of counteracting them that
I relied so heavily on documentary evidence (e.g. notations on small
claims court file cards that "execution satisfied", or letters in
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DCA case files from the consumer confirming that the work had been
done) and telephone calls to consumers narrowly focused on the
question of whether the work (or whatever) had actually been done.
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FOOTNOTES
1. In more technical terms, this is a court of general juris-
diction, as opposed to a court of limited or special jurisdiction,
such as a small claims court.
2. For example, a high volume "legal clinic" in New York City
presently calculates its rates on the basis of $65 - $75 per hour.
At this rate, a fully litigated case would cost several thousand
dollars. While a letter threatening suit could probably be had for
$100 and might well produce the desired settlement, a contractor who
did not (for whatever reason) wish to settle at this point could be
quite secure in calling the lawyer's bluff, knowing that the cost to
the consumer of carrying out her lawyer's threat would be prohibitive.
3. Standard practice is, apparently, to demand at least $1000
"up front" before litigation is actually undertaken. See note 97.
4. The principal exceptions are members of the occasional union-
negotiated "judicare" program.
Under some circumstances a victorious plaintiff can recover
her attorney's fees from the defendant. Examples are cases in Massa-
chusetts in which the seller had employed "an unfair or deceptive act
or practice," Mass. Gen. L. ch 93A, sec. 9, and cases anywhere in
the United States in which the warrantor of a consumer product has
failed to carry out his obligation under the warranty, 15 U.S.C.
sec. 2310(d). However, unless an attorney can be found who is willing
not only to finance his or her own expenses until recovery from the
defendant can be had, but also to assume the risks that the defendant
will prevail (on the merits, on a "technicality", or on appeal) or
that a judgment against him will prove uncollectible, fee-shifting
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statutes will not make the formal judicial process accessible to
most consumers.
5. See Note, "The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income
Litigant as Performed by the Small Claims Court in California,"
21 Stan. L. Rev. 1659 (1969).
6. See e.g. New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. (NYPIRG),
Winning Isn't Everything 6 (1976), discussed in sec. II.B., below,
at note 33.
7. This is true both because the marginal propensity to consume
declines as income rises, and because the poor tend to pay more than
the middle class for comparable items. See D. Caplovitz, The Poor
Pay More: Consumer Practices of Low Income Families (1963).
8. See H. Ross and N. Littlefield's study of a business which
apparently did treat consumers fairly for just these reasons, "Com-
plaint as a Problem-solving Mechanism," 12 Law & Soc. Rev. 199 (1978).
9. The average home improvement contract involved in a complaint
to New York City's Department of Consumer Affairs (hereinafter, DCA)
in 1978 cost the consumer $2,091; the median such contract cost her
$1,536. See sec. VI.B.(1), below, at note 167.
10. See H. Ross and N. Littlefield, note 8, at 213.
11. See e.g. J. Ruhnka and S. Weller, Small Claims Courts: A
National Examination (1978); A. Sarat, "Alternatives in Dispute
Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court," 10 Law & Soc. Rev.
339 (1976); B. Yngvesson and P. Hennessey, "Small Claims, Complex
Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature," 9 Law & Soc. Rev.
219 (1975).
12. E. Steele, "Fraud, Dispute and the Consumer: Responding to
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Consumer Complaints," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1107 (1975); Center for the
Analysis of Public Issues, The New Jersey Office of Consumer Protec-
tion: A Promise Unfulfilled (1970); compare W. Whitford and S. Kim-
ball, "Why Process Complaints? A Case Study of the Office of the
Commissioner of Insurance of Wisconsin," 1974 Wisc. L. Rev. 639.
13. R. Wexler, "Court-ordered Consumer Arbitration," 28 Arb. J.
175 (1973); J. McGonagle, "Arbitration of Consumer Disputes," 27
Arb. J. 65 (1972); M. Jones and B. Boyer, "Improving the Quality of
Justice in the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies,"
40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 357, 369-380 (1972).
14. Most recently, in L. Nader, "Disputing Without the Force of
Law," 88 Yale L. J. 998 (1979).
15. For example, the Department of Consumer affairs of the State
of California licenses home improvement contractors. Bus. & Prof.
Code sec. 7150 - 7161. Its investigators handled more than 15,000
complaints from consumers of home improvements in the last half of
1978. In that period, it obtained about $3.5 million in restitution
or in additional work done for these consumers, and referred about
240 cases for formal hearings before the Office of Administrative
Hearings. Contractors' State License Board, Report of Investigation
Activity for the Six Months Ending December 31, 1978. While the
hearing may be disciplinary in nature, it may also culminate in a
stipulation that the contractor provide specific consumer redress,
or in a suspension order which permits the contractor to complete
specific work and to apply for reinstatement thereafter. See Bus. &
Prof. Code sec. 7095, 7192. This system is structurally similar to
DCA's. The extent to which it is similar in terms of procedures,
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effectiveness, and efficiency remains to be investigated.
16. Contrast the systems investigated in the sources cited in
note 12.
17. Formally, the Civil Court of the City of New York, County of
(The Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, or Richmond), Small
Claims Part.
18. See note 11 for the general literature. The Sarat study is
based on the Manhattan (New York County) small claims court. The
NYPIRG study, note 6, is based on the Queens court. See also Note,
"How to Defeat the Jurisdiction (and Purpose) of Small Claims Court
for Only Fifteen Dollars," 44 B'klyn L. Rev. 409 (1978) (data from
Manhattan).
19. These data, and other statistics about the small claims courts
not otherwise attributed, were given me in July, 1979 by Mr. Phoenix
Ingraham, Chief Clerk of the Civil Court, or by his direction.
20. N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, sec. 1801.
21. The restrictions preventing the small claims court from order-
ing the defendant to perform, and from punishing him for failing to
pay a judgment, derive from similar restrictions upon the law courts
of England. Neither restriction, on the other hand, bound the court
of equity operated by the Chancellor. In the United States, even
today when most courts have both "legal" jurisdiction (derived from
the law courts) and "equitable" jurisdiction (derived from Chancery),
when a court is exercising its "legal" jurisdiction it is bound by
these traditional limitations. New York's small claims courts, like
most such courts, have only "legal" jurisdiction.
22. N. Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, sec. 301, 1801.
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23. N. Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, sec. 1809.
24. N. Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, sec. 1802.
25. N. Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, sec. 1807. As to arbitrators'
decisions, New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), sec.
7511(b) (1), provides that
"The award shall be vacated...if the court finds that the
rights of (the protesting) party were prejudiced by:
(i) corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award;
or
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator...; or
(iii) an arbitrator...exceeded his power or so imperfectly
executed it that a final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made; or
(iv) failure to follow the procedure of this article..."
26. My observations in this section were gathered during several
days which I spent sitting at a desk just behind the counter in the
Brooklyn small claims court clerk's office. Most of what I was doing
there was going through file cards in completed cases in order to
assemble a systematic sample of home improvement cases. I did, how-
ever, take advantage of my proximity to observe the waiting line and
the interactions between clerks and claimants.
27. A 1979 statute, L. 1979, c. 78, sec. 1, which added sections
1813 and 1814 to the N. Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, provides in a roundabout
way that businesses sued in the wrong name may nonetheless be liable
for the resulting judgment.
28. The Rules of the Civil Court, sec. 2900.33(b) (1), provide that
the hearing on a small claim shall be scheduled "not less than 15 nor
more than 30 days from the date the action is recorded." The practice
in the Brooklyn court during the period studied was to schedule
hearings closer to 30 than to 15 days from the filing date. A
shorter period would increase the difficulty of serving defendants
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with timely notice.
29. Statistical information about the incidence of such settle-
ments in home improvement cases, as well as about other possible
dispositions of these cases, appears in sec. IV.A., below. Des-
criptions of typical settlements, as well as of other dispositions
of home improvement cases, appears in sec. V.D., below.
30. The description of small claims hearing procedures in this
section is based on ten evenings which I spent observing calendar
calls and arbitrations at the Brooklyn court. It is in general out-
line consistent with my observations during one evening spent at the
Queens court.
31. This rule derives from New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules
(CPLR), sec. 4533-a, which permits the use of paid bills as prima
facie proof of damages. The CPLR was designed with the needs of the
State's formal court system in mind. The N. Y. City Civil Court Act,
sec. 1804, entitled "Informal and simplified procedure on small
claims ," provides:
"The court shall conduct hearings upon small claims in such
manner as to do substantial justice between the parties accord-
ing to the rules of substantive law and shall not be bound by
statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, pleading
or evidence, except statutory provisions relating to privileged
communications and personal transactions or communications with
a decedent or mentally ill person...The Provisions of this act
and the rules of this court, together with the statutes and
rules governing supreme court practice, shall apply to claims
brought under this article so far as the same can be made
applicable and are not in conflict with the provisions of this
article; in case of conflict, the provisions of this article
shall control."
It is clear to me that applying CPLR sec. 4533-a to require a
small claims plaintiff to produce a paid bill -- or a live "expert"
witness, whose testimony is admissible on the issue under general
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rules of evidence -- before she can recover for damage she has
sustained is unfair to the claimant who cannot afford to have the
repair done until she receives her compensation from the defendant.
A principal purpose of the small claims court acts was to avoid the
unfairness of applying procedural rules which prevent poor people
from recovering their substantive due. A fair reading of N. Y. City
Civ. Ct. Act, sec. 1804, would permit claimants who have not yet
repaired the damage they suffered, and who cannot afford (or do not
know) an expert witness, to recover so long as the judge or arbitra-
tor is persuaded of the justice of their claims.
On May 9, 1980 I telephoned Mr. John White, Assistant Chief
Clerk of the Civil Court, to inquire about the practice I observed
in the Brooklyn court. His position is that " to use sec. 4533-a
is the 'legal' thing to do, but not the practical thing to do," and
that doing so was inconsistent with the spirit of the small claims
provisions of the N. Y. City Civ. Ct. Act (sec. 1801 - 1814) and of
the Rules of the Civil Court (sec. 2900.33). His impression was that
in most of the boroughs a claimant would be permitted to recover with-
out producing either a paid bill or an expert witness. When I
pressed him about the contrary Brooklyn practice, he responded un-
happily that "Brooklyn is an entity in itself."
For the practices of arbitrators in Brooklyn in applying this
"rule", see text at 'note 104.
32. Directive No. 464, from Administrative Judge Francis Smith to
all judges, clerks, and arbitrators (April 27, 1978) , provides:
"To all litigants who try their cases before an Arbitrator
it is imperative that notice be brought home clearly to them
that the award is final and no appeal can be taken therefrom.
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This shall never be treated as pro forma. It is the duty
of the Arbitrator to so inform the litigants prior to the
hearing and ascertain that they understand it fully."
The reason given for the Directive is that "(n)umerous complaints by
litigants in small claims matters contend that prior to signing the
consent to arbitrate form, notice by the clerk or arbitrator concern-
ing the purpose and effect of the arbitration hearing has not been
understandingly given."
As indicated in the next paragraph, the consequences of giving
a clear and undiluted warning that arbitrations are not appealable may
be at least as bad as those which caused Judge Smith to issue this
Directive. Furthermore, perhaps in an effort to avoid diluting the
warnings, arbitrators rarely (in my experience) adverted to any of
the adverse consequences of refusing to consent to arbitrations.
33. See NYPIRG, Winning Isn't Everything 6 (1976): 52% of the
"successful" claimants in their 1976 sample were paid in full, 4.1%
in part, and 43.8% not at all. This is consistent with the results
of my small claims court sample. See sec. IV.A., below.
34. See id. at 4: 100% (31/31) of settlements in both their
1974-75 and their 1976 samples were carried out. My data is consistent
with this.
35. Out of 38 cases in both NYPIRG samples which were decided by a
judge, only 2 (5%) were appealed. Id. at 8.
36. These examples are, respectively, cases SC11 and SC20 drawn
from my small claims court sample. They are discussed in more detail
in note 129.
37. See note 33.
38. NYPIRG, note 33, at Appendix D.
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39. NYPIRG found that only two out of 19 judgment creditors who
sought assistance from a sheriff or marshall were able to collect,
even with his help. Id. at 6. My own survey uncovered two success-
ful executions in contrast to four unsuccessful attempts to collect
with the sheriff's aid.
40. Out of the seven judgments not resulting from settlements as
to which I was able to determine whether or not they were ever satis-
fied, three (all against licensees!) were satisfied and four (all
against non-licensees!) were not.
The NYPIRG-Citibank Small Claims Court Action Center to assist
judgment creditors is described in NYPIRG, Small Claims: Big Problems
(1978).
41. N. Y. City Adm. Code, Ch. 32, Art. 42, set out in Appendix A.
42. Sec. B32-352.0(a).
43. Appendix C.
44. Sec. B32-355.0(5).
45. This alerting procedure is rather catch-as-catch-can, since
no check is made with the Complaint Division's vendor file or with
the Home Improvement Division before a license is issued, and the
license applicant is not even asked whether any DCA complaints are
outstanding against him.
46. Sec. B32-358.0. This section was held unconstitutional in
People v. Lavender, 48 N.Y.2d 334, 398 N.E.2d 530 (1979), in the
context of a criminal conviction for violating the section's prohibi-
tion, in subdivision (1), of "abandonment or wilful failure to per-
form, without justification, any home improvement contract or project
engaged in or undertaken by a contractor." The court held that the
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section violated the 13th Amendment of the United States Constitution
and two statutes (42 U.S.C. sec 1994, 15 U.S.C. sec. 1581(a) )
implementing it, in that it established a form of involuntary servi-
tude, albeit one voluntarily contracted for.
While the opinion stresses the criminal nature of the punish-
ment imposed, the court was apparently unaware that the section is
enforced in any other way (e.g. by threat of license revocation).
Since a court may, in an approptiate case, require a contractor to
complete (or to hire someone else to complete) his contract on pain
of penalties for contempt, see Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores (Iris
Construction Corp.), 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377 (1960), and since
even a professional's license can be revoked for failing to carry out
his commitments, In Re Feld, 263 App. Div. 653, 34 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1942),
the opinion in Lavender should be read as invalidating section B32-358.0
only in the context of criminal sanctions for failure to perform.
When the question arises, DCA's procedure for enforcing this section
should be likened to the arbitration board's award of specific perfor-
mance in Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores, and to the Appellate
Division's revocation of the attorney's license for (inter alia)
failure to execute his agreements in In Re Feld, and should be upheld.
There is, nonetheless, a risk that the Lavender opinion will
be interpreted woodenly by a lower court as invalidating section
B32-358.0 in all contexts, and hence removing the basis for DCA's
consumer redress procedures with respect to home improvement contractors.
47. By sec. 773-4.0 of the License Enforcement Act of 1973. This
Act is set out in Appendix D.
48. Compare Application of Hippodrome Garage, 69 Misc.2d 831, 331
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N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1972), which had apparently been interpreted
by some DCA hearing officers, even after the License Enforcement Act
of 1973, as depriving them of jurisdiction to award restitution to
consumers. See memorandum of 11/29/78 appended to DCA's Guide for
Hearing Officers (1979/1980), which argues against this interpretation,
citing a later Court of Appeals case dealing with (and approving) the
power of a state licensing agency to award this remdy. Kostika v.
Cuomo, 41 N.Y.2d 568, 394 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1977). Curiously, this memo-
randum, prepared by DCA's Advocacy Division, omits any reference to
the License Enforcement Act of 1973, despite the fact that that Act
provides the most persuasive distinction of the 1972 Hippodrome case.
49. Sec. 773-5.0(d); sec. B32-365.0(2).
50. See sec. IV.C., below, at note 90 for a justification of this
estimate and the text following note 90 for a discussion of differen-
ces between licensees and non-licensees.
51. This procedure is set out in CPLR sec. 7803(4), 7804(b), and
7804(g).
52. My descriptions of informal DCA procedures are based on my
discussions with the personnel involved in administering them, and on
my personal observations of their behavior, during the period from
January through June, 1979. I had a desk and telephone at my disposal
in the Complaints Division, and was a familiar figure in the halls
and offices of DCA, asking questions about aspects of procedures which
I did not understand or about particular cases in my systematic samples
or -- as in the case of consumer redress hearings -- just sitting in
and observing. See Appendix E for a discussion of issues raised by
this information-gathering methodology.
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53. Complaints involving matters other than home improvement
contracts generally receive more handling by the Complaints Division
at each stage -- on the telephone, when received by mail, and when
the consumer walks in. An effort is normally made either by a volun-
teer or by a salaried employee of the Division to settle the case with
the "vendor". The difference is that for most complaint categories
no specialized unit analogous to the Home Improvement Division has
been created.
54. I refer to Mssrs. Goodman and Sendyka by name as well as by
title, since both men had occupied their unique positions within DCA
since these positions were established, leaving room for question
whether either position and its attendant duties would be quite the
same once its incumbent departed.
Mr. Sendyka did in fact leave DCA in early 1980, well after the
information-gathering phase of this study was completed. As of May,
1980 DCA was in the process of hiring a replacement.
55. More of the flavor of the hearings can be gotten from reading
sec. V.D., below, and the accompanying notes.
56. The hearing officer who checks this entry also fills out the
"Directions to Inspector" blank of a "Special Inspection" report form,
entering the precise issues about the job performance for which the
special inspector's report is needed, and the telephone numbers of
both parties who he should contact in order to arrange his special
inspection.
57. See sec. V.D., below, for a more thorough description and ex-
planation of typical DCA orders.
58. There were 34 cases in my three DCA samples (of complaints
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filed', formal decisions promulgated, and hearings held) in which
hearings were held, decisions requiring licensee action were issued,
and I was able to ascertain the results. Proportions of cases in
which licensees pursued each option are rounded to the nearest
percent.
59. DCA, Guide for Hearing Officers (1979/1980), at 43.
60. These cases are Dli, discussed in note 151, and D6/D20, dis-
cussed in note 161.
61. The bias of the DCA process towards consumer redress rather than
licensee discipline is clear. As I point out in sec. VII.B., below, it
is not always possible to achieve both objectives at once. The fact
that disciplinary objectives regularly give way to remedial ones sup-
ports my .characterization of the process as a species of "alternative"
dispute resolution mechanisms. See sec. I.A., above.
62. I obtained some confirmation that this was true in practice as
well as in theory by visiting both the Manhattan and the Queens small
claims courts, interviewing their clerks, and inspecting their files.
However, my conversation with Assistant Chief Clerk John White on
May 9, 1980, see note 31, in which he responded to my questions about
a particular practice I had observed in the Brooklyn court by asserting
that "Brooklyn is an entity in itself," leaves me in some doubt as to
whether further probing might have revealed other peculiarities in the
Brooklyn court's practices. My best judgment, based on what I ob-
served in the three courts and on the shared sturctural limitations
of all of the City's small claims courts, is however that differences
in results in the different courts are not likely to be significant.
63. See also Appendix E: "Methodology: Approach, Acceptance, Bias."
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64. The files in question were numbered K9500/78 through
K13999/78. "K" refers to King's County, the formal designation for
Brooklyn; "78" refers to the year in which the case was filed.
65. Included, for example, were "roofing", "woodworking", "water-
proofing", "modernization", "remodeling", "home improvement", "con-
struction", and "contracting" companies, as well as those whose names
included "storm windows", "aluminum", "doors", "cement", "awnings",
and "security systems".
66. Appendix A. In one of the deleted cases the job had involved
replacing the consumer's picture window; in the other it had involved
carpentry done at the claimant's business. See N. Y. City Adm. Code,
sec. B32-351.O(6); see also subd. (2), (3), and (4) of that section.
67. Furthermore, I assumed that many contractors would be suspi-
cious of someone who was prying into cases that had been brought
against them. Unlike the situation when I called consumers, I did
not feel free to invoke my vague connection with DCA to reduce their
defensiveness. With non-licensees my temporary possession of a DCA
telephone line, and my willingness to supply them with the name and
number of a DCA official with whom they could check my bona fides,
would hardly have encouraged them to speak openly, as it had when I
dealt with some initially suspicious consumers. With licensees, on
the other hand, assertions of a quasi-official status might have
created problems for DCA if, for example, a contractor were to com-
plain to an elected official that having to deal with me was a legally
unauthorized burden of licensing.
68. See sec. III.D., below.
69. In sec. II.B., above.
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70. In sec. VI.B.(l), below.
71. For example, as to how the arbitrators regarded themselves,
their role, and the parties before them, how they conducted the
hearings, how the parties behaved at the hearings, and the relation-
ships between the evidence they tried to present, the evidence they
were permitted to introduce, and the evidence that apparently moved
the arbitrators.
72. Of course, there may have been some cases involving home
improvement contractors which were mishandled by the docketing clerks
and never labelled "HIC", but I have several reasons for thinking
such uncorrected mistakes were rare. First, the docketing clerk had
to make a discrete decision whether to send the file to the Home
Improvement Division. Once she decided to do so, marking the docket
book was a mechanical process and part of her routine. Second, if
she failed to catch the fact that a home improvement contract was
involved, the file would go to an investigator whose responsibility
was to call the vendor and try to obtain satisfaction for the consumer.
The appropriate procedure for dealing with home improvement cases was
well known among investigators, and the mistake would likely be cor-
rected at this point. Finally, if any case in the 134000 series
had been routed to the Home Improvement Division but not so marked in
the docket book there is a good chance I would have discovered it,
since I kept a close look-out for cases in this series when looking
through Harold Goodman's files, hearing calendars, and DCA decisions.
I never found a case which had not been properly marked in the docket
ledger.
73. This occurred where the contractor was out-of-business and
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therefore never even received the NL letter (12 cases), or where
the last correspondence in the file was from the contractor, denying
all liability (three cases).
74. There were 13 cases in this category.
75. There were four such cases.
76. These issues are discussed in Chapter V.
77. Some of these may, however, reflect the hearing officers'
decisions on the merits, where these decisions took the form of
pointed hints at the hearings and where the indicated losers accepted
the hints gracefully rather than be confronted with formal orders
adverse to them.
78. These issues are discussed in Chapter V.
79. See sec. V.D., below.
80. See sec. VI.A.(2) and VI.B.(2), below.
81. See sec. VI.D. and Chapter VII, below.
82. I would have presferred an entirely objective criterion, but
since I had no independent means of verifying the existence, cause,
or extent of the consumer's injury, or the quality of any repairs
which may have been done, I could not with any certainty sort out the
cases where the consumer deserved no more than she got (despite her
protestations to the contrary) from those in which her continuing
dissatisfaction is indeed justified. Where the cases does not meet
one or both criteria yet the consumer received some redress, the case
is classfied as "OTHER".
The subjective nature of the second criterion also allows for
the opposite possibility that a case may have been put in this cate-
gory where the settlement or judgment was not in fact very substantial
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in relation to the injury actually incurred. This subjectivism is
practically unavoidable in a study of this type. Part of the reason
for settling is the desire to put the details of the controversy, and
the anxiety and unhappiness that frequently accompany it, behind one,
and the consumer who had taken that step (or the similar step of
accepting the legitimacy of a judgment issued by a judge or arbitra-
tor) may well be reluctant to open her wounds for the benefit of an
interviewer. Thus, though I always was given an answer to my ques-
tion whether the requested (or agreed upon, or ordered) relief was
actually received, I frequently picked up strong signals that the
matter was an unpleasant one, and realized that it would be improper
(as well as probably unproductive) for me to try to explore further.
Furthermore, a subjective element may be perfectly appropriate
in the evaluation of dispute resolution procedures. Just as the ex-
tent of the "actual" loss (the money paid beyond value received, the
cost of repairing damages attributable to the contractor's defaults,
the value of time spend futilely awaiting his arrival, etc.) varies
from case to case, so does the significance of that loss to the con-
sumer's over-all well-being. A person who has been "ripped off" also
suffers from an implied insult. The awareness that the contractor
thought so little of her ability to defend herself that he was will-
ing to treat her with contempt is painful. Yet the loss is entirely
subjective, in the sense that it exists only to the extent that the
consumer is aware of having been wronged. Once she concluded that
"justice has been done", that the contractor has been made to honor
his commitment to her, that he has not been permitted to "get away
with it", the consumer's self-respect is restored and reinforced.
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Yet this restoration is a subjective as the original loss, depend-
ing entirely on her perception that she has received an adequate
measure of redress. Thus, if two consumers are mistreated in the
identical way by a contractor and obtain the identical remedy from
him, yet one feels she has received adequate relief while the other
does not, they may both be right!
83. The purpose of these criteria is to isolate those cases where
the consumer is presumably entitled to some relief, but she nonethe-
less failed to obtain it. These criteria are in principle over-
inclusive, since in some of these cases the consumer may never have
been entitled to anything. However, the appropriate discount factor
for this over-inclusiveness is probably small. Out of the 12 cases
in this sample which were heard by a judge or arbitrator (exluding
one case which was "dismissed without prejudice" for reasons unknown),
the consumer obtained a settlement in seven, won a judgment in four
more, and lost outright in only one,
The DCA complaints sample supports this estimate: out of
about 50 cases in which I was able to make a judgment as to the
merits of the original complaint (on the basis of a settlement, a
special inspection, or an adjudication), I was fairly clear that the
consumer's claim was without merit in four only. On the other hand,
out of the 37 cases in the decisions sample, 28 were either decided
for the consumer or settled, while nine were dismissed on the merits.
The ratio was even less favorable to the consumer in the hearings
sample, where in 34 cases that had definitely come out one way or
the other, 22 were for the consumer (including settlements) but 12
were for the contractor (including orders that the contractor do the
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work five days after he received the consumer's check).
However, the ratios from the first two samples are more
relevant than those from the latter two in estimating the "quality"
of raw consumer complaints. The latter samples are drawn exclusively
from those cases which licensees (who, as Table II demonstrates, have
a strong tendency not to wait for a hearing to be held before resolv-
ing meritorious complaints against them) have refused to settle be-
fore a hearing. If 8% is about the correct proportion of groundless
complaints in a raw sample, then my original presumption, that an in-
justice had occurred (or at least a procedural imperfection had been
revealed) whenever a consumer who complained received nothing without
having lost on the merits, seems close enough to being accurate to
be usable for present purposes.
84. In addition to abandoning her small claim in favor of an
ordinary Civil Court proceeding, the consumer also failed to pursue
a DCA complaint which she had brought about the same matter. Her
Civil Court suit was still pending eight months after her original
claim was filed!
85. Like the consumer in SC15, this consumer had also filed a
complaint with DCA at the same time as his small claims court com-
plaint. He permitted both to lapse in favor of his formal Civil
Court action. In this case DCA had issued a notice of hearing for a
date exactly two months after his complaint was filed. Had he pressed
forward with his DCA complaint rather than going to Civil Court, he
would have obtained the same relief he eventually did, four months
earlier, and without an attorney's fee. My impression is that DCA
loses a lot of patronage to people who believe that you never get
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something for nothing.
86. Of course, I do not have the contractor's story, or the
arbitrator's: either or both may think the consumer has been dealt
with generously. This is a classic instance of the subjective
criterion in operation. The consumer received a sizable judgment
(by small claims court standards). "Objectively" the system seemed
to have worked well for her (at least better for her than for about
half the claimants), yet she is convinced that she has been done in,
albeit by the arbitrator's stupidity rather than by the contractor's
cupidity.
87. The consumer got this much out of the contractor by dint of
"incessant phone calls."
88. Thus, NYPIRG's study of the Queens small claims court,
Winning Isn't Everything (1976) at 6, found that all of the settle-
ments in their samples were in fact carried out.
89. Typical examples are a service receipt signed by the consumer,
or on the other hand, a report by a DCA inspector that he visited
the contractor's purported business address and found it vacant.
90. Twenty-two licensees in the small claims court sample, plus
47 L's and seven L-NL's in the complaints sample, equals 69 contrac-
tors who were presumably licensed at the time of the contract.
Thirty-one non-licensees in the small claims court sample, plus 34
NL's plus four NL-L's in the complaints sample, equals 69 contractors
who were presumably not licensed at the time of the contract. I
say "presumably" because my data with respect to the small claims
court sample is adequate to tell me only whether the contractor was
licensed at the time I checked the records, six months or more
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after the complaint was filed, and of course significantly more than
that after the typical contract was signed. The ratio of licensee/
non-licensee complaints may of course not be a perfect indicator of
the ratio of licensee/non-licensee contracts. Licensees may for
example be so much more reliable than non-licensees that they are
complained against significantly less frequently in proportion to
the work they do. But this tendency might be counter-balanced by
the fact that licensees are much more amenable to dispute-resolution
processes, which fact, if known to consumers, would likely increase
their relative incidence of complaints in proportion to their con-
tracts. Thus, the 50:50 licensee/non-licensee complaint ratio is
probably a fair estimate of the licensee/non-licensee contract ratio
as well.
91. See note 49 and its accompanying text, sec. II.C., above.
92. I have cited only one licensee and one non-licensee for each
match, though in most instances several cases could have been cited.
Furthermore, there are doubtless matches in this sample for a number
of other types of contracts, but since I did not always make a note
of the details of the underlying contract, my data with respect to
other possible matches do not permit definite assertions.
93. The foregoing analysis of the attitudes and dispositions of
non-licensees was based on inferences from their behavior. In-depth
interviews with them would of course be helpful in confirming or re-
fining this analysis. Unfortunately,,many of the non-licensees whose
conduct gave rise to complaints in my samples are out-of-business
and/or without listed telephones. Those numbers I did obtain turned
out to be answering services who instructed me to leave my number
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and my call would be returned. I judged this an inauspicious way
to begin what would in any case be difficult interviews, and declined
to leave my number. Strategies exist for obtaining frank interviews
with acknowledged law-breakers, see e.g. E. Sutherland, The Profes-
sional Thief (1937); F. Thrasher, The Gang (1963); C. Shaw, The Jack-
Roller (1966); P. Letkemann, Crime as Work (1973); C. Klockars, The
Professional Fence (1974). They are, however, complicated and time-
consuming, and I did not pursue them.
94. See A. Schwartz, "The Case for Specific Performance," 89 Yale
L. J. 271, 296 (1979), arguing that specific performance should
generally be available at the plaintiff's option, and that the strong-
est case for allowing this option is one in which a consumer has con-
tracted for major construction services.
95. An example of a statute permitting victorious consumer-plain-
tiffs but not victorious seller-defendants to recover their attorneys'
fees is sec. 110(d) of the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Warranty Act of
1974, 15 U.S.C. sec. 2310(d), which applies to actions brought under
that statute in state or federal court for breach of warranty on con-
sumer goods. Home improvement contracts come within this statute
only to the extent that they involve the installation of specific
goods (storm windows, aluminum siding, appliances, etc.) for which
a separate warranty is given or properly implied. The statute is,
however, unfamiliar to most attorneys, and few cases have been
brought under it. See also note 4.
96. See sec. VI.A., below, for evaluations based on my samples
of the actual navigability of these two processes.
97. An example of this is D27 (from my DCA decisions sample). As a
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result of a special inspection and two hearings by DCA the contractor
finally completed the work specified in the contract. DCA did not,
however, have jurisdiction to award the consumer the $4500 which he
claimed was owed him by the contractor under a $50/day liquidated
damages clause for delay in completing the contract. Since the
amount in question was above the $1000 jurisdictional limit for small
claims court, his only alternative was to bring a formal action in
Civil Court. But for that he needed a lawyer, and though he contacted
several attorneys with neighborhood offices in Queens, he had not
been able to locate one who would take the case for less than $1000
payable up front, which the attorney would keep regardless of the
outcome. Since that was more than he was willing to risk for this
venture (the delays and vagaries of litigation being what they are),
he intended to drop this claim if he could not find a lawyer who
would take it on a contingent fee basis.
98. N. Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, sec. 1801.
99. She could straddle the fence by suing for $1000 in small
claims court, and hope that someday she would find a way to sue for
the remainder in civil court. This is technically possible because
the doctrine of res judicata does not bar recipients of small claims
court judgments, as it does recipients of judgments in courts of
general jurisdiction, from later suing for amounts in excess of those
awarded. N. Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, sec. 1808.
100. N. Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, sec. 1804.
101. Id.
102. E.g. Woodart v. Frankart Kings, Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1979);
Swarth v. Barney's Clothes, Inc., 140 Misc. 2d 423, 242 N.Y.S.2d 922
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(1963).
103. See CPLR sec. 7511(b)(1), quoted in note 25.
104. See note 31 for a discussion of the source of this "rule"
and a criticism of the Brooklyn court's practice of applying it.
105. See sec. II.B., above, at notes 38-40.
106. This was true in three of the six cases in my small claims
court sample which were settled at the hearing. See note 129 for
details.
107. N. Y. City Adm. Code, sec. 773-4.0(e).
108. N. Y. City Adm. Code, sec. B32-358.0(1).
109. See, for example, the logical evasions and legal fictions
which courts have needed to invoke in order to approve the adminis-
trative determination of workmen's compensation claims. The classic
case is Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), which validated this
practice on the theory that the administrative fact-finders were
agents of the court (despite the fact that they were firmly imbedded
in the executive branch). A few state courts have refused to engage
in double-talk and have struck down statutes delegating such powers
to administrators as violative of their state constitutions. See
e.g. State v. Mechem, 63 N.Y. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957). The New
York Court of Appeals, however, early on accepted the propriety of
such administrative adjudication. See e.g. Carroll v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 173 N.E. 507 (1916).
110. In most of these cases there would be an adequate remedy at
law, as is evidenced by the fact that the very same types of cases
are presented to small claims courts and adjudicated by them despite
their limitation to legal remedies. See the comparisons of specific
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cases brought in each tribunal in sec. V.D., below.
111. Thus, in SC23 the consumer had paid $600 towards the installa-
tion of storm windows, but had heard nothing from the contractor and
got no response to her many calls to his answering service. Her com-
plaint, filed in small claims court on September 6, apparently
brought (or at least was followed by) quick action. She explained
to me that the contractor "had gone away on vacation. His man was
supposed to call me. They did the work in September." The case may
well be one of premature panic by the consumer (apparently, her pres-
ent interpretation), or it may be one of the many cases in which an
official paper of some sort is enough to prod the slow-moving con-
tractor into immediate action. If the latter, it is an example of a
cheap and effective form of consumer relief.
112. In L69, the mistake involved the contractor's failure to put
a strap around an electrical pipe, with the result that Consolidated
Edison refused to connect up the electricity to a basement apartment
in the consumer's house. An L letter from DCA got the problem solved
immediately.
113. In L-NL8 and NL letter on August 2 produced a letter from the
contractor enclosing a note to him from the consumer admitting that
it was just a misunderstanding and agreeing that she would pay the
contractor $15 to do the window in question. He also immediately
renewed his lapsed license.
114. In D16 the complaint had to go to hearing before the problem
could be worked out. The contractor had made many attempts to com-
plete the job but, since the consumer had not given him a key and was
never in when his men arrived, the work never got done. This knot
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was untied by an order that the contractor call the consumer on
the day before his men go to the job site! It is hard to know if
they would eventually have comiunicated successfully with each other
without such an intermediary, but at least in some cases of this
type the availability of an intermediary speeds and eases communica-
tion at a time when developing resentments make this difficult, and
even prevents minor mistakes and misunderstandings from developing
into hardened positions and implacable distrusts.
115. In D37 a contract was made on May 27, 1878 and $100 deposit
paid toward a total of $5570. For some reason work had not begun
as of August 9, when the consumer made her complaint to the DCA's
Jamaica field office. At the hearing on October 31, the hearing
officer found that as a result of the contractor's not starting the
work the consumer had had to have it done by someone else at a
higher price, and therefore ordered the contractor "to refund all
monies paid by (the consumer) to the licensee and further relieve
the complainant of any and all burdens or obligations under the con-
tract." The money was returned.
116. Her claim would take the form of an "affirmative defense" of
"failure of consideration" to the contractor's or finance company's
claim. While this defense would not have to be proven anew had the
consumer obtained her restitution in a court of general jurisdiction,
the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to judgments obtained in
small claims court.
117. In L79 the contractor, upon receiving an L letter, immediately
refunded the consumer's $50 deposit with a note saying "We can't do
it for the price quoted and are cancelling. Sorry for the delay."
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The consumer had indicated to DCA on the postcard in which he made
his complaint that he wanted the option of going forward with the
contract or cancelling. However, he apparently accepted the con-
tractor's decision to treat the contract as cancelled.
NL76 involved two separate contracts between the consumer and
the contractor (an individual, apparently working alone). The first
contract, in October 1977, involved the installation of shutters for
$330. The second contract, in February 1978, was for the installa-
tion of a storm door, $50 deposit paid, the $168 remainder due on
completion. Sometime between February and August the shutters fell
off in a wind; they were never fixed, and the storm door never in-
stalled. Following an NL letter on August 15 the contractor imme-
diately returned the deposit, but had never (as of June 13, 1979)
replaced the shutters. Nonetheless the DCA file was closed on
August 31, 1978 with the notation "returned deposit".
118. The many hearings I sat through and files I read in cases
where disputes arose after the job had begun suggest the probability
that a party who has come to regret having entered into a relation-
ship (even for a home improvement contract!) will find ways to make
the other party share his regrets. Since here too an annulment is
likely to be less traumatic than an enforced relationship or a subse-
quent divorce, a restitutionary remedy which does approximate justice,
or which even falls a bit short, at this stage may be much better
than specific performance.
119. The requirement that contractors pay for someone else to do
the job, while having received nothing from the consumer in return,
may strain the resources of the less liquid among them, and will
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generally seem a lot less fair, despite the rule of contract law
which allows the consumer her "expectation" recovery. The uncertain
ethical basis for this insistence that someone be compensated for
what she would have received under the contract (here, a given job
at a given price), rather than simply for her "reliance" interest
(the amount, if any, it cost her to have relied on the contract, for
example an equally favorable price from another contractor which is
no longer available) and her "restitutionary" interest (the return of
her deposit) was first pointed out in L. Fuller & W. Perdue,
"The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages", 42 Yale L. J. 52, 57 -
66 (1936).
120. See notes 115 and 117.
121. See Amended Regulations Relating to Home Improvement
Business (1975) sec. 1(e) - 1(1), set out in Appendix B.
122. In L65/D36 (the same case picked up in two samples), the
consumer alleged she had cancelled within three days, while the con-
tractor denied that the cancellation was sent within that time and
wanted as liquidated damages 25% of the $7485 contract price. The
contract was signed in June, 1978, the complaint filed in August, the
hearing finally held in November (after an adjournment at the con-
sumer's request, for illness, of an October hearing date). At the
hearing, "after an off-the-record discussion, the licensee agreed to
refund the $85 deposit". Perhaps he believed the consumer would per-
suade the hearing officer that her cancellation was timely , or per-
haps he felt that if she was unwilling to compromise at the hearing
(as by agreeing to have part of the work done) the matter was not
worth a fight.
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Just such a compromise was reached in L47. The contract,
signed in July 1978, was for remodeling two bathrooms for a total of
$5700. The consumer indicated in her complaint letter that while
she had attempted to cancel, the contractor wanted $750 for permit-
ting her to do so. The DCA's L letter of August 14 elicited no re-
sponse from either party, nor did the 7-day letter sent on September
16. My phone call on April 13, 1979 uncovered a happy consumer: "They
compromised with us and did just one bathroom. It was fine except
that they chipped the tub. They're supposed to come back and fix it."
Her voice indicated no doubts that they would do what they were
"supposed to".
The three day cancellation provision worked less smoothly in
H13. The consumers had paid $100 deposit toward a $4600 bathroom
renovation contract. After a month of second thoughts by the con-
sumers and episodic negotiation with the contractor over just which
fixtures were to be installed, the consumers (apparently on the advice
of counsel, whom they paid $150) sent the contractor a letter pro-
testing that they thought the document they had signed was just an
estimate, that they never received the "notice of cancellation", and
in any case that they had cancelled. The company's salesman testi-
fied, without serious contradiction from the consumers, that he had
spent five hours at the consumers' home the evening of the sale, that
the consumers had signed that evening not only the contract but the
$100 deposit check and a bank agreement for the remainder, that they
were handed the cancellation notice, and that his company had ordered
some of the fixtures after their supervisor had twice visited the
consumers' home, with the consumers never mentioning that they had
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cancelled. The contractor's position was that they were entitled
to 30% of the contract price ($1380) if the consumers cancelled; the
consumers insisted that $100 was enough (tacitly abaonding their
right-to-cancel claim). Throughout the hearing the salesman made
frequent offers to carry out the contract as written, or with modi-
fications (such as an iron tub!) upon a small adjustment in price.
The consumer-wife would not hear of it, stating that anyone who would
try to foist a junky steel tub on her could not be trusted working
on her house.
The DCA dismissed the complaint on May 7, 1979, five weeks
after the hearing, the opinion declaring -- quite properly -- that
the consumers had failed to demonstrate a timely cancellation.
In L70, the consumers, a Hispanic couple, claimed they had
been told to sign the $6700 contract on July 25, 1978 simply to
determine their credit availability, and that in any case they had
cancelled within three days. The contractor responded to the L letter
of August 15 by insisting that "we would have been happy to let her
out, but she told us to start." The hearing was held on September 27,
at which the husband testified that when he received notice on July 28
that the bank loan had been approved the previous day, he had gone to
a notary and together they tried unsuccessfully to notify the con-
tractor by telephone that he was cancelling. Apparently at the
hearing officer's suggestion, the consumer had the notary mail the
hearing officer a "certificate" on September 30 verifying the incident.
DCA's decision deftly avoided the issues of whether the consumer's
efforts on July 28 constituted a sufficient cancellation, and whether
the contractor had misrepresented his intention to treat the contract
229
as binding when he induced the consumer to sign it on July 25, by
pointing out that the "notice of cancellation" which the contractor
supplied did not conform to the requirements of section 1(f), and
therefore treating the notice of rescission which the consumer gave
at the hearing as sufficient. It therefore ordered the contract
rescinded, and directed the contractor in the future to furnish
proper cancellation notices with his home improvement contracts.
Finally, in H20 the consumer, an upper-middle-class insurance
salesman, had paid $890 deposit on a $2890 bathroom remodeling con-
tract. At the time the complaint was filed the parties had agreed
in principle to call the deal off, but a dispute remained over whether
the consumer would be required to accept a vanity which the contractor
insisted was almost complete, with the value of the vanity deducted
from the amount of the consumer's refund. The consumer had wanted
to look at the vanity, but the contractor had refused to let him see
it. At the hearing on April 11, 1979 the contractor justified this
by saying that no one would be very impressed by looking at a half
completed vanity; the consumer, while not really doubting the vanity's
existence, was inclined to think that it was being made by a subcon-
tractor, and that the contractor, who had claimed to the consumer that
he did all his work in his own factory, was ashamed to admit he had
lied. The case changed complexion at some point between the complaint
and the hearing when the consumer discovered his three-day cancella-
tion right. Since the contractor had given none of the three forms
of notice required by the regulations, the consumer could cancel at
any time, and indicated his desire to do so and receive his full de-
posit back. The contractor explained that he never gave that notice
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when the consumer had come into his office (confusing the DCA three-
day "cooling-off" period with a similar Federal Trade Commission
requirement, 16 C.F.R. sec. 429, applicable only to door-to-door
sales).
DCA's decision recognized that the consumer's cancellation
at the hearing was effective, and the contractor was ordered to re-
turn the $722.50 deposit within 5 days. Furthermore, since the con-
tract form had not merely omitted the required cancellation clause,
but had stated that "this contract is not cancellable by the consumer
for any reason", the contractor was given the substantial fine of
$250. Finally, he was ordered to prepare new contract forms which
conform to the regulations. The decision was formally issued on
July 18, the fine was paid on July 19, and the contractor called the
Calendar Division on July 30 to say that he would send the consumer
his check as soon as possible, and in any case by August 15. DCA
had no practical alternative to acquiescing in the contractor's uni-
lateral decision that he must postpone for a few weeks the carrying
out of his obligations under an order.
123. Warranties given on home improvement jobs can be of four
principal types. First, the contractor typically warrants that he
did his job in a workmanlike manner. This warranty need not be stated,
since it is normally assumed to be part of the contractor's contractual
obligation. An implicit part of this warranty is that the contractor
has shown care and competence in his choice of materials and his
judgment as to how to accomplish the job. This part of the warranty
can be negated by evidence that the consumer or her architect dic-
tated just how the job was to be done! On the other hand it may, if
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the consumer had hired the contractor simply to solve a problem,
while leaving him almost complete discretion as to how he would
do it, expand into a second type of warranty: that the problem
would be solved, regardless of the contractor's reasonableness in
choosing the particular "solution". In this latter case it would
resemble the Uniform Commercial Code's sec.2-315 "Warranty of Fit-
ness for a Particular Purpose".
Third, the contractor typically warrants against defects in
the materials he used. This warranty must be explicit, since it
will not be implied. This applies to any material which is not
"up to snuff" in any relevant respect, including failure to demon-
strate reasonably-expectable durability, regardless of whether the
contractor could have known of this defect at the time he made use
of the material. This warranty runs for the same period as the
warranty of workmanship, so that it may conceivably run out before
the product's lack of reasonable durability becomes evident. The
manufacturer usually makes a similar warranty, either explicity in
advertising and/or in literature accompanying the product, or im-
plicitly via the Uniform Commerical Code's sec. 2-314 warranty of
"merchantability". The consumer has a right against the manufacturer
if the warranty was explicit and directed to consumers; otherwise,
the contractor as the "beneficiary" of the warranty will typically
relay the consumer's complaint to the manufacturer, achieving
essentially the same result. The statute of limitations for the
manufacturer's warranty under the U.C.C. is four years, unless other-
wise modified.
Finally, a fourth type of warranty is a warranty of perfor-
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mance, an assurance that the job will continue to perform certain
functions (e.g. keeping the rain out) for a specified period.
This warranty does not require a showing of any defect at the time
of installation, though it cannot be invoked if the breakdown is the
consumer's fault (e.g. failure to perform regular maintenance of
which she was notified at the time of installation). A "free ser-
vice period", typically of one year, is the functional equivalent
of such a warranty often given by contractors. Long-term warranties,
typically of ten to thirty years duration, are often given by siding
and waterproofing manufacturers; they bind only the manufacturer,
not the contractor, and cover only the cost of replacement materials,
not of labor.
The importance of determining who gave the warranty is illus-
trated by two cases involving different contractors but the same
siding manufacturer. In H12 the job was done in 1968. Beginning
in 1976 the paint started washing and chipping off. The contractor
had given a warranty (apparently without time limit) against defec-
tive material or poor workmanship, but the problem may not have in-
volved defective material so much as ordinary deterioration. As
to the latter, the manufacturer had given a "lifetime" warranty, the
hidden catch being that it was as dependent on the manufacturer's
continued existence as on the consumer's. The manufacturer, who
had been in St. Louis, was now out of business. The consumer had
corresponded with a successor company to the manufacturer and with
the Missouri Attorney General, and both had requested that he send
them more information about the problem. The DCA hearing officer
instructed him to do so, and ordered that if he did not get
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satisfaction a special inspection should take place to determine
the cause of the problem. There is, of course, faint hope that the
consumer will recover anything from a successor to a defunct
guarantor located in a distant state. The likelihood that material
that lasted eight years would be held to be defective is probably not
much greater, and in any case a claim based on the contractor's
warranty against defective materials would be barred by the statute
of limitations. While a fair argument could be made that the con-
tractor who sold the siding to the consumer, doubtless emphasizing
the manufacturer's lifetime guarantee, ought in justice to be held
as a guarantor of the manufacturer's lifetime obligation to the con-
sumer, such is not the law, as DCA explicitly held in H15, the next
case.
H15 involved siding of the same manufacturer, also installed
in 1968, but this time by a different contractor, a major New York
discount chain. The consumer had spend $290 fixing the siding after
the contractor refused. At the hearing on April 5, 1979 the con-
tractor's attorney argued that the contract was executed prior to
the effective date of the Home Improvement law (October 1, 1968),
that they had been out of the home improvement business since 1974
pursuant to an FTC consent decree (!), that they expressly disclaimed
the manufacturer's guarantee in their contract, and that they are
certainly not liable for implied warranties from 1968. The DCA
hearing officer got angry at the attorney for attempting to disclaim
the manufacturer's warranty when the consumer was certainly relying
more on the reputation of the contractor than on the unknown manu-
facturer. The attorney pointed out that nonetheless their disclaimer
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was legally effective. The consumer then suggested that the
problem was not the aluminum but the workmanship and added, picking
up the cue, that of course she was relying on the contractor's
famous name. The attorney pointed out that they had not defaulted
on their workmanship warranty, but had spend $600 on repairs of this
$775 contract. The hearing officer instructed the attorney to try
to get the manufacturer to pick up the tab. The attorney agreed,
and wrote the hearing officer on April 25 that he had definitely
ascertained that the manufacturer was out of business. The hearing
officer then drafted a decision that the contractor should reimburse
the consumer for the $290 she spent getting the job repaired, thus
"sticking to his guns" on the theme that a contractor just should
not be permitted to get away with this. But he left DCA before his
recommended decision was acted upon, and on July 18 the Director of
Adjudication issued an exactly contrary decision, that "based on the
evidence and the current law governing the agency in this jurisdic-
tion", the contractor was not responsible for the manufacturer's
guarantee and the complaint must therefore be dismissed.
124. Five cases from the samples exemplify this process. In
NL4 the consumer had paid $50 toward a $550 awning installation in
April 1978, the contractor made a beginning on the job, and then
abandoned it. The consumer complained in August that the seller
would neither refund the deposit nor finish the job. The NL letter
from DCA got the job done quickly -- most probably, the consumer's
preferred remedy.
In L72 the contractor apparently had more to do on a roofing
job contracted for in January 1978. An L letter on August 14 again
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brought a quick response, as evidenced by a note from the consumer
dated September 7 acknowledging that her complaint had been fully
satisfied.
In L27 the contractor installed the consumer's storm windows
within a month of receiving the L letter, but about a year after he
had promised to.
In SC17, when the contractor received the summons seeking
$500 and alleging "never completed ceiling", he went to the consumer's
house and fixed the ceiling. The only clue to the cause of the
problem is that the consumer indicated that he had paid for the job
in full before it was completed. That prod surrendered, another
strong reminder was needed; but the small claims court summons did
the trick.
125. In NL87 an NL letter elicited immediate action from the con-
tractor, though what he did was, in the words of the consumer, "a
half-assed job." A similar result was achieved in SC53, where a
complaint seeking $900 for "breach of contract - defective and in-
complete repairs to house" brought the contractor back. Though he
did only part of the job, the consumer did not appear at the hearing
and the complaint was dismissed (the contractor, taking no chances,
appeared). However, whatever the contractor did had fallen off
again by the time I spoke with the consumer's husband, who explained
to me that the contractor had used lousy materials, and he did not
know what his wife wanted to do now. The contract was already 14
months old when the consumer filed her complaint, and she might
reasonably feel now that further attempts to get him to finish the
job right would be beating a dead horse.
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L62 involved a $722 roof installed in 1972 with a 10 year
warranty. The L letter went out August 15, 1978; the contractor had
put some tar and plugged the leak by August 21. But the consumer
told me in April 1979 that it had begun to leak again in January,
that she had called the company and they had hung up. She asked me
to send the contractor another letter; I directed her back to
Harold Goodman.
L57 involved a patio awning installed in June 1977 with a
five year warranty. By May 1979 some parts were rusting and the
finish was peeling. An L letter on August 16 got the work done on
September 6. My call to the consumer the following April elicited:
"They finally came. After I called for three months and nothing, I
got disgusted and wrote to DCA, and then they came. The screws are
rusting again so I'll have call them back."
126. In SC50 the contractor had installed a storm door, but the
screen that was supposed to go with it did not fit. A year later
the consumer sued for $250 (the amount paid), the summons alleging
"wrong storm and screen door installed." The consumer told me:
"We didn't want our money back -- just wanted a screen on it. The
moment he got the summons he came back, took out the storm door,
and gave us our money back. I was amazed. We have since gotten
someone else to install one." The contractor can be forgiven for
promptly giving the consumer what she appeared to want from the
summons he had received. In fact, on the "Request for Information"
she had filled out at the Small Claims Court clerk's office she had
stated "wrong storm and screen door installed. When told by in-
staller, owner said he would send missing parts and make necessary
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repairs. Nothing was ever done." Had the contractor received this
full statement he might have understood what she really wanted,
and that she was suing for money solely in order to prod him to carry
out his promise. But the clerk who has to write out the "cause of
action" on the file card (from which the summons is prepared) has
the responsibility of redrafting the complainant's statement of claim
on the "Request for Information" in a way which clarifies the legal
basis for the defendant's alleged monetary liability. The clerk
understandably could have concluded that where the complainant was
suing for the price paid allegations about promises to fix would only
complicate the legally sufficient allegation that the wrong item was
installed.
127. In L51 the consumer complained that the contractor, a garage
door company, had damaged his garage door while repairing it. The
L letter did not do the trick, but when the consumer called Harold
Goodman 15 days later, per instructions in the L letter, to tell him
that the complaint had not been resolved, Goodman called the con-
tractor and left a message that he should call the consumer and get
the job done. That did do the trick, and the door was fixed within
another two weeks.
In L52 the contractor had done some inadequate work on the
consumer's walk. Goodman got no response to his L letter, and
called the contractor, who sent him a copy of a letter it had sent
the consumer a week after receiving the L letter saying "Please call
us -- we've been trying to reach you." Goodman then called the con-
sumer to suggest that she do that, and'apparently decided that the
best way to insure that communication resumed was to arrange a
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special inspection at which both parties would be present. That
worked: the parties agreed at the inspection that the contractor
would return within two weeks to make the repairs, and two weeks
later the parties signed a statement that the work had been done.
In NL33 the NL letter went out on August 15, 1978. A DCA
inspector visited the contractor's business address on September
18 in order to serve a summons and to try to resolve the complaint.
The contractor was out, but his wife showed the inspector a 1975
license in someone else's name (the contract had the license number
of still a third person). The inspector left a notice for the con-
tractor to call Goodman. No call came, and the inspector returned
on October 18, found the contractor in, and served him with a ticket.
The file was closed the next day (standard DCA practice in NL cases
at this point). My call to the consumer on April 12, 1979 produced
the surprising news that the fence had been fixed sometime in the
fall.
In NL53, the NL letter was mailed August 14 and a criminal
court summons served August 17. The contractor told the inspector
at that point that he was resolving the complaint and would apply
for a license. This turned out to be half true. The contractor
called on September 7 to inform Goodman that the window had been
repaired, and the consumer not only confirmed this upon being
called but promptly wrote a letter thanking DCA for its prompt and
effective attention. But the contractor has not yet applied for the
license.
NL44 involved a waterproofing job done in August, 1977,
allegedly with "a 10 year warranty." It is unclear from the record
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whether the warranty in question emanated from the contractor or the
manufacturer. An NL letter in August, 1978 elicited a call from the
contractor to say that he was no longer working as a home improvement
contractor, but that he would work on the problem complained of. He
did so on September 8, but the consumer sent DCA a note the same day
requesting a hearing. Of course a hearing was not possible, but the
inspector visited the contractor's address (where he was doing busi-
ness as a "waterproofing" company) on October 26 and, as typically
happens upon not finding him in, left him a notice to contact Goodman.
The contractor's written response was the most forthcoming of any
from a non-licensee in my complaints sample. He began by insisting
that he was just a painter, not a home improvement contractor. He
was doubtless in good faith on this point, and arguably was correct,
since his business involved applying thick paint-like waterproof
substance to the walls, and while "home improvement" is defined by
Administrative Code sec. B32-351.2 to include the "rehabilitation...
modernization, (or) improvement" of a dwelling, "painting or decora-
ting of a ...home.,.when not incidental or related to home improvement
work as herein defined" is an explicit exception. He then stated
that he had done all necessary patching on September 8, and included
both pictures of the work and a sample wall chip he had replaced to
document this assertion. Finally, he stated that the building was
old and badly made, the brick was rotting, and that therefore the
waterproofing applied to the brick would constantly need repair. DCA
closed the case at this point, rather than attempting to pursue the
jurisdictional issue by issuing a criminal court complaint. My call
to the consumer in April 1979 confirmed that he had indeed done the
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job, but unfortunately also confirmed his prediction that it
would continue to deteriorate; the consumer intended to call him
back to make further repairs. Since the waterproofer was aware
of the condition of the brick at the time of the contract, if he
indeed issued a 10-year warranty it would have to be interpreted
as the equivalent of a service contract, obliging him to return
every time waterproofing material chips off. A similar result
would follow, under a warranty of fitness for a specific purpose,
if she had sought his advice on eliminating leaks and he assured
her that this waterproofing material would do the trick; the dura-
tion of this warranty would depend on the amount of protection she
reasonably believed she was getting. If, on the other hand, the
warranty was made by the manufacturer, the contractor's evidence
is that the consumer's problem is not related to any defect in the
materials. The issue of what kind of warranty (if any) was made
will of course arise only if the contractor refuses in the future
to make periodic repairs.
128. SC12 was clearly such a case. The consumer had known the
contractor, who was 82 and no longer active in the business, for
30 years from church. There was a fire in her house and in the
house next door, which her niece owned, and as to which her niece
gave her "a power of attorney." She had fire insurance on her own
house, which was apparently repaired satisfactorily by a licensed
contractor. She made a deal with defendant to repair her niece's
house for $6000, and had paid him $3500 when the problem arose.
Her version, in a complaint she filed with DCA on March 13, 1978,
is that he was working away until she told him he was not doing it
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right -- he then got very upset and ground to a halt. His version,
which he told Harold Goodman on a personal visit on April 20, made
in response to receiving the NL letter, is that the people he recom-
mended want to do the work, but she is never home. Goodman called
her on the spot, got no answer, and closed the case. The consumer
filed her complaint in small claims court on August 14, alleging his
refusal to finish work on the chimney and roof that he had been paid
for, and further alleging that his failure to fix the roof allowed
water to get in, causing the ceiling to collapse (and, as she told
me later on the telephone, ruining the work inside the house that he
had done earlier). She sought $1000 and, when he did not appear at
the hearing on November 1 received a judgment for that plus $13.40
in costs at the inquest. When he did not pay she went to the sheriff
who somehow determined that the contractor had no money but did own
his house outright. He told her that she could file a lien on his
house, but that the proceeding would cost $400-500 and that she
would require a lawyer. Her thinking in April 1979 was that she
might go to a lawyer in the summer when she gets her bills paid, and
that she guesses "the moral of the story is if you get a real con-
tractor he does the job right, even if it costs more."
It is at least possible that, if some tribunal had had juris-
diction to determine an appropriate remedy in the case, without being
limited to awarding the monetary equivalent of the injury suffered,
and without having the contractor brought into the case by a notice
which tells him that as a result of something he did or did not do
he now allegedly owes the consumer money ( a notice calculated to
produce incomprehension, indignation, and/or defiance on the part
242
of a contractor who has been proceeding, however ineptly, in good
faith), the matter might have been worked out by e.g. a schedule in-
dicating when the work was to be done (and perhaps how), to the satis-
faction and benefit of both parties.
See sec. E of this chapter for a proposal to equip small claims
courts with the necessary jurisdiction.
129. In SC11, the complainant brought a $900 action alleging "breach
of contract -- unfinished work" against an aluminum siding installer.
The case was settled by stipulation before an arbitrator on November
15, 1978. The stipulation provided that "defendant pays $900 by
12/10/78 unless defendant completes aluminum installation of the
rear wall at (complainant's address)". Like clockwork, defendant did
the job on December 10. The drafting of the stipulation was ingenious.
Though the defendant had been dragging his feet about doing the work,
he obviously preferred that to paying $900 (complainant's probably
generous estimate of the value of the work still undone). If he re-
fused to stipulate, he ran the risk that the arbitrator would find
him liable for the full $900. By settling and doing the work, he re-
duced his exposure and gave the consumer what he probably wanted in
the first place.
In SC20 claimant sued a garage door company for $200 (amended
at trial to $1000) alleging "Default in installing garage door. Want
back original door." Defendant counter-claimed for the $508 owing
him under the contract. The following stipulation was entered into
at the arbitration: "$508 to be paid to defendant upon completion of
installation of overhead door by defendant (height of door to remain
at 6'1" and door shall not roll down)." That was apparently the
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magic formula, since my call to the consumer confirmed that the work
had been done and the money paid.
SC46 involved a $650 waterproofing job that failed to keep the
rain out of the consumer's basement. The consumer sued for the re-
turn of the $650, but also complained of consequential damage to her
basement. Defendant, who was represented by an attorney, agreed at
the arbitration to "redo the work per contract", and the settlement
was noted. My conversation with the consumer five months later re-
veals that "they came at 3:40, opened and closed two cracks and
stopped at 4:00. He called two weeks later, said he'd come back, but
he didn't." After several months she called again and told them she
would go back to small claims court if they didn't fix it. They came
back and did some more patching but the rain is still coming in. She
intends to go back to small claims court for her money, since "every-
one tells us that patching won't do the job." She appears not to
have pressed her claim for consequential damages, possibly because
they were minor, or hard to monetize, or mentioned just as an example
of the annoyance she experiences from the job not having been done
right.
Rescission and restitution now seem called for, the water-
proofer having proven himself incapable of fixing the job.
In contrast to these is SC55, in which a monetary settlement
was arrived at. Work began on a miscellaneous contract -- painting,
cement work, fixing a sewer, etc. -- two years before the complaint,
but petered out, with each job allegedly completed only partially and
poorly. The consumer also complained that the contractor had bor-
rowed some of her tools and never returned them. She asked for $1000,
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the jurisdictional limit. When both sides appeared in court as
scheduled on August 22, 1978, and neither requested a "court" trial,
they were sent to an arbitrator, who began the hearing, as always,
with an explanation that he cannot hear the case unless both parties
waive their right to appeal. The contractor, as frequently happens
to litigants confronted with this lecture, decided that he did not want
to waive any of his rights, thus terminating the arbitration. In this
case, however, the assignment clerk on seeing the parties return con-
vinced the contractor that coming back again (with all his rights in-
tact) just was not worth it, and hammered out a settlement; the con-
tractor would pay the consumer $400, to be paid at the rate of $40/
month, starting the following month. The contractor carried out the
settlement for five months, then paid off the full remainder in the
sixth month.
It is not clear why this case was settled with money, rather
than the more usual agreement to finish the job. Either would ap-
parently have made the consumer happy. The key may be the contractor's
likely reluctance to go back to a job after a long time away from it,
his belief (inferred from his willingness to appear and contest, and
his fantasy about appealing) that he had a defense, perhaps based on
the difficulty of doing this job for this particular consumer, and the
clerk's appealing suggestion (in contrast to either going back to the
job site or going through more legal hassles) of 10 easy payments. On
the other hand, the key may instead be that small claims court per-
sonnel are more accustomed to thinking in terms of monetary relief,
and are therefore more likely to suggest it to the parties when the
occasion arises. The opposite tendency clearly exists among DCA hearing
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officers.
130. In many of the DCA hearings I witnessed the consumer come in
convinced that she had given the contractor every reasonable chance
to cure, and therefore suspicious of the efforts by hearing officers
to arrange for still another such opportunity. But while in 21 of
the 37 cases in my decisions sample DCA ordered the contractor (usual-
ly after a special inspection and/or a settlement) to do further work
on the job, out of the 17 of these in which I could confirm whether
the ordered work was done, it had indeed been done in 16 cases, and
the only reason it had not been done in the remaining case (D38) was
that the consumer had refused to pay the quid pro quo. The hearing
officers therefore appear fully justified in their general belief
that regardless of the consumer's tale of unanswered phone messages
and unkept promises, an official DCA order to cure is likely to pro-
duce the requisite action.
131. In D32, the complaint was filed June 6, 1978 and an NL letter
was sent. The contractor responded by insisting that he had completed
the job and by applying for a license, which was issued during the
summer. Since the parties disagreed over whether the work had been
done, a hearing was scheduled. At the hearing on November 20, the con-
tractor agreed to complete four remaining items on a kitchen job. The
order was issued on December 26, and specified that the work was to
be done within ten days of the order. The consumer wrote a letter on
the same date to DCA complaining that nothing had yet been done (she
may well have understood at the hearing that the work would be done
sooner). Nothing further having been heard from either party by
January 5, 1979, Deputy Commissioner White sent a letter to the con-
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tractor warning him that his license would be suspended if the work
was not done within 15 days. This second letter is a regular depart-
ment practice, giving the contractor yet another bite of the apple,
but also keeping the Department from grinding its gears unnecessarily
with quickly aborted suspensions. Nothing still having been heard, a
formal notice of suspension was issued on January 23, to take effect
February 9 unless the order is carried out earlier -- yet another
bite! This finally elicited a letter from the contractor to DCA, re-
ceived February 21, insisting that he had tried eight times to contact
the consumer, and requesting the Department to set up a time with her.
DCA responded by scheduling a hearing on rescinding the suspen-
sion for April 26 (they may also have tried to set up an appointment
with the consumer as the contractor requested, but if so it does not
appear on the record); the consumer requested an adjournment due to ill
ness, and the case was reset for June 11. On that date the hearing
examiner assigned to the case and the head of the Calendar Division
both noted that all work had been completed to the satisfaction of the
consumer, doubtless based on telephone conversations with her. The
suspension was therefore rescinded on June 19. Despite the delay of
nearly a year in doing the work from the time the complaint was filed,
and the invocation of actual DCA discipline (such as it is), the con-
tractor may have been telling the truth about his difficulties in con-
tacting the consumer. His attitude toward the DCA was admittedly not
one of great respect; he began by operating without a license, did not
bother to respond to the Department's escalating warnings of its im- .
pending suspension until it had gone into effect, and doubtless con-
tinued to do business for the more than four months that his license
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was suspended. But it is possibly a good example of the domestication
of a marginal home improvement contractor -- he got his license, he
showed up at a hearing, he responded if belatedly to the DCA's disci-
plinary measures, and he eventually did the work.
132. In H22, the complaint was that each of the 19 windows installed
was either too short, creating drafts, or too large, bending the win-
dow frames. As frequently happens, when the contractor got the com-
plaint he referred it to the manufacturer, who sent a representative
to the consumer's house. This technique can serve to reduce the amount
of the consumer's anger directed at the contractor, give his assurances
that the job was done perfectly added credibility, and sign the manu-
facturer up to correct any defects which were clearly its fault. If
these were the purposes here it did not work, since when the repre-
sentative tested for drafts by lighting a cigarette outside a closed
window he and the consumer watched the smoke waft into the room! The
consumer also brought to the hearing, in addition to his son and a
neighbor/witness, a snake-like object which he placed on the table:
when Cunningham (the hearing officer) could not resist and asked what
it was, he explained it was insulation that came out from a window
frame.
Whether the contractor would have admitted his mistakes in the
face of a less impressive showing cannot now be determined, but when
his chance to speak came he pointed out that he had sent men to fix
the two worst windows, that the fix appears to have worked, and offer-
ed to do the same, or whatever was needed, with the remaining 17 win-
dows if the consumer would pay the $500 due on his $3500 contract.
When the consumer refused to pay until the repair survived another
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winter, the contractor offered to extend the warranty until the end
of 1979. The consumer still refused, and both sides then asked
Cunningham to send an inspector. It was Cunningham's turn to refuse,
on the basis that DCA had only one special inspector and would not
send him out until all work was done and all money paid. This is a
more rigid version of DCA policy than the other hearing officers'
adhere to, but in this case (and others I witnessed) it did no harm
and perhaps speeded things along. After he announced he would take
the case under advisement and closed the hearing, negotiations began
again, with the consumer and the contractor quickly agreeing on the
basis of the contractor's last offer. The consumer later sent DCA
a letter confirming that the work had been done.
In D38 the contractor had installed some doors improperly;
furthermore, one had begun to rust soon after installation. The
complaint was in August, the contractor promised to service the doors
in September, but did not, and a hearing was held in November. At
the hearing the contractor agreed to make the repairs immediately,
and to send the door back to the manufacturer to be refinished in the
spring (when it could be spared). The settlement was carried out on
schedule.
133. So much so that in three cases the repairs were made as a re-
sult of DCA intervention despite the fact that DCA jurisdiction was
questionable at best. In L88 the consumer complained that a siding
job was not properly done. An L letter was sent on August 14, 1978,
the consumer called Goodman on August 30 to say that he had heard
nothing in response and that the contractor keeps making appointments
but does not keep them; a notice of hearing went out on September 25
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for a November 1 hearing, but the work was actually done on October
3. All of this is quite standard, except that the consumer lived in
New Jersey and the contractor was based in Westchester County. The
contractor did have a New York City home improvement contractor's li-
cense (permitting him to do business in the City) and the consumer
did work in the City as well, but despite the silence of the Adminis-
trative Code on the DCA's geographical jurisdiction, ordinary princi-
ples governing the reach of a local government's regulatory authority
would deny jurisdiction in a case like this.
In L58 the complainant had had no dealings with the contractor.
The contractor had replaced a common awning at a neighbor's request,
leaving the complainant with a messier awning than she had begun with.
The neighbor was not complaining. An L letter was sent on August 15,
1978; the contractor responded that "We have replaced the awning free
of charge"; the consumer replied on September 18 "I still have the
bad awning they replaced it with. The company tells me 'See you at
the DCA hearing!"'. A DCA hearing was held on November 8, resulting
in a settlement: "Licensee to install new awning prior to Christmas
1978 at no cost to consumer.(sic)" The contractor carried out the
agreement. DCA's jurisdiction is once again doubtful. The notice
of hearing alleged the violation of sec. B32-358.0(l)'s prohibition
of "willful deviation from or disregard of plans or specifications
in any material respect without the consent of the owner." The
provision contemplates that it is the owner who agreed to the plans
or specifications in question whose consent is necessary before the
contractor deviates. While as a matter of property law both own-
ers' consent (express or implied) is probably necessary before any
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change is made in common property (including the original replace-
ment), sec. B32-358.0(1) seems to contemplate the protection not of
property rights but of contract rights. Only the neighbor appears
to have had contract rights here, and her rights may not have been
violated (i.e. the contractor may have done everything he promised
her he would do ). The contractor's willingness to replace the awn-
ing at the complainant's insistence probably reflects his awareness
of her property rights and his lack of awareness of this limitation
on DCA jurisdiction, but the relevant analysis was not done by any-
one at DCA either (witness the reference to complainant as "consumer"
on the hearing disposition form). This case illustrates the fact
that honest and responsible contractors will typically not push the
DCA on the legality of its actions, even though by doing so it could
deprive the consumer of her choice of forum and thereby increase the
probability that it would never be forced to perform, e.g. to make
expensive repairs.
H23/H23A is a dramatic example of this, underlining the fact
that the contractor's forbearance in this situation need not be the
result of his ignorance of his legal rights. The first hearing, H23,
took place on April 16, 1979. $4500 had been paid, and $400 was due,
on a contract to redo two bathrooms; the complainant alleges that the
work had been botched. The contractor began his testimony by admit-
ting that his man had done a lousy job (he has fired him) and that
much had to be redone. He offered to redo the work by the end of the
following week, but the hearing officer insisted that he wait until a
special inspection could be done. The contractor did not understand
why he should have to wait when he knew what the problem was, but the
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hearing officer insisted.
By the next hearing, H23A, on June 13, the special inspection
had been done as had most of the work indicated on it. Another hear-
ing officer was now presiding, and he began the hearing by confirming
his suspicion, gleaned from the record, that the complainant's proper-
ty included a storefront. He then pointed out that that fact ousts
him of jurisdiction. This is because while N.Y. City Adm. Code sec.
B32-351.0(2) defines "home improvement" ordinarily enough as work
done to "any land or building, or that portion thereof which is used
or designed to be used as a residence or dwelling place...", sec.
B32-351.O(3) defines "building" in an extraordinarily limited manner:
"'Building' means any structure containing no more than four resi-
dence or dwelling units." The intent was apparently to limit the
protection of the home improvement law to people who were, roughly
speaking, "consumers" rather than "professional landlords", by limit-
ing the coverage to buildings which were thought to be typically own-
er-occupied.
Since his lack of jurisdiction was established, the hearing
officer proposed dismissing the case. The contractor immediately ob-
jected, "But it is all taken care of!" The hearing officer then asked
him if he wanted to waive his objection to DCA jurisdiction, and the
contractor, appearing amazed and confounded at this turn in the case,
insisted "yes!". There was then a long, friendly discussion off the
record of the special inspector's report, and the contractor agreed
on the record to do the various odds and ends which remained by June
25.
The contractor's eagerness to have DCA decide the case may be
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tied to the $400 that he may still have been owed -- having done most
of the required work, he would not want anything to prevent his re-
ceiving his ultimate reward. But this may be unduly cynical. Nothing
was mentioned at either hearing about when he was to be paid and his
right to be paid would seem to depend on his doing the remaining work
set out in the special inspection report rather than on his continu-
ing to permit a DCA hearing officer to issue him orders. Rather, he
seemed from the beginning eager to do the right thing, and now that
he had done most of it and was fully committed to quickly completing
the rest he seemed to want some official recognition that he had done
it, much as a child whose poor conduct has once been noted by his
parents may crave their recognition that he has "made up for it".
134. In D9 the consumer paid a downpayment of $50 on a $2250 con-
tract for assorted work. Much of the work was done, but 14 items re-
mained when the contractor stopped work. At the hearing on June 19,
1978, the contractor agreed to do 13 items (one item on the consumer's
list was dropped by mutual consent, as was a $500 item not on the list
because dropped previously); the agreement was conditional on the con-
sumer's securing a bank loan and establishing an escrow. The fact
that the contractor demanded an escrow at this point and that the con-
sumer and the hearing officer went along with the demand strongly sug-
gests that the reason the work stopped was the contractor's justified
fear that he would never get paid. What followed reinforces this con-
clusion. The hearing officer, at the contractor's request, wrote to
the consumer on July 31 that unless she implemented the settlement
her case would be closed. Her attorney responded that the consumer
was working on obtaining the financing. On September 18 the hearing
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officer wrote another letter to the consumer, inquiring about her
progress. Finally, on September 24 the consumer's attorney re-
sponded that her client had been told that the work was worth no more
than $1000. A DCA order followed dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the consumer had unilaterally changed the terms of the
settlement. But the consumer had, of course, done more than that --
she had gotten the benefit of whatever work the contractor had done,
apparently a substantial amount, for $50. The DCA can do nothing
for the contractor, other than relieve him of this complaint in this
forum. Furthermore, the amount involved may well be too small in
relation to the anticipated hassle to give him a viable remedy in
small claims court.
135. In L90 the consumer had paid all but $250 on a $4750 job, and
was complaining about four details (such as a panel behind a shower
head) that were not finished completely. The settlement reached at
the hearing was that the contractor would complete the items "within
five days after the receipt of $250 from the consumer." Since the
general custom is that the consumer is free to hold off the last
payment until the work is complete, this seemed an implicit acknowl-
edgement that the matters complained of were not substantial. The
hearing was held November 20 and the order issued November 22. The
only other entries in the file are a note to Deputy Commissioner
White from the contractor on January 31: "We have waited patiently
for the check. In response to a call from Mr. Cunningham we sent
the consumer an additional stipulation (to cap four basement windows
if the money is paid). If we do not receive $250 in five days we
will consider the matter closed.", and a note from White to someone
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in the Calendar Division, dated January 18 (!): "Please write to
consumer that the case will be closed if he does not carry out his
responsibilities." To find out what happened thereafter I first
tried to contact the consumer, and when I could not locate him I
called the contractor. He told me he never received the check, but
was not surprised. "He didn't want to make the last payment so he
made up an excuse." This, he said, happens quite often.
In H21 a consumer, who had paid only $20 on a $660 roofing con-
tract, complained that the job had been done wrong and leaks, damaging
a room in his house. The contractor was worried that he would not get
paid, but claimed to be even more worried by a threat from the con-
sumer that he had a gun and would blow the contractor's head off if he
ever came back. The consumer protested that this was slander. DCA's
decision fined the contractor $50 for neglecting to put the three-day
cancellation clause in his contract (which he paid promptly), and or-
dered him to seal the leaks within five days of receiving a $640
certified check from the consumer. The unusual requirement of a cer-
tified check suggests that the hearing officer thought the consumer
extremely untrustworthy, and was unwilling to be a party to "holding
up" the contractor for any additional work in exchange for an even-
tual total of only $20.
136. D2 is an example, though hardly a shining one, of this process
in action. The consumer concluded after she had paid $1500 on a
$2600 siding job that it was not being done properly, and refused to
continue progress payments. The contractor, in turn, stopped work,
and in June 1977 the consumer complained to the DCA. A hearing
scheduled for September was postponed at the consumer's request be-
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cause she had a dialysis treatment, and for some reason nothing more
happened until a special inspection was ordered and held in August
1978. Sendyka, the special inspector, not surprisingly found many
items not done, but on the original issue of whether the work was
being done properly he sided with the contractor. A dilemma arose
about rescheduling the hearing: Sendyka's contract with DCA calls
for him to be available for hearings every Wednesday and in the field
two other days, but the consumer had dialysis every Wednesday. The
Department's attempted solution was to hold a hearing on Wednesday,
September 27 without the consumer, but to use Sendyka's list of 15
unfinished items as a bill of particulars, on the (mistaken) notion
that the consumer would be happy to be "represented" by this list of
unfinished items., whereas the contractor might want to cross-examine
Sendyka on some of them. The hearing eventuated in an order on Octo-
ber 12 proposing that the remaining work be done in three one-day
stages, with one-third of the balance being paid at the end of each
day; if the consumer refused the settlement, the complaint was to be
closed. The consumer did refuse, wanting to withhold payment until
three months after the work was completed. The complaint was closed
on December 5, but it was reopened on December 18 when the consumer
called to request a hearing on the proposed settlement. A hearing
was scheduled, then rescheduled at the consumer's request, then the
contractor did not appear because his wife was having a baby, then
someone decided to order a new special inspection, which reaffirmed
the original report, and a hearing was held on it on June 6, 1979,
again a Wednesday, at which the consumer of course did not appear.
The tentative settlement was that the consumer place $1100 in escrow,
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to be released when Sendyka certifies that the work has been done;
if the consumer refuses, the complaint would be irrevocably dismissed.
This time someone must have brought the consumer into the negotia-
tions by telephone before the order went out, because between June 18
when the order was drafted and June 27 when it was sent it was changed
to eliminate the escrow requirement, apparently reflecting the con-
tractor's agreement to accept the consumer's promise to pay when Sendy-
ka gave the job his approval.
137. In D28 the consumer complained that some things had not been
done properly, a special inspection was ordered after the first hear-
ing, Sendyka found five minor items that required repairs ( on a $7880
job), and at the second hearing the contractor agreed to do them if
the consumer paid him the $276 which he owed him for kitchen work.
The consumer responded that he owed him nothing for kitchen work be-
cause he had never done any. The next day the contractor delivered
documentation to DCA, including copies of invoices from kitchen equip-
ment suppliers which he had paid that indicated delivery at the con-
sumer's home. The hearing officer thereupon decided that "While I
would normally order the contractor to do the repairs indicated on
the special inspection report, because of the consumer's lack of can-
dor and misuse of DCA processes I am dismissing the case." The case
is an appropriate application of the equitable doctrine of "unclean
hands": while the consumer would be entitled to a legal judgment for
the value of the necessary repairs (against which the court would al-
low a set-off or counter-claim for $276), on the theory that even a
conniver is entitled to some forum in which to vindicate his rights,
there is no reason why DCA should offer him an additional, more con-
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venient, or even more effective forum in the very case in which he
has attempted to use its processes to take unfair advantage of the
contractor.
138. See the discussion of H21 in note 135, and the discussion of
SC32 and of L80 in note 158.
139. The results of the small claims court sample illustrate the
advantage for the consumer if the contractor acts voluntarily. Out
of 15 cases in which the claimant received a judgment (11 by inquest
and four after a hearing), I was able to confirm that she actually
received redress in only three, while she definitely received no re-
dress in four. In contrast, out of seven cases settled in court,
four definitely received substantial redress, while none definitely
went empty-handed; the corresponding results where the case was "dis-
missed -- no appearance either side", which normally indicated a pre-
hearing settlement, were that out of 10 such cases five definitely
resulted in redress while none definitely went without. See Table
1, page
It is a commonplace in the sociology of law that orders which
are perceived simply as attempts by a more powerful individual (or
institution) to impose his (or its) arbitrary will will more likely
be subverted, evaded, or at best carried out grudgingly, to the
letter but not to the spirit, than will orders which are perceived
as legitimate and appropriate. Orders resulting from settlements
which been freely agreed to are, of course, likely to be perceived
as legitimate and appropriate.
The reduction of antagonism is also an end in itself, since
it is depressing to feel put upon, harassed, or cheated, to have
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"learned a bitter lesson". There is no similar depression associated
with involvements in mistakes, misunderstandings, or reasonable dif-
ferences of opinion, so long as these have been satisfactorily re-
solved, or even with being the victim of a minor degree of neglect,
so long as it has been apologized for and appropriate amends have
been made.
140. This was Michael Cunningham, who heard about half of the home
improvement cases I attended.
141. Employees like DCA's special inspector are common to law en-
forcement agencies (which DCA in part is) but unusual in courts.
Analogies do exist in probation officers who make pre-sentence re-
ports in criminal cases, in social workers and psychiatrists who may
be associated with courts for the purpose of making home visits, men-
tal examinations, and similar investigations with respect to custody
and competency determinations, and in special masters and monitors
who may be appointed in difficult or ongoing cases with instructions
to find facts and to report back to the court. In no court of which
I am aware, however, and certainly not in New York's small claims
courts, is there one or more experts regularly retained by the tribu-
nal to perform functions in "ordinary" civil cases (including home
improvement cases) similar to those performed by DCA's special in-
spector.
142. In D14 the contract was to point the bricks and paint the
windows. The consumer had at the time of his complaint paid only
$90 towards the $1040 contract, but he complained of endless aggra-
vation and poor and incomplete work. The complaint was docketed on
July 5, 1978 and a special inspection done the next day. Frank
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Sendyka, the special inspector, reported that the pointing was in-
complete and not done in a workmanlike fashion, and that the painting
was not done at all. The contractor called in response to the L let-
ter and the report of the special inspection requesting an early hear-
ing so that he could get paid. An order emanated from the hearing of
September 13, doubtless after negotiation between the parties, that
the work be done between October 10 and October 20, which it was.
The case thus contains elements of incompetent performance by
the contractor, great irritation on the part of the consumer, and a
desire by the contractor that the resulting deadlock be broken in a
way that assures him that he will be permitted to complete the work
and will be paid for it when he does. It is interesting that the
combination of a special inspection which confirms that the contrac-
tor did a sloppy job, a "hearing", and a DCA order that the contrac-
tor complete the job at a specific time somehow solved the problem
for the parties, leaving the contractor paid and the consumer content
with the work and delighted with DCA (spontaneously: "I am very
happy about this office of Consumer Affairs and I hope it stays in
business a long time"). Sendyka's criticism of the job did not seem
to figure into the final settlement, and setting a schedule for the
job to be done seemed to be what both parties always wanted. But
the consumer insists that the work was done only because of DCA's
intervention, demonstrating that the interposition of neutral offi-
cials who merely state the obvious and provide a forum for the par-
ties to reach a new understanding and "!make it official" may be a
critical step in settling disputes.
L91 involved a $6500 contract signed in November 1977 cover-
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ing assorted home improvements and painting. The consumer com-
plained to DCA's Brooklyn field office on July 17, 1978 that the
improvements were not completed and the paint job was shabby.
Following unsuccessful efforts by the Brooklyn field office to
resolve the complaint, an L letter was sent out August 14. The
contractor replied on August 21 that his men had been to the job
often between April and June and that all work had been satis-
factorily completed. Harold Goodman called the consumer August
25 to request an itemized list of problems, and the consumer re-
plied on September 2 with a catalog of 13 items broken and not
repaired, improperly installed, or not done at all, plus 8 paint
job defects. A hearing was accordingly held on October 30, at
which a special inspection was of course ordered. At the inspec-
tion on December 5, the contractor agreed to make 9 repairs with-
in sixty days, weather permitting, and the parties agreed to
settle on 3 more items. While the hearing was reset as a matter
of course for January 17, 1979, the consumer called the Calendar
Division on January 3 to inform them that the contractor had
started work and to request that the matter therefore be adjourn-
ed indefinitely. The settlement was therefore achieved, if not
by Sendyka, at least in his presence, with his status as an ex-
pert, objective official serving at least as a catalyst, and
without any further DCA input. Unfortunately, it did not close
the case: by July 11, the second time I spoke with the consumer,
the contractor had just completed the non-paint items, but was
refusing to repaint, and the consumer told me he was writing to
reopen the case, his house being "a total disaster".
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The consumer in D5 complained in December 1977 that the con-
tractor had not done an adequate job insulating their walls. A
special inspection was ordered at a hearing in April 1978, but was
not done until August 29. At the inspection Sendyka opened up
walls and indicated where insulation needed to be added. Most of
the required work, with the exception of one wall, was done in the
following week. At another hearing on September 29 the contractor
agreed to complete the work by October 11; the consumer complained
on November 11 that it had not been done; the contractor insisted
on November 19 that he would be glad to do it and was awaiting the
consumer's call; a copy of the contractor's letter was sent the
consumer on November 28, and nothing further appeared in the file.
My call to the consumer on April 16, 1979 revealed that the work
had still not been done and that the consumers were upset because
they could not install siding until it was done, but that they had
no specific plans to do anything about it. For some reason, a
rather gentle tap produced most of the necessary repairs, while a
formal order embodying an agreement reached at a hearing, and some
follow-up correspondence, has not gotten the job finished. Per-
haps the parties had such difficulty communicating with each other
that only the presence of a third party on the scene saying "do
this and that" could produce a breakthrough, but once a misunder-
standing developed with respect to carrying out his instructions
one or both parties could not overcome his reluctance to deal di-
rectly with the other even to the extent of arranging for an order
issued from DCA headquarters to be carried out. That this may be
the explanation is suggested by a demand I heard frequently from
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consumers during settlement negotiations at DCA hearings: "I
could go along so long as I don't have to deal with him again."
Cunningham's response is usually, "You don't have to -- call me
if there is any problem, and I will deal with him." This leaves
both parties satisfied, at least for the moment. But it does re-
flect the extreme difficulty many consumers have in dealing direct-
ly with contractors iWho they feel have wronged them, and suggests
to me that some of them would prefer to leave a job unfinished,
even at considerable inconvenience to themselves, if the alterna-
tive involves, as it did in this case (which had been decided by
another hearing officer) their taking the initiative to resume
contact with the contractor.
H19 involved a consumer who perhaps expected too much. She
hired a young contractor just starting out to build her her dream
kitchen for $6500. With this much at stake she watched the job
closely as it progressed, exasperating herself and the contractor
in the process. By the time of the hearing she had compiled a list
of minor defects (most of which were confirmed by Sendyka when he
later did a special inspection), all of which the contractor would
probably have fixed without a hearing but for his realistic fear
that the carping would continue indefinitely, the reality having
somehow fallen short of her dream. Cunningham told the parties
at the end of the hearing, "Don't do anything until you get my de-
cision", and ordered the inspection the next day. The inspection
was done two weeks later, with the contractor agreeing to do the
work within 30 days. The adjourned hearing kept being reset at the
parties' request until two months after the inspection, at which
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point DCA was notified that another agreement was reached that the
work would be completed within two weeks. The essential remedy in
this case is the special inspection report, since it gives the con-
tractor, who was willing to finish the job but afraid that it would
never end, a finite task that would be recognized by the relevant
government officials and therefore probably (if reluctantly) by the
consumer as "finishing the job".
In H3 the contractor had installed a storm door and replace-
ment windows. The door hinge came off the jamb in a wind, and wind
was also coming through the windows. The consumer arrived at the
hearing with photographs of the door, insisting on a new jamb, but
agreed to the contractor's offer to put wood putty in the existing
one. He also offered to recaulk the windows, but since she thought
more than that was necessary a special inspection was ordered to
determine what needed to be done. At the inspection Sendyka agreed
with the contractor, the work was done on the spot, and the consumer
signed a note agreeing that all necessary repairs had been made.
H8 involved a window and siding contract. The consumer com-
plained to DCA early in 1978 that rain was coming through the win-
dows. At a special inspection in July the contractor recapped the
windows and drilled weep holes. This helped, but heavy, windy rains
still left the floor soaked. At the hearing I attended in March,
1979 the consumer complained that the manufacturer and the contrac-
tor keep passing the buck between them, and mentioned that since
her grandson was dying and her son going insane, she did not need
this. Cunningham had no difficulty arranging with the contractor
that he should set up a date with the consumer, the manufacturer,
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and Sendyka for all of them to be at the house, to try a hose on
the outside of the windows, and then "to scratch your heads to
determine the source of the leaks and fix them." Both parties
left the hearing very satisfied with this arrangement. While I
have not been able to locate the file since to check that it
worked out, the contractor has shown good faith and a willingness
to spend money to correct complaints in other cases, and doubtless
did the same here.
In H32 the contractor had installed two wooden doors for
$950; the lamination was now separating on both. The contractor,
on his supplier's advice, offered to varnish the doors, but the
consumer insisted she had already done that, twice, and really
needed two new, good doors. The contractor, a young Italian immi-
grant, was troubled at the prospect of being ordered to install
new doors, since he seemed sure he would not have any recourse
against his supplier. The hearing officer ordered a special in-
spection, which was held within three weeks, on May 22, 1979.
Sendyka's report: "After a rather long discussion it was decided
that the contractor would return within two weeks to make effec-
tive repairs by the following procedure: by applying glue,
sanding, staining, sanding, and finishing with a coat of varnish -
- both sides of each panel. Contractor will guarantee for three
months." The returns were not in at my last visit to DCA, but
the prospects were good that the job had been done. The settle-
ment is clearly better than any the parties could have worked out
alone, since mere varnishing would not have done the trick, the
contractor did not know what more he should do, and he was not
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willing to supply new doors, particularly when his supplier was
insisting that the present ones could be fixed. Similarly, it is
better than any specific order which any tribunal that did not have
the benefit of an expert who had seen the doors would come up with,
and probably better than an order to pay money, which the contractor
might not have been in a position to obey. What we have is the at
least potentially happy combination of an order to cure with expert
advice on how to accomplish the cure.
Finally, in H18 cracks had developed in the consumer's
driveway which the contractor had cemented. At the hearing on April
10, 1979 the parties disagreed over how many and how serious were
the cracks, but they agreed that the contractor had ignored many
phone calls from the consumer, and also agreed on the need for a
special inspection. One was ordered, and was held on April 26.
Sendyka found six hairline cracks, thus agreeing with the consumer
as to how many and with the contractor as to how serious they were.
A settlement was worked out on the spot, with the contractor agree-
ing, in exchange for not having to make repairs at present, to ex-
tend the guarantee for five years against cracks larger than a
pencil-width, or the lifting or lowering of the concrete. This is
an unusual settlement but one which seems to precisely fit the
problem. It is probably not in the consumer's interest to require
the contractor to dig up and redo her driveway at present; her real
concern is what the hairline cracks portend. The very precise
guarantee answers that concern, at least when put in the context
(as I assume it was) of Sendyka's assurances that the cracks do not
necessarily mean that the driveway is undergoing serious deteriora-
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tion.
143. In D27, which involved a $15,000 contract, it took over a
year of hassling for the consumer and DCA to get the contractor
to finish. The complaint was filed October 21, 1977; a notice was
sent to the parties on December 7 for a hearing on December 15; a
special inspection was held instead on December 12 (probably by a-
greement between the parties, with the concurrence of someone in
Calendar Division) at which 17 deficiencies were identified. As
often happens, the contractor promised at the inspection to correct
the problems, apparently obviating the need for a hearing. As also
frequently happens, the contractor did not do all of the agreed-upon
work, and a hearing was held on August 2, 1978, at which it was
agreed that 10 items had been done, one should be withdrawn, and the
contractor would do the remaining 5. The contractor had done only
one of these by the second hearing on November 15. At the hearing
one more item was withdrawn and the parties agreed that the four re-
maining items, all minor, would be completed in Mr. Sendyka's pres-
ence. By that point that consumer had (he told me) been threatened
by the contractor and had gone to the D.A. to tell him whom to look
for if anything happened to the consumer. He continued, "Thank God
for the Department of Consumer Affairs, without them I would have
lost. Otherwise, we would have shot each other." What the DCA had
offered was an expert fact-finder (Sendyka), a credible threat of
sanctions (through the quasi-disciplinary hearings), and an on-the-
spot umpire for the final stages of performance (Sendyka again, in an
unorthodox but not unfitting role).
D30 involved a new bay window. The consumer complained on
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March 29, 1978 to the New York Attorney General's Consumer Protec-
tion Division that the window was never properly installed; the AG's
office immediately forwarded the case, as it always does at least in
home improvement cases, to DCA with a form letter saying "this is
within your jurisdiction". The contractor responded to the L letter
by explaining that he was sure it was a manufacturing problem and
was awaiting the manufacturer's inspection and report. The manu-
facturer's representative did not help the contractor's case, his
report being that the installation was definitely incorrect and
would have to be redone. The contractor stuck to his position, so
Goodman sent Sendyka to inspect on August 22. Sendyka agreed with
the consumer and the manufacturer, and a hearing was scheduled for
September 28. The hearing was adjourned at the consumer's request
to October 17, when the contractor did not appear. Calendar Divi-
sion on November 3 accepted his explanation that he never received
notice of the hearing, and it was rescheduled for November 29. The
hearing resulted in an order on December 26 that the contractor in-
stall a new window within 30 days (the usual time period allowed in
such DCA orders). The consumer wrote to DCA on January 30, 1979
that the contractor had neither installed the window nor spoken with
him about it. Deputy Commissioner White called the contractor on
February 20 and was assured work would start shortly; he relayed
that information to the consumer in a letter on February 21, adding,
"Tell us if he does not and we will suspend his license." The con-
sumer duly notified him on March 12 that nothing had been done, and
White wrote a letter to the contractor that his license was suspend-
ed effective March 25, 1979, and until the window was installed.
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The contractor called Commissioner White on March 25 and spoke
with the Director of Adjudication telling her that the window was
then being installed. When the consumer confirmed this, the sus-
pension was cancelled. The process had taken a full year, but it
was effective.
144. In H6, the consumer was told by two other contractors that
the windows that were installed under a November 1977 contract were
too small. A hearing on September 11, 1978 resulted in a special
inspection on October 23, at which Sendyka concluded that the win-
dows simply needed caulking. The caulking was done soon thereafter.
The consumer was not mollified, but continued to believe the windows
to be defective. At a hearing on January 23, 1979 the contractor
offered to install 13 storm windows at "cost" ($30/window); the con-
sumer reluctantly agreed to consider the offer. On reflection, her
conclusions were that the offer was outrageous and that DCA was in-
competent and prejudiced in favor of contractors. She communicated
these conclusions to her Congressman who wrote Commissioner Ratner
that a consumer protection agency should not treat a wronged consumer
so badly. The settlement having been refused, the hearing was recon-
vened on March 20. The consumer was highly intelligent, articulate,
and deeply convinced that she had been wronged, and would not agree
to any settlement other than replacing the windows (which of course
was not offered). The hearing officer spent much of the hearing
expressing his anger at her for going over his and the Department's
head, rather than giving her 30 days to produce her witnesses (as
Cunningham does in similar situations). His decision was to order
a second special inspection, which took place April 9 and resulted
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in Sendyka's reaffirming his earlier determination that the in-
stallation was correctly done. The case was dismissed on May 23.
145. In H11/llA the consumer complained that a siding job done
in August 1974 was leaking and that part of the siding had fallen
off. The consumer alleged that he had received a verbal 20 year
guarantee; the contractor responded that he only gives one year
(written) guarantees. The consumer, a city employee, was a mem-
ber of his union's pre-paid legal services plan and was represented
by an attorney (the only other consumer represented by an attorney
at a DCA hearing I attended was a well-to-do lady who owned a co-op
apartment in Manhattan). After the first hearing, on March 26,
1979, a special inspection was ordered. Sendyka did the inspection
in May. His report concluded that there were four minor problems
with the present condition of the siding, but that none of them
could have caused the leak of which the consumer was complaining.
As to that, he opined that the leak may be due to a problem he
found on a part of the wall above the siding. At the adjourned
hearing on June 20 the consumer's attorney now insisted that the
contractor was responsible for all existing problems because his
work was never completed and the warranty period therefore never
started running. Her theory was predicated on the fact that, though
the contractor had returned 10 to 12 times to correct various prob-
lems and to try to find and plug the leak, since the leak was never
effectively stopped the job was never complete. Contractor: "We've
been coming back to try to stop a leak we have no responsibility for --
it comes from above our siding, as Sendyka's report indicates."
Consumer: "I don't agree the leak is coming from above."
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Cunningham: "You can always get your own expert." Consumer: "No,
I'll go along with the report." His attorney then tried to cushion
that concession by emphasizing that Sendyka had merely concluded
that the leak may be due to the problem he found above the siding,
leaving room for the consumer's theory that the siding was at fault;
however, it was clear that his theory plus her arguments were no sub-
stitutes for the evidence she was missing, and her cross-examination
of Sendyka did not extract anything helpful either. The consumer
lost.
146. In D19 a $7935 contract for a new roof and for aluminum siding
was signed on November 22, 1977. On December 9 the consumer complain-
ed to DCA, seeking to cancel the contract prospectively; the file
does not indicate what happened with this complaint, except that the
work proceeded. On June 27, 1978 the consumer wrote DCA that the
work had been done, the roof leaked, the contractor patched it in 35
placed, but it still leaks. At a hearing on August 15 the hearing
officer ordered a special inspection. At the inspection on September
5 Sendyka, the special inspector, found that more patches were needed,
and the contractor promised to do them within two weeks. Sendyka re-
scheduled the hearing for October 18. The contractor's request that
the hearing be adjourned pending a reinspection was granted, and an-
other special inspection was done on October 23. Sendyka found no
further problems with the roofing, but five problems with the siding,
which the contractor was in the process of correcting. The adjourned
hearing was held on November 8. The consumer presented photographs
of the roof showing a roof thoroughly criss-crossed by large patches.
DCA's decision on November 21 was that the patching detracted from
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its being a "new roof" within the meaning of the contract, even
though it had ceased to leak, that the relevance of the patched-
up appearance is that if the consumer wanted to sell the house she
would not be able to realize the full value of having a new roof,
and ordered the contractor "to install a new roof on the premises
in a workmanlike manner with careful attention to be paid to the
finished appearance." On November 24 the contractor wrote to Deputy
Commissioner White that he was taken aback by the DCA decision since
even Sendyka had testified at the hearing that a new roof was not
needed, and requested White to listen to the tape. On December 11
White wrote to the contractor that he reviewed the record and that
it was his determination to let the decision stand as it is. "It is
the opinion of this Department that the roof which you initially
installed required too much follow-up servicing and patching. When
consumers purchase a new roof, they are entitled to a job where
quality of workmanship does not require as much patch-work repair
as this particular job demanded. I am sorry you are dissatisfied
with our decision." Somewhat surprisingly, without further prodding
or Article 78 proceedings the contractor agreed on January 4, 1979
to install the new roof, requested an extension until the spring to
do the work (which was granted) and actually did it on April 24, 1979.
The remedy in this case is extraordinary, not because it re-
quires the contractor to redo part of a job which he botched, but
because it does so in a situation in which the contractor had (at
least by the time of the final hearing) already repaired the job in
a way which a disinterested expert (like Sendyka!) might think think
adequate. The roof could not be seen from the ground and was now
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water-tight; the repairs were not elegant, but they were not con-
spicuous and they worked. If one assumes that the purpose of a
good roofing job is to keep the water out while not embarrassing
the homeowner with her neighbors, this one makes it. The analysis
implicit in this decision is subtler. The purpose just stated might
be appropriate in the case of a "roof repair" contract, or even an
inexpensive or moderately-priced contract for a "new roof". But the
case here is analogous to that of the consumers who purchased Cadil-
lacs in 1977 and received "Cadillacs" with Oldsmobile engines. The
engines were of course inconspicuous, and they may even have worked
as well as genuine Cadillac engines. But they left the consumers,
who had been convincedby Cadillac advertising that Cadillac engines
were better, feeling gypped and insecure, and by the same token re-
duced the cars' trade-in value. In D19 the consumer had apparently
paid enough for a "Cadillac" roof, and certainly more than one
should pay for a "jalopy-roof", and was therefore entitled to a
generous interpretation of the phrase "new roof" to include all of
the values a new roof provides, including security from worries
about the need for constant repairs, and resale value. DCA's ulti-
mate decision was therefore appropriate, representing a fair inter-
pretation of the contract and one that a sophisticated court would
probably adopt if the case were properly presented to it. It is,
however, a courageous decision, in that it departs from conventional
analyses and therefore from safe bureaucratic routines.
147. Four cases, two against the same contractor, illustrate how
these sanctions operate. D33 is an example of the consumer receiving
satisfaction after DCA bared its teeth, but without any decision
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having been reached on the merits. The $960 contract in October
1977 for the installation of aluminum gutters and soffits was in-
complete when the consumer complained in June 1978. A hearing was
scheduled for September 15 on the consumer's complaint, but the
contractor neither appeared nor contacted the Calendar Division
with an excuse. His license was therefore suspended on October 16,
and a hearing scheduled for November 21 on the issue of why he did
not appear. The contractor did appear at that hearing and pleaded
"more important business"-as his excuse for not showing up at the
earlier hearing. DCA fined him $100 on December 5 and ordered the
suspension continued until he paid the fine, at which point the
hearing on the original complaint was to be reset. This was appar-
ently sufficient to bring the contractor to heel, since he paid the
fine on December 26 and told DCA that he had resolved the complaint.
The Calendar Division called the consumer on January 30, 1979, con-
firmed the resolution, cancelled the reset hearing which had been
scheduled for January 31, and closed the case.
D7/D31 involved a complaint filed April 24, 1978 that floor
tiles had been improperly installed. The contractor responded to
the L letter with a note admitting that this had occurred, and a
(presumably unnecessary) special inspection on May 8 confirmed that.
Despite the unanimity on the facts nothing was done for the consumer,
and the contractor failed to appear at a hearing on July 20. His
license was suspended for failure to appear, and when he appeared at
a disciplinary hearing on September 11 the suspension was rescinded
conditioned on his paying a $100 fine, which he did. Both consumer
and contractor then appeared at a November 8 hearing which resulted
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in an order on December 26 that he redo the tile floor at no cost
to the consumer within 30 days. When the contractor had not com-
plied by February 16, 1979, Deputy Commissioner White wrote him
that his license would be revoked if the work were not done within
two weeks. When the consumer wrote White on March 15 that nothing
had been done and that the contractor was still in business, White
revoked his license as of April 12. The contractor brought his li-
cense into DCA on April 16 (as he was instructed to do in the revo-
cation notice), informing DCA that he no longer works as a contrac-
tor, but only builds cabinets.
On May 9 Shelley Sherman (who had by this point taken over
White's responsibilities in this area) wrote to the consumer that
the contractor had told her that he had been robbed and was now out
of business, but that he would, "as good public relations", do the
labor if the consumer would provide the tiles. By May 24 the con-
tractor must have reconsidered his decision to go out of the home
improvement business, since Sherman wrote to him (copy to consumer)
that DCA was authorizing him to complete the repairs, and that if
they were done to the consumer's satisfaction within two weeks his
revocation may be rescinded. On July 13 she wrote to the consumer:
"Please advise within 10 days of the results of your complaint. If
we do not hear from you we will assume the complaint has been re-
solved." While nothing more appeared in the file as of mid-August,
when I called the consumer on September 15 he told me that the work
had been done to his satisfaction two or three months previously,
and that his son had written DCA telling them of this.
The two cases against a single contractor are L92 and H28.
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At the beginning the matter in L92 looked simple enough. Everything
had been done promptly on a $681 contract except for "capping" around
the entrance door, an item which later turned out, was worth about
$55. The contractor responded promptly to the L letter, stating that
the contract was completed, that the complaint was not in the con-
tract, and that DCA should send an inspector to compare the contract
and the work done. The consumer was rather surprised at getting a
copy of this reply and called Harold Goodman, at whose suggestion
she wrote the contractor (copy to DCA) that the contract stated
clearly, "will cap around entrance door", and that she would request
a hearing if the job was not done within 48 hours. Two days later,
on August 25, she arrived at Goodman's office with the information
that the capping had not been done. A special inspection was
arranged for October 3. The contractor did not appear at the in-
spection, as was his right. Sendyka duly reported that the capping
was clearly in the contract and had not been done; a copy of his re-
port was sent to both parties. The contractor still did not do the
capping, and also did not appear as ordered for the subsequent
hearing on November 22.
At this point the facts in H28 must be set out. As in L92,
nothing much was at stake. The consumer had complained that some
of the screens he had installed did not fit and that the trim
around her front doorway was coming loose. The contractor also
failed to attend a hearing on this case in November, 1978. His
failure to appear in the two cases resulted in a suspension hearing
on December 19 at which he did appear and claimed that he had called
for an adjournment before the November 22 hearing in L92; but since
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he had no excuse for missing the hearing in H28, he was fined $50.
The contractor finally attended hearings on the merits of the
two cases on February 15, 1979. The hearing officer ordered a
special inspection in H28 and reserved decision in L92. Several days
later the consumer in L92 wrote to Commissioner Ratner that the con-
tractor had been bragging on February 16 or 17 that "I beat that guy".
Ken Bromberg, the then Director of Adjudication, wrote back for the
Commissioner that the hearing officer had not yet decided that case
and that the contractor must have a lively imagination. The deci-
sion, issued March 23, of course ordered the contractor to cap the
door immediately, and also to pay the $50 fine previously assessed
within three days or his license would be suspended. The contractor
actually paid the fine on April 3, but did not cap the door.
Meanwhile, on March 6 at the special inspection which had been
ordered in H28 Sendyka confirmed the existence of the problems the
consumer had complained about, and the contractor promised to correct
them within ten days. He did not do the work, but instead called
the consumer on April 24 to tell her he could not get to the adjourn-
ed hearing scheduled for the following day, to beg her not to go, and
to promise her that he would do the work the following week. She did
go, he (for once true to his word) did not. When the hearing officer
assured the consumer that he would suspend the contractor's license
for his non-appearnace, she insisted that she did not want anyone
losing his license, but just wanted the job done.
It did not, however, appear that DCA would be able to oblige.
It suspended the contractor's license on May 22 for failure to comply
with the March 23 order in L92 and to appear at the April 25 hearing
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in H28. The suspension order warned him that the failure to return
his license within ten days would result in its revocation. On June
7 the license was revoked for failure to appear and for failure to
suurender his license.
The revocation finally sobered the contractor. He asked
Shelley Sherman what he would have to do to get his license back.
She told him he would have to do the work that had been ordered. An-
other hearing was held in both cases in mid-October, 1979. The con-
sumer in H28 called in to say that the work had been done; the consum-
er in L92 appeared, and the contractor handed her $55 in cash. As of
November 9, 1979, Ms. Sherman was preparing an order reinstating the
contractor's license.
148. In H3, the consumers, an elderly woman (who appeared at the
hearing with her nephew) and her 84 year old husband, paid a $400
deposit in August, 1978 toward a $1000 miscellaneous repair job. As
of the March 20, 1979 hearing nothing had been done, other than
letters sent from the contractor in November and in January apologiz-
ing for the delay and allowing them $100 off the contract price. At
the hearing the contractor insisted that he had not abandoned the con-
tract, as evidenced by these letters, and would therefore not return
the deposit. The consumer stated that she would rather have the money
back, since her husband almost had a stroke from the excitement caused
by this situation and does not want the contractor back in his house.
She would, however, agree to let him do the external work -- gutters
and leaders -- if he would set a definite date. The contractor's
response was that he could not set such a date! The hearing ended
with the nephew stating that it would be best (impliedly for his
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uncle's health) if the contractor simply returned the money.
The DCA's decision, issued May 22, was that the contractor
must return the deposit, within five days. On June 20, the head of
the Calendar Division called the consumers to see if they had gotten
their money; they had not. Since the orders in at least five other
cases were being similarly ignored by the same contractor, the six
cases were cited together as the reasons in an order of July 19 re-
voking his license. Another call to the Calendar Division on August
3 confirmed that they had not yet received their deposit. It is not
likely that they will, unless the contractor makes a deal with the
Department to comply with all outstanding orders in exchange for get-
ting his license back.
Two more of these six cases, D34/H9 and H34, found their way
into my samples. In D34/H9, the contractor had received $1600 on a
$1787 contract, had done some of the work, but had not installed an
awning or a door. The complaint was filed in July 1978 and a hearing
was first scheduled for September 6. At the contractor's urgent
request it was adjourned to September 27, and again to October 18.
At the hearing the contractor offered to figure out the value of the
work not done and to reimburse the consumer accordingly. The hear-
ing was therefore adjourned, looking forward to a prompt settlement.
It was reconvened on November 28, the contractor having offered $341
(less the $187 still owed him), and the consumer had refused because
he was paying another contractor $900 to do the work. The consumer's
daughter, who appeared at all hearings in this case in lieu of her
father who works and cannot take a day off, also brought in a $775
estimate from a third contractor, who apparently could not do the
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work himself. On December 26 DCA decided that the contractor's
reimbursement offer was implausible and internally contradictory,
that the work was worth the average of the other two estimates
($900 and $775), and that he should reimburse this amount to the
consumer, less the $187 owing (this decision was D34).
By March 20, 1979, the contractor had still not paid this,
and a hearing was held on that day to determine why (this hearing
was H4). The contractor's principal answer was that he had dealt
at the time of the contract only with the father, that in the ab-
sence of this essential party this and the prior hearings were im-
proper, that he had so protested at the first hearing and had
written a long letter to Deputy Commissioner White on March 1
making this and a number of other objections to the decision (as
indeed he had), that he was not refusing to pay, mind you, but he
just thought he had some legal rights too. On May 8 he was ordered
to pay the $650 within 30 days and to submit proof to DCA that he
had done so, or his license would be revoked. Instead of paying he
sent another letter to DCA to Commissioner White on June 18,
reiterating his objections to the original decision and requesting
reconsideration. Shelley Sherman responded on June 26 that she had
reviewed the decision and was affirming it. She followed this with
an order to him on July 5 to pay within 10 days or lose his license.
On July 12, he responded, as usual, with a letter rather than payment,
insisting he was entitled to a point-by-point rebuttal of his criti-
cisms. As was mentioned before, on July 19 his license was revoked.
Finally, H34 involved a leaky roof. The contractor guaranteed
the roof for one year, and of course ignored the consumers' com-
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plaints when the leak occurred within this period. After the
continuing leak had damaged the interior of the house, the con-
sumers paid another contractor $20 to fix the roof and $155 to
repair the extrinsic damages. They then complained to DCA seeking
reimbursement of the $175, the contractor offered them $75 to
settle, and they -- understandably but unwisely -- refused. A
hearing was scheduled for February 15, 1979 but the contractor
did not appear. The same thing happened on March 26. As a result
of these defaults he was ordered to pay a $200 fine on May 8, as
part of consolidated order dealing with several of his cases. For
some reason the case was rescheduled for June 7 even though he had
not paid the fine: surprisingly, he did appear at this hearing,
but only to contend that the case should be dismissed for lack of
evidence, the contractor who did the repairs not having appeared
to testify. He did not testify himself that the repairs were not
necessary, or that they were not done, but merely asserted, in his
usual imitation-of-a-nitpicking-lawyer fashion, that there was a
technical failure in the consumers' prima facie case. On June 26
Shelley Sherman, in her letter affirming the decision in H4/D34,
reminded the contractor that he still had to pay the $100 fine.
On June 29 the hearing officer's decision in H34 was handed down,
ordering him to pay the $175 within 10 days because the job had
been "guaranteed for one year and the contractor failed to abide
by the guarantee, causing the consumer extra expense." The hear-
ing officer did not deal with the contractor's technical failure-
of-proof argument, doubtless because there is no evidentiary rule
precluding consumers from testifying about the qualitative damage
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done to their property, and the cost to them of that damage is
sufficiently established by their testimony that they paid that
much to repair it, buttressed by a paid bill. But the contractor
as usual acted as if he could render the hearing officer's decision
void simply by asserting it was incorrect, and wrote back to the
hearing officer on July 12 that he should please dismiss the case
because it was not proven. To reiterate, DCA's response to this,
and to the contractor's shenanigans in the five other cases, was
to revoke his license as of July 19, 1979.
I have not checked on the progress of these cases since
October, 1979. It is conceivable that this contractor may, like
those in Note 147, at some point conclude that it is in his interest
to settle the outstanding cases in order to regain his license.
149. As I discussed in section II.C., II.D., and IV.C., above, DCA
has very little leverage over non-licensees. The cases noted in
this paragraph, however, all involve licensees and ex-licensees.
The following case illustrates the problems DCA runs into
even when it makes an all-out effort against a large-scale offender.
In L-NL82 the consumer complained that the contractor had improperly
installed aluminum siding in April, 1976, so that water leaking
around it was causing delamination. Since the contractor's license
had been suspended in December, 1977 for failure to carry out two
earlier settlements, Goodman sent out an NL letter on August 14.
The file was then sent to the Advocate's Office, which was in the
process of negotiating with the contractor who was seeking clearance
for license renewal. This case, it turned out, was one of twelve
unresolved complaints against the contractor; he had also failed to
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carry out five (not two) settlements, had never complied in any
respect with the three day cancellation provisions, had never
stated on his contracts that he would provide the consumer with a
Certificate of Workmen's Compensation Insurance or that he would
purchase all necessary construction permits, as required by the
Home Improvement Business Law, nor did he carry out his duty to
secure the necessary permits. The attorney in the Advocate's
Office who was handling the negotiations spoke with the consumer
in December, 1978, telling her that DCA would do its best to try
to get her some relief but that there was little hope since the
contractor was out of business. However, on April 3,1979 DCA
obtained from the contractor a formal "Assurance of Discontinuance"
which the attorney had drafted. In this Assurance he admitted on
behalf of his corporation to having violated "section B32-358.0.1
of the Administrative Code by abandoning and wilfully failing to
perform, without justification, home improvement contracts under-
taken by it", to having violated section B32-357.0.3 "in that the
business transactions of Applicant have been and are marked by a
practice of failure to timely perform or complete its home improve-
ment contracts", and to the various defaults and violations men-
tioned above. He then agreed to comply within three months with
the terms of the settlement orders previously issued in four cases,
and to "resolve to the consumer's satisfaction" the complaints of
six more consumers, including L-NL82. Should he fail to satisfy
these consumers, he agreed to binding arbitration before a DCA
hearing officer, or if the consumer prefers an ordinary DCA hearing
(thus preserving her option to go to court if she is unhappy with
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the decision), he agreed to abide by the decision of the hearing
officer. In either case he agreed to pay DCA a $250 fine if the
hearing officer determines that he was at fault in the matter.
Finally, he agreed to comply in the future with all applicable
laws and regulations, and to pay DCA a $1000 fine. DCA, for its
part, did not explicitly promise to renew his license, but the
concluding statement in the Assurance:
CONDITIONS OF LICENSE RENEWAL
23. Before the Department of Consumer Affairs renews
Applicant's license, Applicant will
(a) Resolve all outstanding complaints against it;
(b) Pay $150.00 of the $1000.00 fine owed to the Depart-
ment; and
(c) Satisfy all Small Claims Court judgments against it.
24. Each and every separate Paragraph in the Assurance
is a material factor in the Department's decision on
whether to renew Assurer's license.
when combined with the DCA attorney's acceptance "for Bruce C.
Ratner as Commissioner of the Department of Consumer Affairs of the
City of New York" may be interpreted as an implicit promise to do
so if all conditions are met.
In any event, they were not met. When on July 9, a little
more than three months after the agreement was signed, I called the
consumer to find out whether the work was done (as was my wont), she
expressed complete ignorance about the Assurance, telling me she had
not heard from DCA since December, and had not heard from the con-
tractor since long before that. I told her about the Assurance,
and suggested that she contact the DCA attorney who was handling the
case. Five weeks later, on August 16, I discovered that the consum-
er's ignorance was not a result of DCA oversight. The DCA attorney
in question told me that DCA had received an irate letter from the
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consumer as a result of my phone call, that the consumer had
purposely not been told about the Assurance to avoid getting her
hopes up, that they had never believed that the contractor was
willing or perhaps even able to satisfy all of the complaints
within three months (or perhaps at all), and that their under-
standing was that he had by this time done some work on some of
the jobs, though not on this consumer's. The decision not to in-
form the consumers was also based on the belief that so long as
the contractor wants his license he will keep chipping away at
his obligations, and might eventually complete them, whereas if
he were confronted with several consumers bringing arbitration
proceedings he might just run for cover, leaving all his consumers
at best with unenforceable awards against a bankrupt corporation.
The latter scenario is quite plausible, since the contractor's only
personal obligation (as opposed to his corporation's obligations,
which are enforceable only against the property -- if any -- of the
corporation) under the Assurance was to immediately deliver (on
pain of $100/day penalty) his suspended license to the Department
if it was revoked pursuant to a provision in the Assurance pro-
viding for automatic forfeiture if he fails to comply within 15
days with any adverse arbitration or ordinary DCA hearing decision
which might be issued under the terms of the Assurance.
DCA's strategy here may have been the best available one,
but it raises two problems. First, why bother drafting strict
remedial provisions if the beneficiaries are not to be informed of
them? Second, might not a public agency have an obligation to in-
form consumers that they have become third party beneficiaries of
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a contract giving them a new set of legally enforceable (at least
in principle) rights? But all strategies generally available to
public consumer advocacy agencies for obtaining redress from
contractors of doubtful honesty are bedevilled with similar
problems. They typically do business under a corporate name which
they can abandon to bankruptcy if significant judgments are ob-
tained against it. While techniques are in principle available
for "piercing the corporate veil", they are ponderous to invoke
and hence rarely used. Where licensing is required, as in New York
City, an attempt may be made to keep them from getting a license in
another corporate name. Even that is difficult, however, since the
principals in a corporation may be able to find people to "front"
for them in obtaining the license, or they may be able to carry on
business without a license without an unacceptable level of official
harassment. Furthermore, at least some contractors may be willing
to move their business from one jurisdiction to another, or else
take their unscrupulous techniques from one type of business to
another, perhaps unlicensed, one. The leverage available to public
enforcement agencies in exacting redress is therefore not large,
and as in the present case is often more a matter of carrot than of
stick. Since it is galling to enforcement officials to have to
bribe offenders to do their duty, their formal positions tend to be
stern, mandatory, and uncompromising. Once they have obtained
ritual acquiescence in these positions from the offenders, however,
they must frequently work out pragmatic and non-doctrinaire modus
vivendi with the offenders if they are to obtain any actual relief
for consumers.
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150. H16 involved a storm door which did not fit right and
the screen of which did not fit at all and hence had not been
installed. The contractor had responded to the consumer's com-
plaints about this by putting him off, but his most recent such
assurance was ten months old. Yet when the consumer insisted at
the hearing that he wanted his money back rather than more assur-
ances, the contractor pleaded that they were a reputable company
and should be allowed to complete the contract. Cunningham:
"But you have a bad track record here." Contractor: "If we
haven't installed a new door by May 15 (40 days after the hear-
ing), they will get their money back." Cunningham: "Sounds
fair." Consumer: "I don't want to have to talk to him again."
Cunningham: "Talk to me if there are any problems." Consumer:
"O.K." Upshot: On June 26(!) the contractor refunded $215 of
the $275 he had received, deducting $60 for "the cost of materials."
The contractor apparently calculated correctly that the consumer
would not make a fuss over the $60, even though the settlement at
the hearing had contained no reference to any such allowance.
In L85, a siding job was done for $3000 in November, 1977;
by the following summer it was falling apart. The consumer first
went to the Better Business Bureau, which informed the consumer,
based on the contractor's representations, that his problem had
been adjusted. The consumer then presented his complaint in per-
son at the DCA office, which sent the contractor an L letter on
August 14, 1978. The contractor replied on August 18: "We re-
paired it on August 8. The consumer is still complaining about
things we fixed." A copy of this reply went to the consumer, who
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came back to the DCA office on October 5 to say that the repair
was falling apart. Goodman called the contractor, who promised
to send a repairman the next day. It does not appear whether the
repairman came, but if so this repair did not last much longer
than the earlier one, since on December 22 Goodman noted on the
file, "set for hearing". The hearing notice went out January 23,
1979; at the hearing on February 15 a special inspection was
ordered which was held March 27. Sendyka noted 11 specific prob-
lems with the job in his report on April 3, and the hearing was
reset for May 16. At the adjourned hearing, a settlement was
reached that the contractor would repair all deficiencies by June
15, and that Sendyka would reinspect thereafter. When I spoke
with the consumer July 11, he told me that the contractor had
patched some of the problems but not others, and that while Sendyka
had been there the previous day for the scheduled reinspection,
the contractor had not appeared. Presumably, this case will con-
tinue limping along at the same one-step-a-month pace until the
consumer gets tired or the contractor finally fixes it right.
151. Thus, in Dl the contractor had received $1550 for water-
proofing the consumer's house pursuant to a contract of May 9,
1973; he gave the consumer a 15-year warranty. The consumer com-
plained in October 1974 that the waterproofed brick was chipping;
the contractor responded on October 21 to the L letter of October
8, insisting that the bricks underneath his work were deterior-
ating, and that he was therefore not responsible for the problem.
A hearing was held on November 26, 1974. The record contains no
decision by the hearing officer who heard the case or by anyone
288
based on this hearing. The contractor claims in an affidavit
that the hearing officer dismissed the complaint; DCA, in verified
pleading by Deputy Commissioner Smith, asserts that no decision
was reached in that hearing because the hearing officer left the
Department. By the summer of 1976 the consumer had had the work
totally redone by another contractor, and was pressing DCA to get
her $1550 back. A hearing was held on October 20, 1976 before
another hearing officer, who concluded that holes had developed in
the waterproofing which had caused the cracking and falling away of
the brick. This hearing resulted in an order of January 11, 1977,
approved by the then Deputy Commissioner, that the contractor refund
the $1550. The contractor refused, his license was suspended, he
brought article 78 proceedings, which were settled by an agreement
removing the suspension and providing a new hearing. This hearing
was held on July 7, 1978. The contractor (who is a general con-
tractor, not specifically a waterproofer) argued that the consumer
had chosen the waterproofing material, "Kenitex", based on advertis-
ing she had read, that he had no special knowledge about it but
went along, and that his 15-year warranty applied to his workman-
ship but not to the Kenitex. The decision of October 31 reaffirmed
the restitution order on the ground that he had had the duty to as-
certain the appropriateness of Kenitex before applying it, and
therefore was responsible when it did not do the job. Although the
DCA opinion does not analyze the problem this way, this duty is
presumably part of the contractor's warranty of workmanship which
he acknowledges he made. The formal DCA order to repay issued on
November 6, 1978, the contractor brought another article 78 proceed-
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ing on November 29, the DCA (represented by the Corporation
Counsel's office) and the contractor (represented presumably by
the attorney he had hired in January 1977 to contest the earlier
restitution order) began exchanging papers in December, the case
was referred by the Supreme Court to the Appellate Division in
April, 1979, and no decision had yet been reached by August, 1979.
Thus, it is now five years since the consumer first complained,
and at least three years since she had the work redone; she has
been to at least three DCA hearings, is out $1550, and has as yet
not gotten any relief at all from this process. The contractor has
not done so well either, since he must have paid at least $1000 in
attorney's fees and related litigation costs by now, has had to
spend time with his attorney as well as at the DCA hearings, and
may yet be forced to pay the $1550 or lose his license. City
officials and attorneys have also spent substantial amounts of time
on the case. It is hard to believe that everyone involved (other
than perhaps the contractor's attorney) would not be happier now if
DCA had not misplaced the file (or whatever it did) after the Novem-
ber 1974 hearing, but had rather done its usual thing, sending the
contractor back to patch or reapply the Kenitex or, if appropriate
and necessary, to find some other eay to solve the consumer's
problem.
152. Three of these cases illustrate the problem.
.In NL55/SC30, the consumer had paid $2000 toward a $4750
kitchen renovation job and gotten $1463 worth of work before the
contractor stopped. She presented her complaint at DCA's Brooklyn
field office on June 19, 1978; when they could not get satisfaction
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for her they sent it on to the main office, which sent out an
NL letter on August 15. The contractor did not respond, and an
inspector therefore paid them a visit on August 30. They assured
him that they no longer did kitchens or any home improvement work
and that they had resolved two of the three outstanding complaints,
and were in the process of resolving the third (NL66). The process
in question involved their sending the consumer a letter that day
offering her $500 if she returns the kitchen unit they delivered.
DCA closed the case on August 31, having exhausted its processes.
The consumer then filed in Brooklyn small claims court, seeking
$1000 ( the $537 excess of payment over work done, plus $500 from
a penalty clause set out in the contract). At an inquest on Decem-
ber 11, she was awarded $1000 plus $17.60 in costs but she never
collected a penny. Her response to my telephone call inquiry:
"No, it's uncollectible. I went to the sheriff but he said he had
tried to collect on behalf of others, and that they were out of
business. Of course they're doing business under another corporate
name at the same spot -- they have been through three different
corporations. (They make cabinets and install them.) It's really
frustrating to get a judgment and then not be able to collect."
There is apparently no force presently operating in New York that
can keep them from continuing this scam, although of course any
consumer careful enough not to pay them except for work already
completed will not be burnt. But most consumers are not this defen-
sive in dealing with apparently respectable businesses, nor is it
clear that consumers should in every case resist the entreaty,
"why don't you give us something up front (or you'll have to give
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us $X up front) to pay our workmen (or suppliers)."
SC36 involved a consumer who had paid a fiber spraying
company $650 in April 1978 to repair four of her ceilings. As
soon as the job was done one ceiling fell and was replaced. By the
time of her complaint on September 18, the other three ceilings had
fallen, but the contractor had stopped answering her calls. The
contractor did not pick up the certified mail summons from the post
office so the consumer had someone serve it personally on October
27. Not surprisingly, the contractor did not appear at the hearing
on December 18, nor did he pay the resulting judgment of $600
(+ $13.40 costs). The consumer then went to the sheriff, who gave
her the assignment of locating some seizable assets. The consumer's
conclusion: "I have to do a lot of research -- the sheriff needs
to know statistics and I don't have them. I guess it's a waste of
time going to small claims court."
Finally, SC 26 really involves two separate complaints, each
for $1000 filed the same day by two neighbors against the same con-
tractor. Each one began with identical allegations: the contractor
had "installed blue stone steps and cleaned them with acid. The
very next day the steps turned brownish-green. Totally discolored.
...We want him to change the stone or pay us." The two cases were
tried before a judge on November 9, 1978, none of the parties was
represented by a lawyer, and the judge awarded each complainant
$500 plus interest and costs. And that was it. When I contacted
one of the consumers on June 13, 1979, she told me: "No, he never
paid. We went to the sheriff, who did nothing. It was up to us
to find the defendant's bank account -- how could we do that?"
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See the sources cited in Note 6 for proposals to improve
the effectiveness of small claims court collection procedures.
153. Appendix C.
154. 91 involved the same contractor whose shenanigans were
described in Note 148. The consumer complained to DCA in late 1978
about the contractor's failure to complete a job. At the same time
he filed a small claims court complaint. On January 10, 1979 the
latter resulted in a $500 judgment against the contractor, who did
not pay it. The consumer, following the sheriff's advice, then
tried to locate some assets of the contractor's corporation. This
at first did not seem like a difficult assignment, since the con-
tractor's forms listed two addresses. One address, however, turned
out to be a chemical company, and the other one a private home
(definitely not the owner's): people at both addresses reluctantly
admitted that they picked up mail for the contractor, but they both
insisted, possibly correctly, that they had no other connection with
the contractor and knew nothing about him or his operation. At this
point, a DCA hearing, which had been scheduled before the consumer
won his judgment, was held. At the hearing, on January 15, 1979,
the consumer was informed that, since his judgment debtor was a
DCA licensee, he had a right to enlist DCA's assistance in collecting
the judgment under its General Regulation 7 (Appendix C). However,
since the Regulation required that the judgment have remained unpaid
for 30 days, the consumer was told to wait the 30 days and come back
if he did not receive payment. Between that hearing and the present
one on March 20 the contractor had sent him a money order for $10
with a note explaining that he would send additional checks from
293
time to time, or if the consumer preferred he would come back and
complete the job which was the subject matter of the consumer's
small claims court action. The consumer refused the offer. At
the March 20 hearing the contractor made several defenses of his
refusal to go beyond his offer. First, he stated that his "company
is going through reorganization and refinancing." When the hearing
officer indicated interest, telling the contractor to send him the
relevant papers, the contractor realized that this tack could cost
him his license (on the theory that the reorganized company was
different from the one which had received the license) and went on
to his second point, that his lawyer told him that a payment every
once in a while is o.k. His third point was that if the sheriff
had attempted to collect, the sheriff would have agreed to a
schedule of periodic payments. The hearing officer's response to
all three points was to tell the contractor that if he did not pay
within 10 days his license would be revoked.
The contractor's response to this warning was to send DCA
a check dated March 28, made payable jointly to DCA and to the con-
sumer. DCA endorsed it and sent it on to the consumer. Unfortunate-
ly, the contractor had taken the precaution on March 14 of removing
all money from the account on which the check was drawn; when the
consumer tried to deposit it, it bounced. At the hearing officer's
suggestion the consumer then went to see a friend of the hearing
officer's at the Queens District Attorney office. This Assistant
D.A. called the contractor and instructed him to pay the $500
immediately or face prosecution. Finally someone was talking the
contractor's language, and he sent the consumer a good money order
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on April 10, 1979.
155. Thus, in L7 the consumer signed a $1250 contract on May 17,
1978 to have his kitchen cabinets refaced and a missing counter-
top installed. By the time of his complaint on July 15 to the
Nassau County Department of Consumer Affairs, he had paid $1000 and
had received everything but the counter-top. Nassau relayed the
complaint to the New York City DCA since, although the contractor's
office was in Nassau, the sole basis for their own jurisdiction
under their law is the consumer's residence, which in this case was
New York City. The contractor, however, had a New York City license
(as well as his Nassau one) as he is required to under New York's
law if he does business in the City. He was therefore sent an L
letter on August 4, and replied the next day that they were waiting
to get the counter-top from their supplier, that they had told the
consumer that, and that the consumer is withholding payment pending
receipt. As it ordinarily does, DCA sent the consumer a copy of
this reply. The consumer called Harold Goodman on August 22, and
followed up the next day with a letter, stating that he did not know
that the counter-top would be delayed until he had made his first
$500 payment. So far, nothing unusual; indeed, the case seemed ripe
for settlement, and it was indeed settled in late October or early
November by the contractor allowing him $300 off the contract price
in exchange for not having to deliver the counter-top.
But now the odd facts. The consumer explained in his com-
munications with Harold Goodman that he had pressed the panic button
on July 15, and now wanted a hearing in a hurry, because he was
picking up rumors that the owner of the company was leaving town. A
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hearing was scheduled for September 28, adjourned (supposedly so
that the contractor's attorney could be present) until October 25,
and then again (perhaps with the consumer's consent, since this is
about when the settlement occurred) to November 22, by which time
DCA had learned of the settlement and cancelled the hearing. By
the time of the first adjournment the company's owner had indeed
left town permanently, leaving behind at least 22 unsatisfied DCA
complaints in addition to L7. His former general manager, who had
not been a principal in the company, had purchased the assets of
the company (including its "goodwill" which was apparently valuable!)
and was negotiating with an attorney in the Advocate's Division of
DCA seeking some kind of accommodation which would permit him to
continue to operate the company under its original name (so much for
any notion that word-of-mouth is more important than advertising in
building a contractor's reputation). Under the settlement finally
reached in June 1979, the new owner was permitted to operate under
the original name in exchange for paying the 22 unsatisfied claimants
between 10% and 30% of the amount owed them by the original licensee.
The consumer in L7 was therefore fortunate in having come out about
even. He apparently achieved it by never paying the contractor until
he had done an equivalent amount of work.
156. In H29, as part of a larger contract, the contractor's plumber
installed a new radiator on the consumer's porch. The pipes were
exposed under the porch and froze the first winter, cracking the
radiator, freezing the porch, and killing the consumer's plants.
The hearing officer pressed the unhappy contractor to get his plumber
to repair the job, insisting that the installation was unworkmanlike
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and suggesting that the contractor tell his plumber that the
hearing officer would complain to the Board of Master Plumbers
about him if he does not make good. The contractor finally agreed,
and ended up paying the plumber $375 to install a new radiator
rather than fight with him over whether he had done it right in
the first place. But when, following the contractor's agreement to
have the radiator repaired or replaced, the consumer asked, "What
about my plants?", the hearing officer responded immediately, "That
is not our problem, but I commiserate." The theory is clear: DCA
will insist that the contractor deliver the performance he explicit-
ly or implicitly promised, including in this a level of design,
workmanship, and materials appropriate to the purposes the consumer
obviously had in mind in contracting for the job, but the consumer
will have to look elsewhere for the losses she had suffered as a
result of the contractor's not having done the job right in the
first place.
157. In SC19 the consumer complained of "leaky roof, concrete
block base leaking, missing handle on window, etc. Ruined lawn not
being able to water it." The contractor refused to accept the
certified mail summons addressed to it, probably on the mistaken
assumption that this would defeat the court's personal jurisdiction
over him. The consumer obtained a default judgment for $100 plus
$13.40 costs (there is no way to tell what proportion of this re-
flected the damaged lawn as opposed to defects in the job itself).
When the contractor received notice of the default judgment he
applied to have it set aside; his application was denied. He re-
fused to pay, but the business had money in the bank and the sheriff
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was able to collect the full judgment.
In SC24 the consumer sought $850 because of "bad workman-
ship and bad material on bathroom remodeling which resulted in
damage to the ceiling". The parties settled at the hearing on
$250. While I could not contact the consumer to confirm that she
had received the money, since the contractor was a division of a
chain of retail stores and was represented at the hearing by an
attorney, the probability is very high that it paid the judgment.
In SC37 the contractor had warranted his roofing job 10
years, and a leak had developed. The consumer filed a claim on
September 21, 1978 based on a job done in December 1977. She
sought $600 alleging that she had had to repair damage to a ceil-
ing and a walk-in closet, and that the leak was continuing. After
a hearing on October 26 at which the contractor was represented by
an attorney, the arbitrator awarded the consumer $150, plus $13.40
costs, and the consumer in fact collected. I have no way to deter-
mine the basis of this award -- the consumer's expenses in repairing
the damaged ceiling and closet, her likely expenses to repair the
leak, and/or a rough sense that she is entitled to one-quarter of
what she claimed -- much less its adequacy.
158. For example, the complaint in SC32 produced a halfway job.
The consumer had paid $1400 in May 1978 for cement work, and sued
on September 15 for $1000 alleging unsatisfactory work. The hear-
ing before an arbitrator on October 24 was dismissed by consent,
the contractor having apparently begun the process of repairing the
job. The consumer's wife told me in August, 1979 that the work was
done but it was not right. "We paid $1400, and it wasn't even worth
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$400." When I asked her what they were planning on doing about it,
she responded: "My husband doesn't want to do business with him.
He did the whole neighborhood -- some of it was o.k., some wasn't.
Maybe it's because we're Jewish." I have no way to evaluate her
suspicion, but this elderly couple's reluctance to follow up, proba-
bly motivated at least in part by a fear of reprisals, resonates
with fears I picked up in conversations with several other consumers
who had dealt with marginal contractors. These consumers, mostly
women, have picked a fight in a "legal" forum with physically power-
ful men who have been inside their houses and whose demeanors do
not necessarily suggest a commitment to resolving all disputes peace-
ably. A suggestion of a threat from the contractor was often enough
to get these consumers to "cool it" rather than pursue further legal
proceedings. Indeed, even the sudden awareness by the consumer of
her vulnerability, unprovoked by anything the contractor of his men
may have done, may have produced the same effect. Though my samples
of course did not include cases in which these fears deterred con-
sumers from bringing a formal complaint against a home improvement
contractor in the first instance, the number of such cases must be
large.
The job involved in L80 was done in July, 1978 for $700; the
leaks began again the next week. Goodman's L letter of August 14,
1978 got a reply August 29: "This has been taken care of to the con-
sumer's satisfaction -- you can check with her." The case was closed
as "resolved" August 30, with a copy of the contractor's letter going
to the consumer. The consumer shot back a letter September 2: "I
have not received any satisfaction. Someone came, observed the
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dripping, tried to fix it, failed, and left." The case was reopened
and a hearing was held October 16, at which a special inspection was
ordered. Sendyka's report of his December 5 visit stated, "Skylight
needs more flashing. Contractor will do that within 10 days, and
put cement over a small hole. Reset for 1/17/79." The reset date
in a case like this is merely precautionary, since by that date the
10 days would have passed and the contractor should have completed
the necessary work per his agreement at the special inspection. In
this case, however, the precaution proved necessary, since the con-
tractor instead of just doing the work appeared at the hearing and
promised to comply with Sendyka's report within 10 days of the hear-
ing. An order that he do so issued in due course on February 1. But
when I spoke to the consumer on April 13, she told me: "They didn't
come. I'm not going to worry about it. I'll get someone else to do
it even though I paid them $700. I'm single and I don't want to
bother these people, don't want them to come and burn my house down."
As in other instances where the consumer fears physical danger from
the contractor, such as SC32, I have no way to place the fears at a
definite point on the continuum between paranoid fantasy and clear
and present danger. But when a contractor demonstrates to a consumer
his readiness to mislead officials and to ignore their orders, he
demonstrates an absence of strong super-ego controls or fear of
sanctions. While most people of this description would nonetheless
draw the line at violence, the risk that he will not has thereby in-
creased to a point that consumers who feel vulnerable may be wise (or
at least reasonable) in giving up their right to relief in order to
reduce that risk.
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159. An example of a consumer who suffered for her ignorance of
the DCA consumer redress process is the complainant in SC34. She
was suing for the $1000 jurisdictional limit because the cement
work on her patch, steps, and walk developed serious cracks almost
immediately after it was done. The arbitrator awarded her $400
plus $13.40 costs. When I called to check if she had received the
money, she told me, "It was paid. But I thought the judgment was
asinine. The defendant admitted he was guilty and offered me $300.
I had paid more than $1000 for the job. A repairman would charge
$650 for a patch, but a patch job won't really work. It will
actually cost me $2000 since the railing came off too. I brought
photos to the hearing: the whole cement is opened up, like an
earthquake. The arbitrator is a dope."
The contractor in this case was licensed. Had the case been
brought before DCA, the contractor would most probably have been
required to redo the job -- a more satisfactory remedy from the
consumer's point of view. I therefore asked the consumer why she
had not filed a DCA complaint against the contractor rather than
going to small claims court (where she had to compromise her claim
even at the time she filed it just to get it within the jurisdic-
tional limit). Her answer: "The man was a perfect gentleman.
There had been a cement strike at the time he had done the job, so
he was probably given bad cement. So I won't complain against him.
But can I complain about the arbitrator?"
160. For the reasons discussed in the last section, see text at
notes 127 - 133, both the consumer and the contractor should nor-
mally prefer this remedy, at least on sober second thought.
301
161. An example of the utility of a damage remedy as a "fall-
back" is D6/D20. The contractor installed 20 windows in the
consumer's home in July, 1977 at a price of $3400. The installa-
tion was financed by a bank, which obtained a note from the con-
sumer and advanced most of the sale price to the contractor,
retaining part of it to protect itself against warranty claims by
the consumer (a wise precaution, as it turned out). Beginning
that fall, the consumer complained to the contractor of drafts,
and when he did not come back she enlisted the bank to call him.
When he still did not appear she filed her complaint with DCA on
February 8, 1978, asserting that all the windows were drafty. At
a hearing on March 20, a settlement was reached under which the
contractor was supposed to return and recheck all of the windows
within one week. He again did not appear, and this time the con-
sumer stopped paying her bank loan beginning with her April pay-
ment "because of her complaint", as she had a right to do. She
also complained again to DCA, which ordered the contractor's license
suspended as of June 5, 1978. This finally elicited a visit from
an employee of the contractor who, according to the consumer, looked
around, said he would be back, and never reappeared. Despairing of
any relief from the contractor, she contracted in June with another
contractor for the replacement of the eight windows in her bedrooms
at a cost of $1,140.
Meanwhile the contractor appeared at a disciplinary hearing
on June 26 at which the consumer was not present and insisted that
the consumer had refused to let him make any repairs unless he
replaced all the windows; accordingly, his license suspension was
302
lifted and a special inspection was ordered. Now the plot thickens.
Sendyka visited during the summer and concluded that none of the
original twenty windows were drafty. The hearing on the case was
rescheduled for October 18. A few days before that date the Cal-
endar Division received a call purportedly from the consumer
requesting an adjournment; they therefore called the contractor to
tell him not to appear until November 1. But the consumer appeared
promptly on October 18, insisting that she had not placed the call
to the Calendar Division and knew nothing about it! The consumer
was told to come back November 1, and both parties were notified
that the source of the mysterious phone call would be an issue at
the hearing, as well as what to do about the consumer's underlying
complaint. Meanwhile Sendyka did a second special inspection on
October 24, coming to the same conclusion about the absence of
drafts; at the inspection the contractor, perhaps sensing the wind
blowing against him, offered to insulate the 12 windows that the
consumer had not replaced. The November 1 hearing was of
course interesting. The consumer was represented by counsel from
South Bronx Legal Aid. Both parties of course disclaimed any re-
sponsibility for the phone call. The hearing officer found that
"the testimony is inconclusive, though it appears that some folly
was practiced by that side most likely to gain from an adjournment."
Lest there be any doubt who that is, he also found that the contrac-
tor had lied at the June 26 hearing when he testified that the
consumer had given him the choice of replacing all the windows or
making no repairs. But Sendyka testified firmly that there were no
drafts, despite the testimony of the daughter of the consumer that
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the draperies swayed with the wind, and the testimony of the con-
sumer that she had paid $1,140 to eliminate that problem with
respect to the eight bedroom windows. DCA was now in a quandary:
their only expert testimony was that the job was done perfectly,
but the contractor had violated his promises and had lied to them,
and had by ignoring the consumer's, the bank's, and DCA's requests
that he service the job allowed the consumer to panic and spend a
large amount of money in an attempt to rectify the perceived defect.
Their solution, embodied in an order of November 17, was to require
the contractor to correct the defect or to reimburse the consumer
for the $1,140 she spent replacing the windows on the theory that
the replacement resulted from the contractor's failure to make a
good faith effort to service, which breached an implied warranty.
An implied warranty of good faith effort to service, like
other implied warranties, derives from an analysis of precisely
what the consumer buys when she buys a particular product or ser-
vice. If, in the case of replacement windows, all she has bought
were the physical windows, there would perhaps be no warranties at
all. Obviously, she has also bought a workmanlike installation of
these windows (thereby implying a warranty), and also some protec-
tion from the maintenance problems of aging wooden windows and from
the large drafts which may come through such windows (implying
other warranties). But a fair reading of her reasonable expecta-
tions suggests still another element to her purchase -- the
security that comes from having dealt with a contractor who "stands
behind his work". Such a contractor returns when notified of a
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perceived defect and either justifies the work or corrects the
defect, and does not wait until he is threatened with credible
sanctions before so returning.
This analysis suggests that the consumer has the right to
require the contractor to attempt a "cure", relieving her of the
dilemma of either suffering with the perceived defect until some
tribunal decides what the contractor is obligated to do about it,
or else using her own money to do something about it at the risk
of not being compensated if the tribunal eventually decides that
that was the wrong thing to do. This right to cure at the consum-
er's behest would be precisely analogous to the established right
to cure, as he is clearly permitted to cure, to facilitate the
prompt and economical resolution of claims, and to relieve the
party invoking the right of the risk of suffering an unnecessary
out-of-pocket expense if she eventually loses on the merits.
One problem with DCA having invoked this implied warranty
of a good faith effort to service, this consumer's right to an
attempted cure, in DC/D20 is that no legal authority was cited for
it. Another problem is that, since the consumer's remedy was meas-
ured by the price charged in the replacement contract rather than
in the original contract, DCA went beyond its previous, self-
imposed, limitation to restitutionary remedies, in effect giving
contract damages.
Not surprisingly, on December 26, 1978 the contractor's
attorney filed an Article 78 proceeding. It was referred to the
Appellate Division on April 10, 1979, and had the makings of a
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landmark case. But in August, 1979 the contractor's attorney con-
tacted the Corporation Counsel's office, indicating a desire to
settle. The bank has apparently not paid him the remaining amount
owing on the contract, and will not do so until he either satisfied
the DCA order or prevails in a suit against the bank, in which he
would have to establish the invalidity of the consumer's claim in
order to establish his right to the withheld money. It may well
turn out to be cheaper for him to pay than to continue to litigate
the issue on the merits in the article 78 proceeding and/or the
litigation with the bank.
162. See SC11, discussed in Note 129, and D6/D20, discussed in
Note 161.
163. See note 31 and accompanying text.
164. Consumer Reports, October 1971, at 624 - 631.
165. This is not the contractors' presumed billing rate but rather
an estimate of their opportunity costs in having to spend time at
hearings, rather than at some more directly profitable pursuits.
While billable hours, considered alone, might earn them more on
average than $15, this figure is not unreasonable when all the
other time spent in running a contracting business, much of it
unfruitful, is averaged in.
166. These figures are based on the 11 cases in the small claims
court sample in which the consumer received monetary, or easily
monetizable, relief.
167. These figures are based on the average and median contract
sizes in my DCA complaints sample. Although small claims court,
unlike DCA, has a $1000 jurisdictional limit based on the size of
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the damage claimed, this is not likely to have a seriously distort-
ing effect on the comparative size of the contracts involved in the
two forums since the amount in dispute is usually a small fraction
of the total contract size.
168. In the case of employees the $15/hour figure is an estimate
(perhaps high) of the cost of their time to their employers. Since
the point of this Chapter is to demonstrate the ranges of magnitude
of the costs of these processes to consumers, contractors, and the
public, so long as the various figures chosen are applied consis-
tently and are not totally unrealistic the conclusions will not be
affected.
169. 62,463 - 3202 = 59,261 cases handled by the 44 employees in
the remaining boroughs. Assuming the same average caseload per
employee, at this rate the equivalent of 2.38 people would be
needed to handle Staten Island's small claims caseload of 3203.
Where I have had precise figures available I have stated
and used them throughout this Chapter, rather than rounding them
out to the same level of significance as the roughest approximation
I have sometimes had to use. Needless to say, the accuracy of any
particular calculation can be no better than the accuracy of the
roughest approximation which went into it. Once again, what these
calculations fairly reflect are levels of magnitude rather than
precise dollar amounts.
170. In NYPIRG's surveys of Queens small claims court claimants
in 1974 and in 1975, out of 129 respondents who explained what their
cases were about, two of the complaints involved home improvements.
Winning Isn't Everything (1976), Appendix B. This comes to 1.55%.
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While my inspection of 150 random file cards in the Manhattan small
claims clerk's office, and approximately 1050 in the Queens' small
claims clerk's office, yielded lower proportions (0.67% and 0.48%,
respectively), I did not examine the "Requests for Information" in
ambiguous cases in Manhattan or Queens as I did in Brooklyn, but
rather treated these as non-home-improvement cases. These lower
figures are therefore not as accurate as the one I developed for
Brooklyn.
171. According to Mr. John White, Assistant Chief Clerk, the
clerk's office of the Bronx small claims court is presently over-
loaded. Interview of June 22, 1979.
172. These were the weeks beginning March 19 and 26, April 2, 9,
16, and 24, May 1, and June 4, 11, and 18, 1979.
173. See for example my suggestions for improving the remedies of
both small claims courts and DCA, in sec. V.E., above.
174. See generally sec. V.E., above.
175. N.Y. City Adm. Code, sec. B32-358.0(1), in Appendix A.
176. The occupations and industries in question include dentists,
doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, psychologists, veterinarians, optom-
etrists, nurses, realtors, airlines, interstate movers, taxicab
owners, insurance companies, certified public accountants, banks
utilities, and others. This list could, of course, be expanded.
177. See e.g. Buffoleno v. Denning, 82 Misc. 2d 472, 369 N.Y.S.2d
600 (Civ. Ct., Queens Co. 1975).
178. DCA's advantage over the small claims court in this respect
is described in sec. V.D., above, and in the illustrative cases in
notes 142 through 145.
308
179. See sec. VI.A., above.
180. This follows from the fact that the agency's leverage over
the licensee is limited by the value to him of his license. That
is, if a licensee pays a $5000 agency judgment, or obeys an order
to perform $5000 worth of work, rather than lose his license, his
license must have been worth more than $5000 to him. Since licens-
ing agencies almost always have the power already to suspend or
revoke the licenses within their jurisdiction without regard to the
monetary value of these licenses, they should be permitted to issue
remedial orders enforceable by proceeding against the license so
long as they continue to follow appropriate procedures.
181. Examples of this are the cases discussed in note 122 in which
DCA applied its three-day cancellation rule to permit consumers to
obtain restitution of their deposits and rescission of the contracts.
I strongly doubt that most small claims arbitrators in New York
City are familiar with this rule, and consumers are not likely to
know about its existence where the contractor's violation consisted
of failing to mention the cancellation righftin his contract. At
DCA, on the other hand, the Home Improvement Division noted the
violations in processing the complaints, and mentioned them in the
notices of hearing. The hearing officers are also familiar with
these rules, and would have picked up the violations even had the
Home Improvement Division missed them.
182. For example, the contractors who failed to mention the con-
sumers' cancellation rights on their contracts were fined as well
as being forced to return the consumers' deposits and to rescind
their contracts.
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183. N.Y. City Adm. Code, sec. B32-357.0, Appendix A, empowers the
Commissioner to fine the licensee up to $250 or to suspend or revoke
his license where "4. The business transactions of the contractor
have been or are marked by a practice of failure to timely perform
or complete its contracts...." A disciplinary proceeding could
presumably be brought pursuant to this provision based entirely on
the records of a series of consumer redress hearings in which the
contractor's tardiness or failure to complete had been demonstrated.
I am not, however, aware of any such proceeding having been brought.
184. In any case one was available, in the form of small claims
court.
185. See the case cited in note 149, and compare the dilemma faced
by the Attorney General of the State of Washington, who agreed in
1971 to dissolve a Temporary Restraining Order he had obtained
against Glenn Turner's Dare To Be Great Pyramid Scheme, well aware
that it would then resume its fraudulent practices, in return for
obtaining $363,000 rescission for consumers who had already been
defrauded. Wexler, "Court-Ordered Consumer Arbitration", 28 The
Arbitration Journal 175 (1973). See generally E. Steele, "The
Dilemma of Consumer Fraud: Prosecute or Mediate", 61 A.B.A.J.
1230 (1975).
186. See note 185.
187. See the cases cited in notes 148 through 150.
188. See for example F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944);
W. Gellhorn, Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraint 107 ff
(1956); M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Ch. IX (1962);
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W. Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing," 44 U.Chi. L.
Rev. 6, 15-19 (1976) (hereinafter cited as "W. Gellhorn").
189. See for example T. Moore, "The Purpose of Licensing,"
4 J. Law & Econ. 93 (1961).
190. See T. Moore, op. cit.; W. Gellhorn at 13-19, and the various
authorities there cited; K. Leffler, "Physician Licensure: Compe-
tition and Monopoly in American Medicine" 21 J. Law & Econ. 165
(1978); L. Shepard, "Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental
Care," 21 J. Law , Econ. 187 (1978); B. Pashigian, "Occupational
Licensing and the Interstate Mobility of Professionals," 22 J. Law &
Econ. 1 (1979).
191. See the summary of the intellectual history of the "deregula-
tion movement" and of its principal criticisms, proposals, and
achievements, in G. Robinson, E. Gellhorn, and H. Bruff, The Admin-
istrative Process (2d Ed. 1980). Its most dramatic accomplishment
to date is the deregulation of commercial airlines, see Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
192. See W. Gellhorn at 14-16, and the authorities there cited.
193. Compare J. Cathcart and G. Graff, "Occupational Licensing:
Factoring it out,"9 Pac. L. J. 147 (1978), criticizing "(t)he
present array of experience requirements among the licensed occupa-
tions in California (as) utterly chaotic and lack(ing) an overriding
rationale," id. at 148, but suggesting that a rational scheme might
well insist upon some prior experience in the case of contractors,
id. at 156-163, especially Table B at 160.
194. See W. Gellhorn at 7-13 and 21-35, and the authorities there
cited. Gellhorn has the temerity to suggest, at 7-10, that the
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educational requirements even for doctors and lawyers may be a bit
overdrawn.
195. See W. Gellhorn at 10-13, and the authorities there cited.
196. Compare the segmentation in the health-care field criticized
by W. Gellhorn and the authorities cited at 16-17. J. Cathcart and
G. Graff, "Occupational Licensing: Factoring it Out,"9. Pac. L.J.
147, 159 lists 30 health professions, each of which has separate
licensing requirements (though physicians are permitted to range
into the areas covered by some -- but by no means all -- of the
other licenses). W. Gellhorn at 21-25 criticizes proposals for
mandatory specialty certification in the legal profession.
197. See General Regulation 7, in Appendix C.
198. N.Y. City Adm. Code, sec. B32-355.0(5).
199. 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 931.
200. N.Y. City Adm. Code, sec. B32-350.0.
201. W. Gellhorn at 20-21.
202. See Appendix B.
203. See sec. II.D., above.
204. W. Gellhorn at 26-27. Footnotes have been omitted.
205. "On Her Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer
in New York City," 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971).
206. Thus, for example, in the first quarter of 1979 there were
79 consumer redress cases in which a formal decision was written.
Of these, 28 were home improvement contractor cases, 17 were second-
hand dealer cases (most involving automobiles), 10 were garage and
parking lot cases, 9 were TV service dealer cases, 5 were locksmith
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or keymaker cases, and 5 were employment agency cases. The remain-
ing 5 cases were divided among four classes of licensees.
207. Their hearings are tape-recorded anyway (though they are
rarely transcribed or even played back).
208. This individual was eventually let go.
